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ABSTRACT 
 
The Paradox of Persuasion: Interpersonal Influence in Everyday Conversation 
 
by 
 
Lisa Pfost Argyle 
 
Political scientists have been using individuals’ self-reported efforts to try to influence 
the votes of others as one indicator of political activism for more than a half-century. 
However, in spite of this widespread use, very little is known about the motivations of 
interpersonal persuasion.   This dissertation examines why some people try to influence the 
votes of others during the course of their everyday political conversations, while others are 
content to discuss politics without trying to persuade.  Although attempts to persuade are 
often treated as a form of campaign participation with a goal of influencing the outcome of 
the election, I find that the motivations for persuasion are more internal and interpersonal 
than are the motivations for other forms of campaign involvement.  I argue that interpersonal 
persuasion should be treated as a form of discursive participation, with consequences for our 
understanding of public opinion and deliberation. 
I use three large-scale survey datasets to examine interpersonal persuasion as a distinct 
form of political participation: the 2012 American National Election Studies (Ch. 3), the 
Youth-Parent Political Socialization Panel (Ch. 4), and the 2008 National Annenberg 
Election Studies Phone Survey (Ch. 5).  Each dataset has distinct advantages in design and 
 viii 
content that allow for examination of particular features of the motivations of persuasion.  
Using a variety of statistical methods and data sources, the overall argument is that attempts 
at persuasion have relatively little to do with campaigns and elections, and much more to do 
with individual orientations towards politics and social norms about political discussion.   
In particular, I find that organizational membership and campaign mobilization efforts do 
not provide the driving force for attempts to persuade that characterize other forms of 
political activity.  Additionally, persuasive behavior does not ebb and flow in expected ways 
relative to the campaign cycle or the competitiveness of races.  Rather, internal (but not 
external) efficacy, political capital (e.g., political interest, attention to political news), and 
exposure to disagreement and attempts to persuade by other social contacts are highly 
predictive of persuasive behavior.  Persuasive behavior also declines over the life cycle, 
unlike many other forms of participation, and it is not a stepping stone to other more costly or 
time-intensive forms of participation. Therefore, persuasive behavior is equally or better 
understood within a framework of discursive participation, where it is a mechanism for 
people to develop their political identities, form political opinions, and process political 
events within the context of their social networks. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Politics describes the struggle to gain influence and power over the governance of 
society. In democratic politics, the only legitimate way to gain that power is by influencing 
the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of the citizens who are being governed.  Citizens, in turn, 
exercise their democratic authority by attempting to persuade other citizens and elected 
officials to pursue their favored course of policy.  The involvement of (at least some) 
committed citizens in the political process, through voting, donating, volunteering, or 
expressing specific opinions, is essential for the smooth functioning and representational 
legitimacy of the democratic process.   
Aside from voting, discussing politics is the most common form of political activity 
reported on the American National Election Studies (ANES).  In spite of the recent scholarly 
emphasis that has been placed on political discussion, surprisingly little research has 
considered what makes half of these political discussants attempt to influence the votes of 
others when they talk about politics.  I therefore propose a more systematic evaluation of 
persuasion as a form of political behavior in the mass public, with specific focus on the 
appropriate measurement of persuasive behavior and exploration of the psychological and 
relationship characteristics that motivate some citizens to attempt to persuade their discussion 
partners, while others take a non-persuasive approach to political discussion.   
Identifying the persuaders who shape public opinion at the interpersonal level and 
understanding their particular motivations for this unique form of participation is a prime 
goal of campaign managers and an important precursor to understanding the nature and 
movement of public opinion. Take, for example, the following story that was produced by a 
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popular NPR radio program, “This American Life,” and aired on November 2, 2012, just a 
few short days before the Presidential general election.  The segment was entitled “Red State 
Blue State” and described the state of political disagreement in American politics.  The 
following is taken from the transcript of that broadcast, where Lisa Pollak is a program host: 
Lisa Pollak: The most creative rejection of a friend's politics I heard was this-- a man 
named Drew wrote to say that he got an ultimatum from his friend, Ryan. The two 
guys are married to sisters and hang out together all the time. But if Drew votes for 
Obama, Ryan has put him on notice. There will be consequences. Drew explains. 
Drew:  “If you vote for Obama, you're cut off. You can still come over to our house and 
eat, but when I cook ribs, you can bring your own chicken breast and use the grill 
after I'm done.” And at first I thought he was just kidding around, but he's made it 
clear that he's absolutely serious. And I appealed to his wife, and she said, well, I got 
to stand with my husband. 
Lisa Pollak: Wait. He was totally serious that you couldn't eat his barbecue if you voted 
for Obama? 
Drew: Absolutely serious. 
Ryan: Yep, he's got to cook his own meat for the next four years.  I know he loves my 
barbecue so much. And I was thinking one day. You know, I've tried to explain to 
Drew why he shouldn't vote Democratic, but I can't get through to him. So now I'm 
going to do a little negative reinforcement. And if he votes for him, I'm just not 
going to let him eat here. And my wife makes salad or garlic bread or beans-- he can 
have that. He just cannot eat my meat-- my tri-tip, my ribs, my pulled pork, my 
brisket, I make a wonderful prime rib sandwich-- he can't have any of that. 
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Attempting to persuade others, as seen in the extreme example of Drew and Ryan, may 
introduce a level of disagreement that jeopardizes important interpersonal relationships while 
still having only an infinitesimal likelihood of affecting the overall outcome of the election.  
There must be additional social, psychological, or contextual factors that mitigate costs and 
provide enough intangible benefits to motivate approximately one-third of citizens to 
undertake the behavior. Taken from the perspective of a campaign manager, how much 
would it be worth to identify possible “persuaders” like Ryan and motivate them to action 
during an election?  Certainly four years of missed brisket is much more effective than 
traditional canvassing tactics. 
I. The Paradox of Persuasion 
The title of this dissertation, “The Paradox of Persuasion,” is a play on the well-known 
Paradox of Voting.  In this Downsian perspective, if citizens are economically rational then 
the costs of voting – the time and resources necessary to register, form a preference for a 
candidate, and arrive at a polling place to cast a vote – outweigh the benefits of voting – the 
miniscule probability of casting a vote that makes a decisive difference in the election 
(Downs 1957).  The paradox, then, is figuring out why so many people show up to vote even 
though the costs so clearly outweigh the benefits.  At least part of the answer comes from the 
intangible psychological benefits voters receive when they feel like they have done their 
duty, the social benefits from behaving like others in their social networks, and the receipt of 
an “I Voted” sticker. 
Applying the Downsian framework, the decision to try to persuade others about politics 
makes similarly little sense for the economically rational actor.  The costs of trying to 
persuade someone else still require the investment of time and energy to learn about the 
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candidates or issues and form an opinion, and then the time to talk with other people and try 
to persuade them to change their minds.  Additionally, there is the added risk that the attempt 
to persuade will violate social norms and introduce disagreement that strains important 
interpersonal relationships.   The benefit of persuasion relies on a string of conditional 
probabilities that almost makes the vanishingly small benefit of voting seem reasonable; 
namely: 1) the probability of successfully changing the other person’s mind, 2) the 
probability the other person then votes, and 3) the probability their vote is pivotal in 
determining the election outcome.  Social and psychological benefits are one way in which 
political scientists find resolution to the paradox of voting, but what do these benefits look 
like for persuasive behavior?  The research presented in the following chapters represents an 
attempt to understand the social and psychological benefits that may lead someone to engage 
in persuasive behavior in spite of the high potential costs and minuscule likelihood of 
influencing election outcomes.    
II. Why Persuasion? 
There are many ways in which people participate in public life.  What makes persuasion 
worthy of particular attention, above and beyond the attention that is given to other forms of 
participation?  Interpersonal persuasion is central to the democratic endeavor and, next to 
voting, is perhaps the most fundamental and widespread way that individuals express their 
preferences.  Practically speaking, understanding what motivates people to try to persuade 
others within their social networks could enhance political campaigning and mobilization 
tactics.  Political conversation is also central to the formulation and articulation of political 
attitudes and identities, and persuasion plays a crucial role in how individuals understand 
their own opinions in relation to the public will.  Persuasion has long been studied in the 
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contexts of discussion and political participation more broadly, but has rarely received direct 
exploration as a distinct and important form of engagement with the political sphere.   
Practical Campaign Tactics 
The potential worth of identifying the persuaders and how to mobilize them has not been 
lost on the private sector of market research and political campaigns.  Keller and Berry, two 
senior analysts at the market research firm RoperASW, use thousands of surveys spanning 
several decades to describe how one in ten people, the Roper-trademarked “Influential 
Americans,” are the trendsetters who form early opinions and through their recommendations 
help shape the rest of consumer behavior and public opinion (Keller and Berry 2003).  
RoperASW has been snagging clients for decades based on their promised identification of 
these Influential Americans, and other marketing firms and campaign strategists have surely 
attempted to do the same.   
RoperASW’s Influential Americans make up about 10% of the population, and are 
defined by their formal participation in politics or other civic organizations.1   Similarly, the 
2008 Obama campaign, which is often held up as a sterling example of local volunteer 
mobilization, emphasized finding individuals who had large social networks and the 
organizational resources to pull their contacts into politics (McKenna and Han 2014). Both of 
these examples demonstrate attention to a larger circle of influential citizens than is typically 
included in elite-driven explanations of public opinion (which might include elected officials, 
party leaders, organized activists, and media personalities).   
                                                 
1 Roper ASW’s Influential Americans are identified based on their reported participation 
in at least 3 (out of 12) political and civic behaviors.  It is worth noting that the use of 
political and social activists as a general gauge for public opinion is contested (Fiorina 2009). 
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However, this 10 percent is still far shy of the 30 to 40 percent of Americans who say 
they try to persuade their family, friends, or neighbors in a presidential election.  What 
accounts for the discrepancy?  Is it merely that only 10 percent of people are successful at 
their attempts, and the remainder try and fail to persuade others and so have little influence in 
politics?  While it is almost certain that many of those who try to persuade others fail at the 
attempt, I believe there is a more important theoretical difference in the conceptualization of 
“Influential Americans” as it is distinguished from active attempts to persuade others.  As 
Keller and Berry put it, the Influential Americans are “the most socially and politically active 
Americans,” who “are connected to many groups” and “because of their position in the 
community, workplace, and society, their opinions are heard by many people and influence 
decisions in others’ lives” (Keller and Berry 2003, 1).  It is not their overt attempt to 
influence others that makes these citizens influential.  Rather, Influential Americans are 
defined by their position in the social structure and their active participation in social or 
political causes.   
Campaigns and market research firms that use this approach are tapping into a segment of 
the population that is already highly active and centrally located in their social networks.  
There is no denying their importance.  However, this leaves a huge untapped resource of 
advocates (20 to 30 percent of potential voters) who are trying to persuade others about 
politics but who are not activists or civic leaders in other ways.  Perhaps this group of 
individuals provides a bridge between the 10% of activists and the other 90% of ostensibly 
less engaged citizens they are reaching out to in a typical election.  Campaign managers 
should have a clear interest in not only identifying who their likely voters are, but also who is 
likely to “go to bat” for their candidate or issue in the thousands of unobserved, private 
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political conversations occurring every moment around the country.  In spite of the many 
recent advances and often impressive scope of social influence research, such literature has 
done very little to identify what might motivate these and other individuals to take initiative 
and incur the costs (time, psychological engagement, interpersonal disharmony) in an effort 
to persuade, especially if they are not often formally engaged in political or civic affairs.   
Empirical Theory-building 
Public opinion researchers ought to be similarly interested in identifying the 
characteristics and motivations of political persuaders.  The importance of interpersonal 
influence in the development of political attitudes is an undeniable theme of public opinion 
research.  For example, Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) foundational “two-step flow” model of 
media influence recognized the essential role of citizen-to-citizen discussion in shaping 
public opinion.  However, due in large part to the difficulty of gathering appropriate 
information, the interpersonal processes that drive social and contextual influence were not 
modeled and tested by the Columbia school of scholars such as Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(Huckfeldt 2014; Weatherford 1982).  By the very nature of persuasion, the biases, 
idiosyncrasies, and objectives of this influential group are likely to reverberate through 
public opinion and into election outcomes and public policy.  For campaign managers and 
scholars alike, the identification of the distinct characteristics of this relatively large but 
under-studied segment of the population – the persuaders – and what motivates them to 
action is essential to understanding national public opinion and, in turn, voting behavior.   
Situating interpersonal persuasion as part of a dynamic process by which citizens form 
and articulate their attitudes helps develop a more nuanced perspective of public opinion that 
goes beyond aggregating poll results (Cramer 2016; Gamson 1992).  As Cramer describes it, 
 8 
“when you listen to the way people make sense of politics, they have justifications for what 
they think, and these justifications make sense to them and are steeped in their personal sense 
of who they are in the world” (2016).  Attempts to persuade are one way that people can 
articulate their justifications and develop their political consciousness and social identities.  
Understanding the mechanisms by which the development and articulation of public opinion 
occur, such as persuasion, is essential for moving beyond a thin quantitative view of public 
opinion to a more complete model public opinion that accounts for how it develops.   
Additionally, a better theoretical understanding of the nature of persuasive behavior 
would enhance scholarly modeling of other forms of political participation.  Political 
scientists have spent decades including attempts to persuade others as one form of electoral 
participation, alongside attending a rally, displaying a sign, or donating to a campaign.  This 
assumption will be directly questioned in Chapter 3, but it is worth noting that the 
participation rates of attempts to influence the votes of others dwarf those of other forms of 
campaign participation.  In the 2012 ANES, for example, 42 percent of the respondents said 
they tried to persuade someone else, versus only 4 percent who worked for a campaign and 
16 percent who displayed a sign or bumper sticker. 2   If the theory presented here is correct, 
and persuasion is a qualitatively different kind of behavior from other forms of campaign 
participation, scholars should think carefully about the decision to include it in their 
participation indexes.  Removing persuasion from the analysis may remove a major source of 
                                                 
2 In the 2012 iteration of the ANES, reported participation rates are as follows:  
Attend a meeting/rally: 5.6%   Contribute money: 12.6% 
Display a sign/button: 16.1%   Attempted to persuade others: 41.6% 
Work for a party/candidate: 4.2%   Discussed politics: 71.6% 
Voted in the Presidential Election: 79.9% 
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noise from the data and allow for a more direct and refined understanding of instrumental 
campaign behaviors.  
Aside from traditional campaign behaviors, political scientists are pushing to expand the 
scope of what is included in our understanding of political participation.  For example, 
political discussion (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009), political consumerism (Gil de 
Zuniga, Copeland, and Bimber 2014), online activism (Gil de Zuniga, Jung, and Valenzuela 
2012), and volunteering in the community (Zukin et al. 2006) have been proposed as 
essential to better understanding the shape of political participation in more recent 
generations.   However, these additional behaviors retain conceptual and statistical 
differences that prevent their full adoption into a single scale of political participation.  
Political participation cannot be understood in a unidimensional way (Dylko 2010; Zukin et 
al. 2006), and this research provides further evidence of the multidimensionality of 
participation by examining the variety of motivations that drive different types of 
participation. Through direct comparison with other forms of participation, a better 
understanding of political persuasion moves forward in developing a more robust 
understanding of a discursive dimension of participation and its relationship with traditional 
forms of campaign engagement.   
Deliberative Democracy 
Reconsidering persuasion as a distinct form of behavior within the deliberative context 
would have significant implications for deliberative scholarship. Mendelberg (2002) 
characterizes the ideal of deliberative democracy by claiming that “if it is appropriately 
empathetic, egalitarian, open-minded, and reason-centered, deliberation is expected to 
produce a variety of positive democratic outcomes” including increased tolerance, 
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engagement in civic affairs, understanding of one’s own preferences, and setting aside of 
one’s “adversarial, win-lose approach” (320).   In spite of a potential dampening effect on 
overall participation levels (Mutz 2006), both empirical scholars and democratic theorists 
contend that exposure to disagreement by tolerant, open-minded individuals improves the 
overall quality of democracy and the capacities of its citizens (Delli Carpini, Cook, and 
Jacobs 2004; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mendelberg 2002; I. M. Young 2000).   
The underlying tension, which is not explicitly addressed in these visions of deliberative 
democracy, is that the ideally “deliberative” or “tolerant” personality seems to be inherently 
at odds with the persuasive personality.  It seems impossible to reconcile the ideal of 
deliberators who approach a political discussion with an open mind and a willingness to 
consider many perspectives in the process of coming to a collective decision, with the 
persuaders who have a high degree of confidence they are right and actively try to shape 
others’ views or the outcome of the discussion.   In order to understand the extent to which 
persuaders are able to enhance or undermine deliberative democratic aims, the identity of 
persuaders and their motivations for participating in this unique way must be closely studied. 
III. Barriers to the Study of Persuasion 
The importance of persuasion in a democratic system is established in the very 
foundations of Western political thought, dating back to ancient Greece.  Aristotle’s 
formulation of the persuasive process, which he viewed as central to the political endeavor, 
consisted of three interwoven aspects: ethos (character of the speaker), pathos (emotion of 
the audience), and logos (logic or reason of the argument) (see Triadafilopoulos 1999).  
However, the body of scientific persuasion research, especially specific to the political realm, 
remains much smaller than anticipated given this theoretical weight and importance for 
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democracy.  Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody describe the study of political persuasion as having 
a “long lineage but a brief history;” they then call for the “systematic study of political 
persuasion, separate from and comparable in importance to the study of voting and public 
opinion” (Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996, 1).   
If persuasion is so fundamentally important to the democratic endeavor, why does this 
dearth of empirical research about persuasive behavior persist?  There are at least three 
reasons, including oversights due to theoretical approaches, practical empirical limitations, 
and normative ambiguity.   
Theoretical Oversights 
Research on persuasion often makes the unstated assumption that some people try to 
persuade others because there is something they want; they expect to receive some tangible, 
social, or psychological benefit from getting someone else to agree with them.  Because this 
underlying motivation is so obvious, there has been very little scholarly attention paid to the 
determinants of attempts to persuade others.  Within political science, the bulk of literature 
on political persuasion has focused on the persuasive activities of political elites, who have a 
clear vested interest in securing votes, monetary or ideological support, or preferred policy 
outcomes.  Therefore, the motivations for their behavior are easily identifiable and not a 
terrifically interesting intellectual pursuit.   
The fields of psychology and communications do study persuasion in everyday 
interactions, but they still assume that all individuals, at some point or another, will have a 
desire to persuade another individual of something.  This has resulted in a bevy of studies 
that focus on the strategy selection process undertaken by the message sender in a particular 
situation (for a review see Perloff 2008, chap. 10; see also Dillard 2004).  However, the focus 
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on the strategic details of successful persuasion has led to very little consideration of the 
initial decision of whether or not to try to persuade.  Politics is an ideal setting to study the 
decision to persuade because it is not initially apparent what benefit is received by 
individuals who try to influence the vote choice of their friends and family members that is 
not also available to those who talk about politics and do not try to persuade. 
Empirical Limitations 
Unfortunately, despite our best empirical innovations, scholars have not yet devised a 
way to be “flies on the wall” capable of unobtrusively observing political conversations as 
they occur in the course of ordinary life.  Political conversations occur in person, over the 
phone, through written correspondence, and, increasingly, online.  They happen at home, at 
work, in social gatherings, and in communities, with family members, friends, co-workers, 
acquaintances, and even strangers.  They are informal, unstructured, and private; they are 
also sometimes formal, structured, and public.  In some of these conversations, one person 
overtly and intentionally tries to change the attitudes or behaviors of the fellow discussant(s), 
in others the discussants have no such agenda.  The variety and pervasiveness of political talk 
makes it nearly impossible to directly observe in all its naturally-occurring forms, so political 
discussion researchers often observe conversation in stylized situations. 
Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody (1996) describe how a research agenda focused on 
regularities generalizable across (and usually empirically isolated from) various contexts has 
actually hindered the development of research on political persuasion precisely because 
politics is so driven by context and interaction.   For example, laboratory studies usually rely 
on random assignment of participants to never-before-seen stimuli or strangers as discussion 
partners.  Political conversation, by contrast, usually occurs within established relational 
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networks, and the nature of the relationship with the discussion partner likely leads to 
different patterns of behavior than those observed among interacting strangers.  More recent 
research has responded by attempting to observe political conversation in more real-world 
contexts.    This includes research laboratories (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014), formally 
organized deliberative bodies (Fishkin 1995; Gastil 2000), neighborhood coffee shops 
(Walsh 2004), workplace water coolers (Mansbridge 1983), moderated groups of regular 
political discussants (Cramer 2016; Gamson 1992), and town hall meetings (Karpowitz and 
Mendelberg 2014; Mansbridge 1983), among others.  Although there are many examples of 
well-designed research projects that examine political talk in a particular setting, each study 
is individually limited to one discursive context (or, at best, a few), and there remains a great 
deal of free-flowing political conversation that cannot be directly observed.   
Another approach to research on political talk and social influence persists without direct 
observation of the actual conversation, and the focus of the study is the occurrence of the 
conversation, rather than the content.  Political conversationalists are surveyed and asked to 
reflect on their usual patterns of discussion and their specific interactions with their 
discussion partners (for example Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1995; Mutz 2006; Stoker and Jennings 2008).  Survey data based on respondents’ 
recall of particular interpersonal interactions require heroic assumptions about what they are 
able to remember and willing to report.  However incomplete, though, these survey 
approaches provide the most feasible and least-invasive window for observing political 
conversations within social networks as they actually occur.   
The role of methodology in determining the questions that are asked and the way in 
which conclusions are reached, and not the other way around as researchers ideally would 
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prefer, cannot be overlooked, especially when modeling a dynamic interpersonal process like 
persuasion (Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996).  There is no obvious or uncontroversial 
method for observing political conversation, which makes persuasive behavior difficult to 
observe and identify.  These methodological obstacles have disadvantaged studies of 
persuasion relative to more easily-studied political behavioral phenomena such as voting or 
campaign donations, which can be clearly and accurately observed.   
Normative Ambiguity 
The slow growth of empirical work on the topic is at least partially the result of an 
entrenched discomfort with the moral ambiguity surrounding the negative potential of 
political persuasion.  For example, one of Hobbes’s suspicions about democratic government 
centered on its propensity to become an “aristocracy of orators,” where the best speakers are 
able to gain the upper hand in a “society of equals,” thereby undermining the whole endeavor 
(see Garsten 2006, pg. 2).  Garsten (2006) tracks the history of normative attitudes toward 
persuasion, concluding that persuasion is so poorly regarded today because of a strong 
distrust in the abilities of the average citizen to engage in reasoned rhetorical argument at the 
founding of the modern democratic nation.  Although persuasion is essential for building 
coalitions, mobilizing voters, avoiding coercive tyrannies, and achieving countless other 
democratic aims, it also has the sinister potential for populism, demagoguery, manipulation 
of the passions of the people, and other undemocratic outcomes.  Because scholars cannot 
clarify whether persuasive behavior is a good thing to encourage or a negative thing to avoid, 
they tend not to study it as a dependent variable. 
In political theory, and often based on Plato’s hesitancy towards rhetoric in public 
deliberation, most modern deliberative theorists construct a vision of democracy in which 
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logos, or dispassionate appeals to “public reason,” is the only one of Aristotle’s elements of 
persuasion that is normatively valid (Tridafilopolous 1999).  For these scholars, rational and 
reasoned public decision-making ought to be made on the internal merits of the arguments 
themselves, without being influenced by who makes the arguments or the emotional state of 
the audience when they are heard. The prioritization of logos presumes that in a deliberative 
setting speakers should lay out a set of facts, and that, by weighing the various possibilities in 
a rational and unpressured way, a majority of discussants will gravitate towards the correct 
solution, and those who do not agree will still understand and accept the eventual outcome. 
However, this strict reliance on dispassionate reason as the only acceptable form of 
rhetoric in the public sphere is one of the major criticisms of deliberative democracy in 
practice (Sanders 1997; I. M. Young 2000). Young (2000) strongly rejects the predominance 
of logos by pointing out the inequality that arises when the reliance on “lawerly” 
dispassionate and reasoned speech privileges wealthy and well-educated white males in 
political discussion and further marginalizes traditionally disadvantaged groups (women and 
minorities).  Scholars of deliberation have not yet worked out the theoretical or empirical 
implications if speakers take many approaches to the conversation, including passionate 
advocacy of a particular cause using a variety of rhetorical tools (i.e. intentional, active 
efforts at persuasion). 
There is a particularly strong hesitation regarding pathos because of the inherently non-
rational nature of emotion and the relative ease of emotional manipulation.  Ethos, although 
still secondary to the logical force of the argument, receives some regard because evaluating 
claims based on the credentials of the speaker is usually deemed a rational heuristic by which 
to make judgments.  However, the growth of political psychology and behavioral research 
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within political science has led to more serious consideration of the ethos and pathos 
elements of attitude formation and political participation, especially as psychologists and 
other scholars increasingly recognize that emotion and logic cannot be neatly separated in the 
human psyche (Lodge and Taber 2013; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000).  Significant 
research has explored how democratic citizens form attitudes, change attitudes, and evaluate 
political information and arguments.  However, even the breadth of the field of public 
opinion cannot explain what it really means for the democratic citizen to be “reasonable” or 
“rational” unless the horizon is expanded beyond information processing and opinion 
formation and renewed attention is given to the role and functioning of all aspects of 
persuasion in the democratic process.   
IV. Political Persuasion as Discursive Participation: An Overview 
Political participation is not a unidimensional concept, and studies of political 
participation encompass a huge variety of ways in which Americans engage in the public life 
of their communities, states, and nation.  There are many competing classifications of the 
dimensions of political participation, with distinctions made based on the publicness of the 
behavior, the kind of information needed to effectively engage in it, the benefits that motivate 
action, or the need for communicative skills to participate (see Dylko 2010).  Some scholars 
make distinctions between political and non-political (civic) behavior and whether the 
primary function of the behavior is to express an opinion (Zukin et al. 2006).  Although the 
present research project does not provide a comprehensive overview of the many dimensions 
of political participation, it contributes to the overall understanding of diverse forms of 
political participation by examining the relationship between persuasion and two particular 
dimensions of political participation: campaign behavior and discursive participation.     
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Canonical definitions of political participation emphasize the direct connection between 
the behavior and desired electoral or policy outcomes.  For example, Verba and Nie define 
political participation as “those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly 
aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” 
(1972, 2).  Later, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady define political participation as “activity that 
has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either by affecting the making or 
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies” (1995, 38).  In both definitions, the extrinsic, instrumental connection 
between the action and its intended effect on policy or electoral outcomes is the defining 
characteristic of political behavior.   
In practice, political participation under this definition includes activities such as 
donating money to a campaign, attending a political meeting or rally, working for a campaign 
or candidate, displaying a sign or bumper sticker, protesting, writing a letter to the editor, or 
contacting an elected official.   The first four of these items can only occur in relation to a 
particular campaign or election cycle. Likely due to the lack of formal connection to a 
specific institutionalized political process, the remaining activities are more expressive in 
nature, and their inclusion in scales of political participation varies (Zukin et al. 2006).  The 
emphasis in later chapters will be on the comparison of persuasion to the other forms of 
campaign-oriented behaviors with which it is usually scaled. I will collectively refer to these 
four items (donating money, attending a rally, working for a campaign, or displaying a 
sign/sticker) as “campaign participation,” in order to distinguish this common subset of 
activities from the full universe of potential political activities that people may engage in.   
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Given this definition of political participation, there is significant debate about whether 
talking about politics is even a form of participation at all.  Although discussion may clearly 
be about political events or topics, there is little evidence that it has the intent or the effect of 
influencing government action or electoral outcomes.  In their thorough analysis of political 
participation, Zukin et al. (2006) consider talking about politics to be a form of non-
participatory political engagement, akin to reported interest in politics or news media 
consumption.  However, talking about politics is an undeniably important way that many 
Americans come to understand and be involved with their political environment, and other 
scholars advocate the inclusion of political conversation among forms of political behavior 
(Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Mansbridge 
1999).   
A formal definition of discursive participation is provided by Jacobs, Cook, and Delli 
Carpini.  According to them, discursive participation is “the process of citizens talking, 
discussing, and deliberating with each other on public issues that affect the communities in 
which they live – from one-on-one conversations to email exchanges to more formal 
meetings” (2009, 3).3  Their definition explicitly includes attempts to persuade others as a 
type of discursive participation.   Aside from persuasion and frequency of political 
discussion, other measures of discursive participation have not been regularly asked in 
                                                 
3 Their definition of discursive participation has five principal characteristics: 1. The 
activity involves “discourse with other citizens – talking, discussing, debating, and/or 
deliberating.”  2. This interpersonal discourse is a form of participation, which has been 
understudied in previous analyses of participation.  3. “Discursive participation can include 
but is not limited to the formal institutions and public processes of civic and political life.” 
As such, it includes unplanned, private, and informal conversations between citizens, as well 
as formal, public settings such as town hall meetings. 4. Discursive participation is not 
limited to face-to-face conversation, but may include interactions over phone, email, or 
internet forums.  5. “It is focused on local, national, or international issues of public 
concern.”  
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national political surveys (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004).  Consequently, a discursive 
participation dimension is not often considered in political science research. Persuasion is 
traditionally included as a form of campaign behavior, and discussion is usually viewed as a 
measure of non-participatory engagement.  The expected motivations and implications of 
campaign participation and discursive participation differ greatly.  As the only activity that 
overlaps between the two, persuasive behavior represents an interesting puzzle in its own 
right, and a unique window into both dimensions of political participation.   
Much of the scholarship on discursive participation has emphasized either participation in 
formal deliberative bodies, or completely informal political discussion between friends, 
family members, or coworkers (although there are many exceptions).  In an increasingly 
socially-interactive online world, the political role of discursive participation is certainly 
changing, whether for better or worse remains to be seen.  A more robust understanding of 
the nature and implications of discursive participation as a dimension of political 
participation more broadly would certainly prove useful in navigating the normative and 
empirical questions facing political scientists as forms of discourse shift.  This research 
project takes a step in that direction by considering the role of social norms in motivating 
different kinds of political discourse, and thinking carefully about the political intentions and 
implications of persuasive participation.   
The overall conclusion of this research project is that persuasion would be more 
accurately understood as a form of discursive participation.  Focusing specific attention on 
persuasive behavior in this light, and on discursive participation more generally, allows for a 
more complete and satisfying understanding of public opinion as a dynamic, rather than static 
or aggregative, concept.  Furthermore, it builds understanding of how people engage with the 
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political system in the course of their everyday lives. This conclusion is reached based on a 
variety of methodological approaches.  In Chapter 2, the existing empirical research about 
persuasion and political participation generally is reviewed to generate a model of the factors 
that influence  someone’s likelihood of engaging in persuasive behavior.  Chapter 3 takes a 
statistical approach to identifying similarities and differences between persuasion and the two 
dimensions of participation, using factor analysis and machine learning techniques.  Chapter 
4 moves beyond statistical abstraction and depicts the reality of persuasion as it occurs, 
including the subject, target, and timing of persuasive endeavors.  Chapter 5 explores the 
motivations of persuasive behavior in the 2008 presidential campaign, concluding that 
persuasion lacks the instrumental electoral purposes that characterize other forms of 
campaign behavior.   Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the empirical findings 
and a discussion of the theoretical and normative implications of conceptualizing persuasion 
as discursive participation. 
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2: Theory and Measurement 
I. A Model of Persuasive Behavior 
Think for a moment about the people with whom you have political conversations.  Some 
of them (perhaps including yourself?) seem to never miss an opportunity to share and justify 
their political beliefs.  Others only reluctantly discuss controversial political topics and 
actively avoid possibly contentious direct disagreement, even though they may hold just as 
strong and informed of opinions.  What is it that motivates some political discussants to try to 
persuade others to share their opinion, while other discussants in similar circumstances talk 
about politics without overt attempts to persuade?  This chapter presents a model describing 
the kinds of individuals, social norms, and political contexts that facilitate attempts to 
persuade others.   
Three classes of explanations must be accounted for in a model of why people choose to 
engage in any form of political participation: 1) individual-level traits and dispositions, 2) 
social context, and 3) political context.    However, these factors are not isolated, and the 
relative weight or sequencing of their influence must also be accounted for.  Specifically, I 
posit that individuals have personal characteristics and intentions that create a baseline 
propensity towards participation, which is then activated or suppressed by the social norms 
and political context they encounter.  Therefore, my model begins with the most stable 
factors, the individual level traits, and then expands outward, where the actual decision to 
persuade may be triggered or suppressed by a number of social or political contextual factors.   
Briefly put, the model proceeds like this: 1) Individuals have personality traits and 
psychological orientations towards politics that predispose them towards taking persuasive 
approaches to political discussion. 2) The decision to persuade is then moderated by social 
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norms; individuals in contexts where social norms validate persuasion or confrontation as 
legitimate ways of talking about politics are more likely to act on their propensities to try to 
persuade others in their social networks. 3) The decision to persuade is also moderated by the 
political context. Strong opinions about a particular issue only lead to persuasion in contexts 
that make the attitude object (an issue or candidate) politically salient, such as elections or 
current events.  A visual depiction of this interaction is available in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Model of Persuasive Behavior 
 
 
 
 23 
In this model, individual-level traits are the primary direct motivators of persuasive 
behavior, which is important because they are also the least fungible by those who may wish 
to inspire more advocates for their cause in the general public.  However, this approach also 
recognizes that individuals do not exist in isolation, and a great deal about what they expect 
from and how they choose to engage with politics comes from the norms in their immediate 
social environment.  Furthermore, we should not forget the political in political persuasion, 
and political context can provide the tipping factor in why similarly equipped and motivated 
people make different decisions about whether or not to engage with politics in a particular 
way at a given time.   
Discursive Participation or Campaign Participation? 
The broad features and flow of this model could reasonably be applied to the decision to 
participate in any political activity.  In that case, what makes persuasion different? Why does 
it deserve specific attention?  As they say, the devil is in the details.  The main differences 
between political persuasion and other forms of behavior are the specific factors that 
motivate participation under each of these headings.  Let me provide a few examples, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.  At the individual level, socio-
economic status and demographics (race, income, and education) have a consistent, 
demonstrated impact on other forms of campaign participation, but they do not have a strong 
relationship with attempts to persuade.  Likewise, at the social level, the strong correlation 
between organizational membership and levels of both political talk and campaign 
participation does not extend to attempts to persuade others. 
Throughout this chapter, a huge variety of potential influences on persuasive behavior are 
identified, and their relationship with persuasion is compared with insights from two existing 
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literatures: discursive (or deliberative) participation, and campaign participation.  Persuasion 
has been included as one form of participation in scales of both discursive participation and 
campaign participation, and it is not immediately clear which model better describes the 
decision to talk to someone and try to show them why they should vote a particular way.   
This chapter contributes to the overall understanding of persuasive behavior specifically, and 
of political behavior more broadly, by systematically comparing the effects of theoretically 
important individual, social, and political factors on these different kinds of participation.   
There are a select few studies that evaluate persuasion as an independent phenomenon, 
and a handful more that model the different forms of participation separately.  The dearth of 
direct research on persuasion means that even where there are reported relationships, there 
has been little discussion and virtually no theory-building about attempts to persuade others 
as a distinctive form of political participation. Identifying the particular nature of influences 
on persuasive behavior, and how these compare with empirical and theoretical research on 
discursive participation and campaign participation is a significant step towards developing a 
correct theoretical understanding of what motivates interpersonal persuasion in the mass 
public.   
Political persuasion is a way in which some people engage with the political system, and 
it varies in important ways from other forms of participation.  The argument presented in 
later chapters as the data are reviewed is that persuasion is best understood as a form of 
discursive participation, but that scholarly work on discursive participation needs to pay 
more attention to the qualitative differences in approaches to political talk.  Continuing to 
model persuasion as a form of campaign behavior in an undifferentiated scale obscures 
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important insights about the motivations and implications of persuasive behavior, campaign 
participation, and deliberation.   
II. Defining Persuasion 
Before moving on to review the expected influences on persuasive behavior, it is useful 
to spend some time establishing a clear conceptual and operational definition of persuasion.  
What does it mean to define persuasion as a form of political behavior?  Intuitively, 
persuasion is about using argumentation or other communication to change the way that 
someone else thinks, believes, or behaves.4 Therefore, engaging in persuasive behavior refers 
to the effort put forth by the message sender to change the attitudes or behaviors of their 
discussion partner(s). 
Textbook definitions of persuasion (Gass and Seiter 2004; Perloff 2008) confirm that 
“pure” persuasion should preserve the free choice and awareness on the part of the person 
being persuaded (i.e., be non-coercive and non-subliminal), and involve language or other 
symbolic communications.  Furthermore, in the political context, persuasion is a social 
phenomenon, and therefore requires interpersonal interactions, not just one person’s internal 
self-dialogue.  However, there are two additional possible characteristics of the definition of 
persuasion that require more discussion.  Specifically, these are whether the message sender 
needs to have an explicit intent to persuade, and whether the persuasive attempt must be 
                                                 
4 Opinion change is often the focus of research about political persuasion, but 
modification of attitudes alone is rarely the sole objective of persuasive attempts.  Policy 
changes do not occur without the motivation of some core group, be it a small number of 
elites or a large number of citizens, to action on behalf of the idea or attitude object.  Voters 
must not only be persuaded to prefer a particular candidate, but also to show up on Election 
Day to cast their ballot.  Yet persuasion is distinct from compliance-gaining or coercion, 
which refer to changes in behavior that may not be accompanied by changes in attitudes, and 
which undermine the agency of the target (see Perloff 2008).   
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successful (i.e., actually result in a changed attitude or behavior on the part of the message 
recipient).  Attention to these two features helps to distinguish among existing research 
efforts that all use the terminology of “political persuasion” but in reality have very different 
research aims.   
Does persuasion require that the message sender has an explicit “intent to persuade?” 
Should persuasion be defined by whether attitude change actually occurred?  In practice, the 
answers to these questions are connected: approaches that emphasize identification of what 
factors successfully produce changes in the receiver’s attitude are often indifferent to the 
message sender’s intentions; meanwhile, approaches that emphasize intentionality often do 
not require success because that removes an important source of variation from the data.  
Most research in political science focuses on persuasion as an outcome, which means it 
emphasizes success but not intentionality.  Research in this tradition aims to identify what 
characteristics of a sender, message, mode of communication, or message recipient improve 
the likelihood that someone will change their attitudes (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 
2004; Petty and Cacioppo 1986). 
However, this definition is not appropriate when the goal is to explain persuasion as a 
process or behavior, as is the case in the present endeavor.  Instead of trying to determine the 
characteristics of a successful persuasive interaction, a process-based explanation of 
persuasion attempts to understand the goals, motivations, and approaches of the message 
sender, and does not limit the scope of research to only situations where the sender happens 
to be successful.  Gass and Seiter (2004) recommend reserving the term “influence” for 
interactions that successfully but unintentionally result in attitude change, and the term 
 27 
“persuasion” for the possibly unsuccessful but intentional attempts to affect attitudes (see 
also Thorson 2014).  That terminology will be used here as well. 
Identifying Persuasive Intent 
Now that we have conceptually defined persuasive behavior as an intentional attempt to 
change others’ attitudes, independent of the success of the attempt, how would one identify 
instances of persuasive behavior in practice? The relevant undertaking is to identify the 
intention of the message sender – was the sender actually trying to persuade someone else in 
a given interaction?  One of the challenges in this research is that there is no clear way to 
validate persuasive participation, as can be done with other forms of political behavior (i.e. 
using voting records or donor rolls to validate voting and monetary contributions).  In the 
absence of any validated measure of persuasive intent, there are three options: 1) ask the 
message sender, 2) ask the message recipient, and 3) make inferences as a third party 
observer.  Each of these approaches has strengths and limitations, which will be discussed in 
turn.   
The most obvious way to find out someone’s intention is to ask them about it directly.  
However, decades of research have demonstrated that individuals do not have a great 
capacity for introspection and therefore a respondent’s evaluation of their own motivational 
states may be unreliable (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Roloff 1980; Smith 1989; but see Smith 
and Miller 1978 and White 1980 for critiques; and see Engelbert and Carruthers 2010 for a 
recent review of the introspection debate).  On a more optimistic note, Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977, 256) report that knowledge of intention is one category of introspection in which 
individuals themselves may be more reliable judges than are outside observers.  Roloff 
(1980) further theorizes that the communicator’s level of awareness of communicating a 
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persuasive message may affect the quality of the presentation and resulting success, with 
more awareness and forethought leading to a higher quality presentation.5  
The key point in this discussion is that although the debate in the literature raises some 
important questions about the reliability and validity of self-reported intentionality, they do 
not argue that individuals are worse at introspection or less aware of their own motivational 
states than outside observers.  Relying only on situations in which the persuader is 
consciously aware of their intention to persuade minimizes type I errors (false positives) by 
only including instances where we can be completely sure individuals intended to persuade, 
even if it omits some cases in which people did not themselves realize or are unwilling to 
admit that what they were doing was persuasive in nature.  There is still some room for errors 
due to social desirability bias encouraging respondents to over-report their political 
involvement, but without any way to externally validate persuasive intent, it is impossible to 
measure the size, or even direction, of this bias.6 
By contrast, any measurement by outside observers, whether it is the discussion partner 
or the researcher, is going to include both type I and type II errors, as intentions may be 
inferred that did not exist, and intentional persuasion may not be recognized as such.  The 
message recipient is a natural place to turn for identification of persuasion in an interaction 
about politics.  Indeed, the recipient’s attitudes have been the focus of nearly every study of 
persuasion to date.  A very few surveys, some of which will be used in later chapters of this 
work, have also asked respondents to identify whether someone else had ever tried to 
                                                 
5 This is true up to a point; Roloff (1980) also suggests that over-practicing of a 
persuasive message, as may be seen in a door-to-door salesman, may actually decrease the 
spontaneity of the interaction and responsiveness to the situation, leading to a lower quality 
and less successful persuasive message. 
6 Overt persuasion may violate social norms and be undesirable in some social contexts. 
For example, see Gerber et al. (2012) and Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie (2014). 
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persuade them.  In existing data, there is very little follow-up on such questions, and so the 
effect of a perceived attempt to persuade on the recipient can be tested to some extent 
(Thorson 2014), but very little inference about the persuader’s characteristics or motivations 
can be made.  Again, without some external way to validate persuasive intent, the reliability 
of asking the message recipient to infer persuasive intent cannot be directly tested. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that message recipients would be exceptionally good at this 
task.  Perhaps the most sophisticated persuaders will approach the conversation in such a 
nuanced manner that the receiver would not even realize the message was persuasive in 
nature, and the resulting data would therefore be unable to distinguish someone who is not 
persuading at all from the most advanced persuaders.  Additionally, it is unlikely that many 
respondents would be able to clearly distinguish between whether someone else was trying to 
persuade them and whether they succeeded, especially in situations of ideological 
disagreement.  Although it would be very enlightening to be able to compare the motivations 
reported by the  persuader with the perceptions of the target, such data do not yet exist, and 
would be costly to gather as it would require a detailed questioning of both discussion 
partners about a specific interaction.     
Third-party classification of persuasive intent still has some methodological barriers to 
overcome, but there are some promising avenues as research methods continue to advance.  
The sheer variety of persuasive tactics that an individual might employ make developing a 
reliable classification of markers of persuasive intent for use by human coders extremely 
difficult.  Third-party human coders are also likely to be much less valid in their judgments 
than discussion partners, because they will be less sensitive to the contextual cues and 
interpersonal dynamics that serve as indicators of persuasive behavior.  Recent exciting 
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developments in machine learning and psychophysiology may help classify persuasive intent 
in an unbiased, third-party manner.  Unfortunately, neither field is presently developed 
enough to provide a reliable classification of persuasive intent for these purposes.7   
In summary, for the purposes of this research, persuasive intent is measured by asking 
individuals whether they have tried to persuade someone else.  This is not expected to be a 
perfect measure, as it is not immediately apparent how willing or able individuals are to 
accurately describe their persuasive intent, or what considerations they have in mind as they 
formulate the response.8  However, there is no evidence that asking a discussion partner to 
identify the persuader’s intent, or observing interactions as a third party would produce a 
more accurate classification.  In the absence of any reliable way to externally validate these 
responses, the best we can do is “take their word for it.”   
III. Individual Level Traits 
The next step is to summarize and evaluate what we know from existing research about 
what makes some people try to persuade others when they talk about politics.  The remainder 
                                                 
7 In particular, natural-language processing and other text-based analyses provide the 
possibility of using a computer algorithm to identify features of texts that are persuasive, and 
use those features to identify whether other texts are persuasive in nature (Biran et al. 2012; 
J. Young et al. 2011).  However, this first requires a corpus of texts that are definitely 
persuasive in nature to train the algorithm.  So either the researcher needs to have a specific 
set of texts that are indisputably persuasive on face value, in which case they are likely to be 
substantially different than the target data of possibly non-persuasive texts, or a set of texts in 
which the message sender has independently identified an intent to persuade, in which case 
we are back to self-reported intentionality.  Psychophysiology is making progress in using 
physiological responses to a scenario to infer emotional or motivational states (see 
Blascovich et al. 2011).  However, there is not yet research on the set of physiological 
markers that would identify “trying to persuade” as a particular state of mind or motivation, 
if they even exist.  Third-party inference of intent is a promising future development, but is 
not yet a viable avenue of measurement 
8 For example, we do not know whether standard question wordings about persuasive 
behavior would cue respondents to think about and report online interactions, situations 
where their discussion partner asked for their opinion, or door-to-door canvassing.   
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of this chapter aims to identify the existing body of empirical knowledge and form 
hypotheses to fill in the gaps.  There are very few direct studies of political persuasion; 
therefore, much of the following discussion relies on inferences from what we know from the 
literatures on campaign participation and deliberation.  In particular, by comparing the 
facilitating factors of persuasion with other forms of participation, we can continue to build a 
theory and testable hypotheses about whether persuasion is better understood as a form of 
campaign participation or discursive participation.  The following sections are organized 
according to the three types of influences described in the theoretical model, beginning with 
the effect of individual traits, moving to the social norms, and concluding with the contextual 
features of public discourse and elections.    
Individual-level traits are a natural starting point, as I expect them to be the most 
influential predictors of persuasive behavior.  Additionally, the majority of prior research on 
persuasion addresses individual-level factors, which makes this section the most concrete and 
empirically-grounded of the three.  However, as tempting as it is to rely solely on the 
convenience and explanatory power of individual-level traits, it is also worth noting that 
because of the social nature of political discussion, relatively stable individual-level 
characteristics will never provide as complete of an explanation for attempts to persuade as 
they do for voting.  For example, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) report that 42 percent of 
1972 persuaders repeated the activity in 1976, which is half of the rate of repetition of voting 
for the same respondents. 9  In other words, “likely persuaders” appear to be a much less 
reliable group than “likely voters.” 
                                                 
9 These high and low figures are reported for respondents to a special panel study 
conducted by ANES in 1972-1974-1976.  By contrast, 80 percent of 1972 voters repeated the 
behavior in 1976. 
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Socio-Economic Status 
Perhaps the most well-known explanation of political participation in America is 
demographics and socio-economic status.  Socio-economic status encompasses or is 
correlated with a number of individual-level traits that condition the likelihood that someone 
will participate in politics.  As a simple heuristic, political science generally demonstrates 
that white, well-educated, high-income men are the most likely to be politically active.  
Gender and race will be addressed separately in the following sections, but the expected 
influence of education and income will be explored here.   
Beginning with education, Rosenstone and Hansen report that, in raw totals, individuals 
with a college degree attempt to persuade others at approximately twice the rate as 
individuals with only a high school diploma, and income has an almost linear positive 
relationship with rates of attempted persuasion (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  In a theme 
that will be returned to later, the ability to understand political facts and events, and the skills 
to confidently express your opinion and formulate a reasoned argument, are logically 
essential resources for political persuasion, and are skills developed through formal education 
(see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Income is clearly tied to education, and may 
confer some important confidence associated with social status; but it is also not 
fundamentally necessary for attempting to persuade others to the same extent as, say, making 
a campaign donation.   
Continuing to model persuasion as a form of campaign behavior makes assumptions 
about the importance of socio-economic status and resources, but research on discursive 
participation and deliberation indicates those assumptions should be re-considered in the case 
of political persuasion. Even as relevant as education and income are in predicting other 
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forms of campaign behavior, and as prima facie related to persuasion as they seem, the 
effects of both disappear entirely after including controls for political and social capital 
(Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009, 56).10  Indeed, Neblo et al. (2010) argue that 
discursive participation may be attractive to precisely those segments of the population that 
are least inclined to participate in more traditional ways, suggesting that discursive 
participation draws on a different set of motivations and resources than other forms of 
participation.  The weak influences of income and education on persuasive behavior indicate 
that persuasive behavior is more akin to discursive participation than campaign participation.      
Race and Ethnicity 
Race and ethnicity may also influence rates of persuasion, both by introducing an 
aggregate participation gap and by influencing norms of interaction between discussants.  At 
the macro-level, we know that whites are more likely than other racial minorities to 
participate politically (Bowler and Segura 2012, chap. 6; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 
chap. 8).  Therefore, at first glance, we would expect whites to be most likely to try to 
persuade others when they talk about politics.  This is consistent with the pattern reported by 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).  However, the importance of race and ethnicity as an 
explanation declines as additional controls for social and political capital are included, and 
both Hansen (1997, 94) and Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009, 56) report very little 
racial disparity in political persuasion. While race is highly related to the way individuals 
engage with the political system (Tate 2004), once these social and psychological factors are 
accounted for, race seems to have little direct effect on persuasive behavior. 
                                                 
10 Political capital includes cognitive resources like political interest, attention, and 
information, and social capital refers to social and organizational connections.  Both of these 
are defined and addressed in more detail in following sections. 
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Part of the explanation for the unexpected irrelevance of race has to do with the micro-
level structure of social networks.  Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague point out that 
“communication networks that include both whites and blacks are relatively rare 
phenomena.”  Furthermore, “given the low rates of interaction and communication across 
racial lines, it becomes mathematically inevitable that very few whites or blacks will 
encounter disagreement over racially structured opinions and preferences” (2004, 215).  
Because interpersonal discussion across racial lines is uncommon, most discussion happens 
within, rather than across, racial groups.  Consequently, there is no reason for racial 
hierarchies to structure the nature of discourse.  Although racial disparities continue to be a 
concern for more formal deliberative settings (Sanders 1997; I. M. Young 2000), in the 
context of informal interpersonal networks it is not expected to be a substantively important 
explanation for engagement in persuasive behavior.  Application of a discursive perspective 
to the understanding of persuasive behavior helps make sense of important empirical 
differences between persuasion and other forms of campaign behavior. 
Gender 
There is a persistent gender gap in political persuasion (Atkeson and Rapoport 2003; 
Hansen 1997; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  Even as women’s participation rates have drawn even with, or 
even surpassed, men’s in voting and other forms of civic engagement, women still lag behind 
men in a variety of authoritative or overtly political activities, including persuasion (Burns, 
Schlozman, and Verba 2001; see also Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014, chap. 2).  Even as 
recently as 2012, the American National Election Studies reports a 4.4 percentage point gap 
in attempts to influence the votes of others.   Gaps in women’s discursive participation can 
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have significant implications for the content, process, and outcomes of public discourse 
(Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).  The persistence of this gender gap in persuasive 
behavior has led to a small body of research that aims to explain why women attempt to 
persuade others less frequently than men (Atkeson 2003; Cirksena 1996; Hansen 1997; 
Stokes-Brown and Neal 2008).  Indeed, these studies are among the only research projects 
that directly address political persuasion as a distinct form of behavior, and, for the most part, 
they emphasize ways that persuasion is similar to other forms of campaign behaviors.     
In an early attempt to explain the gender gap in political persuasion, Cirksena (1996) 
argues that disparities in news media use and education are the primary covariates that 
explain women’s lower reported attempts to persuade.11  However, as women’s educational 
levels have surpassed men’s, more recent studies have found that this kind of resource-based 
explanation is insufficient for explaining gaps in political or discursive participation.   
Structural causes of women’s decreased political interest, confidence, and efficacy should be 
evaluated (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). 
Specifically, women in general are less likely to have confidence in themselves, which 
applies to both their perceived competence in political matters and their willingness to take 
on authoritative leadership roles by speaking in public, women generally dislike conflict and 
competition, and women are more sensitive to maintaining positive social bonds (Karpowitz 
and Mendelberg 2014, chap. 3).  These gender role dynamics significantly impact women’s 
participation in discursive interactions with men, and can be expected to contribute to the 
gender gap in persuasive participation. 
                                                 
11 Education and political interest will be addressed separately in following subsections. 
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Age 
There is a demonstrated negative relationship between age and attempts to persuade 
others (Hansen 1997; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; McClurg 2004; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993).  This negative relationship does not persist when predicting other measures of 
discursive participation, such as face-to-face deliberation, or informal political discussion 
(Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009).  By contrast, age is positively related to voting, and 
other forms of campaign participation have curvilinear relationships that peak somewhat later 
than attempts to persuade (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 138).12  Persuasion demonstrates a 
unique relationship with age, which is not replicated in other forms of discursive or campaign 
behavior.   
Rates of persuasion have been relatively consistent for a number of decades (Putnam 
2000), only rising in a significant way since 2000 (Thorson 2014), which indicates that 
generational replacement is not responsible for the observed decline in persuasion among 
older cohorts of respondents.13  Rather, it appears that something about psychological or 
other life changes in the process of growing older decreases the individual-level motivation 
to try to persuade others.  A decline in cognitive function among the elderly has been linked 
to decreased efforts to persuade others (Burden et al. n.d.), although this is unlikely to fully 
explain the negative relationship among middle-aged respondents.  Another possibility is 
                                                 
12 According to Rosenstone and Hansen, attempts to persuade peak at 25-34 years of age, 
and decline steadily from that point.  By contrast, donating to a campaign peaks at 55-64 
years of age, before dropping off as people retire and disposable income declines  
13 However, there is some evidence of a very recent rise in persuasive behavior (Thorson 
2014), which may be attributable to generational effects due to the rise in digital media.  
Younger people are more likely to discuss politics online (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 
2009), which may lead to higher levels of persuasive behavior among younger populations in 
more recent cross-sections (but see the later section on persuasive behavior and digital 
media).   
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that, because older individuals are exposed to less disagreement (Mutz 2006), the 
prioritization of maintaining long-term relationships may generate more ideological 
similarity in discussion networks and increase aversion to disagreement.  Further research is 
necessary in this area to fully identify the mechanisms responsible for this relationship. 
Political Capital 
Political capital is an important mediator in the relationship between socio-economic 
status and political participation, including attempts to persuade others.  Jacobs, Cook, and 
Delli Carpini (2009) use “political capital” as an umbrella term for a number of factors 
related to an individual’s level of psychological and attitudinal engagement with the political 
system, including:  political efficacy, political trust, social trust, political knowledge, political 
interest, political attention, ideological strength, partisan strength, and political tolerance.  
Ideological and partisan strength will be addressed in the subsection on opinion strength, and 
political tolerance will be discussed in the subsection on opinion diversity; the remaining 
constructs will be addressed in turn here. 
Political Efficacy. Political efficacy refers to “citizens’ perceptions of powerfulness (or 
powerlessness) in the political realm” (Morrell 2003, 589). It is often divided into internal 
and external efficacy, where internal efficacy refers to the belief in one’s own capacity to be 
an effective political participant, and external efficacy refers to the belief that government 
actors and institutions respond to ordinary citizens.  However, in spite of the identification of 
reliable scales of political efficacy more than 25 years ago (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; 
Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991), there is still substantial variation in the operationalization of 
both internal and external efficacy, with many studies using survey questions that do not fit 
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well on either dimension, or failing to distinguish between the two (Morrell 2003).  As such, 
existing findings regarding the role of efficacy in motivating political persuasion are mixed. 
Cook, Jacobs, and Delli Carpini (2009) find no effect of efficacy on persuasion using a 
four item scale that did not differentiate between internal and external efficacy.  Meanwhile, 
Hansen (1997) uses the more robust four-item scale of internal efficacy recommended by 
Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991), and finds a statistically significant positive relationship 
between internal efficacy (or political self-esteem, as she terms it), and attempts to persuade.  
However, she does not include a comparable measure of external efficacy.  Internal efficacy 
has a documented and theoretically sound relationship with attempts to persuade others. To 
take the negative case, it is hard to imagine individuals who lack confidence in their own 
ability to understand complex political issues attempting to push their views on others.14  
External efficacy, by contrast, connects political activity to the instrumental purpose of 
affecting electoral outcomes or public policy.  Even though this is clearly important for 
traditional campaign behaviors, such as donating money, working for a campaign, or even 
voting, the instrumental purpose of discursive or persuasive participation is much more 
tenuous, and has not yet been adequately empirically tested. 
Political Trust. Political trust, or the belief that political actors and institutions are not 
corrupt and can be trusted to make decisions for the common good, has been declining for 
                                                 
14 Additionally, it is worth noting that most research to date is based on cross-sectional 
surveys, and so the results are correlational and unable to address the potential for 
endogeneity.  Although political efficacy is usually treated as an explanatory variable in 
models of political participation, literature on deliberation also explores the possibility that 
discursive participation enhances an individual’s political capital, including their sense of 
political efficacy (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Mutz 2008).  While the effects of 
(undifferentiated) efficacy are small and inconsistent as both a cause and an effect of 
discursive participation, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) do present evidence that 
participation in formally organized face-to-face deliberation increases efficacy and political 
capital.   
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decades and appears to be perpetually at an historic low.  There is an expectation that 
individuals who have more positive evaluations of politicians and political processes are less 
likely to become disaffected and more likely to expend their time and resources in support of 
political pursuits.  However, although the decline in trust often mirrors a decline in overall 
political participation in America, there is no evidence that political trust is causally related 
to levels of political participation (Citrin 1974; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 150).  
Proponents of deliberation also anticipate that reasoned discussion of policy alternatives and 
recognition of competing interests will restore some faith in the legitimacy of decision-
making and the merits of the political process (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009).   
Unfortunately, they are also disappointed, as political trust “shows no consistent relationship 
to our measures of discursive participation,” including two measures of persuasion (Jacobs, 
Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009, 95).  The research indicates that political trust is unlikely to be 
related to engagement in persuasive behavior, whether considered as a campaign behavior or 
a form of discursive participation. 
Social Trust. By contrast, higher levels of social trust are correlated with increased 
attempts to persuade others (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009, 96), and there is some 
evidence that discursive participation increases levels of social trust (Cook, Delli Carpini, 
and Jacobs 2007).  Alongside organizational membership (which is discussed later in this 
chapter), social trust is one component of social capital and much of the literature on social 
trust concerns its interaction with organizational membership in the development of social 
capital.  While the causal interactions between social trust and attempts to persuade others 
have not been directly examined, there is evidence that social trust is more a cause than a 
consequence of civic involvement (Jennings and Stoker 2004).  Therefore, social trust may 
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reflect an individual’s overall perception of their social environment in ways that have direct 
impacts on the decision to participate in inherently social political activities like discussion 
and persuasion. 
Political Knowledge. The importance of political information for political activism is 
unquestioned; individuals who have more information about politics are more likely to 
participate in a variety of political activities (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, chap. 6).  
Because attempting to persuade others assumes that individuals are informed enough to craft 
arguments about the topic at hand, political knowledge is expected to be positively related to 
the decision to try to persuade others.  Indeed, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009, 56) 
find a positive and statistically significant relationship between attempts to persuade others 
and political knowledge.  Interestingly, knowledge is not a significant predictor of 
engagement in non-persuasive forms of discursive participation, which suggests that actively 
promoting a position requires a higher degree of information than other, non-persuasive 
forms of political conversation.  Thorson (2014) demonstrates that individuals who try to 
persuade others have more knowledge of candidate’s policy positions and can provide more 
arguments in support of their position.  One explanation is that potential persuaders 
intentionally marshal additional arguments and information in preparation for their 
persuasive encounter.15     
One important caveat regarding the role of political information is that the impact of 
information is highly contingent on confidence.  For example, some of the gender gap in 
information derives from women providing more “Don’t Know” answers, although they have 
                                                 
15 Individuals who are the target of persuasive efforts also have increased knowledge of 
opposing viewpoints, suggesting some room for information being an effect of persuasive 
encounters, and not just a cause (Thorson 2014). 
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similar levels of information when they are pushed to guess (Lizotte and Sidman 2009).  
Even when controlling for information levels, women are less likely than men to express an 
opinion about political issues (Atkeson and Rapoport 2003).  The lack of confidence among 
women has specific impacts on their willingness to advocate positions in face-to-face 
deliberative settings (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).  Although information has a 
demonstrated positive impact on engagement in political persuasion, the effect of information 
should be understood as contingent on the potential persuader having enough confidence in 
their information and abilities to actively defend their position.   
Political Interest and Attention. The idiosyncrasies of individual preferences are such that 
some people find it personally rewarding to follow current events and keep up-to-date on 
political developments, and politically interested people may derive social and psychological 
benefits from talking about politics with their friends and family.   To some extent, 
explaining political participation is akin to describing participation in a hobby, as it is an 
endeavor that people choose to undertake in their free time. Finding politics interesting and 
enjoyable makes it more likely to occupy someone’s free time and energy. Additionally, 
news media consumption is positively related to participation in political conversation, even 
accounting for political information (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz 1999; Koch 1994), suggesting 
that, aside from innate interest, political news consumption stimulates discursive 
participation.   
More specifically, political interest and attention have been shown to have positive, 
statistically significant relationships with attempts to persuade others (Jacobs, Cook, and 
Delli Carpini 2009, 56), with Hansen’s analysis even going so far as to say that interest is the 
most important predictor of persuasive behavior (1997, 84).  Using a slightly different 
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dependent variable (willingness to persuade a hypothetical “person you know” who holds a 
different opinion), Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) also find effects for news media use, but 
find that the general effects of news consumption drop out once information and attention 
about the specific issue are accounted for.  Their findings suggest that general attention and 
information may just be a proxy for how much an individual knows and cares about the 
particular issue at hand. 
Personality 
A growing body of recent research evaluates the effects of personality traits on the nature 
and level of participation in political conversation and other political activities.  Personality 
may interact with social contexts in ways that alter the individual-level cost-benefit calculus 
to facilitate participation by some personality types and discourage it by others.  In terms of 
the psychological stress incurred from the interpersonal interaction, individuals who have a 
personality that avoids interpersonal interaction and, especially, conflict, may find attempting 
to persuade others an uncomfortable, risky, and prohibitively costly endeavor.  However, for 
people whose personality leads them to engage with others, seek out new experiences, and 
thrive on conflict, attempting to persuade others may actually provide them a sense of 
satisfaction and psychological benefit (Lyons et al. 2016).   
Research on the Big 5 Personality traits demonstrates that personality does influence 
persuasive behavior.  Specifically, openness to experience and extraversion are positively 
related to both discursive and campaign participation (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2010; 
Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010).16  In direct models of 
                                                 
16 See Mondak 2010, chap. 2, for a detailed description of the history and measurement of 
the Big Five traits.  
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attempts to persuade, conscientiousness and agreeableness have no statistically significant 
effect, while emotional stability has a small but statistically significant negative relationship 
with persuasive behavior (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010).  It is worth pointing out that 
these null findings for agreeableness and conscientiousness are interesting in their own right.  
An a priori expectation is that individuals who want to be agreeable and maintain harmony 
in their relationships would avoid trying to persuade others in much the same way that 
agreeable people avoid political discussion generally (Gerber et al. 2012) and avoid 
disagreement in political discussion more specifically (Lyons et al. 2016).  However, that 
expectation does not hold up in the data, suggesting that persuasion is indeed a distinct 
phenomenon from general political discussion and disagreement.   
There are two competing expectations for the effect of openness to experience on 
persuasive participation.  First, Mondak (2010) sees openness to experience as having a 
generally politicizing effect on individual attitudes and behavior, which would suggest a 
stronger inclination to try to persuade others.  This is consistent with evidence that those who 
are high in openness to experience discuss politics at higher rates (Hibbing, Ritchie, and 
Anderson 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). On the other hand, if persuasion is driven 
primarily by intensely and unquestioningly held opinions about a few personally important 
topics, and a strong desire that others hold those opinions, too, then openness to experience 
should have an overall negative relationship with attempts to persuade.   Mondak (2010, 158) 
and Mondak, et al. (2010, 10) find that openness to experience is positively related to 
attempts to influence the votes of others, which suggests that persuasive behavior draws on 
motivations of innate curiosity, or a desire for intellectual exchange, rather than advocating 
an entrenched belief system. 
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Extraversion also has a consistently strong, positive relationship with general political 
participation.  Mondak (2010) hypothesizes that extraversion is most important for forms of 
participation that require social interaction, especially with large groups (i.e. attending a 
meeting or rally).  Since persuasion happens in the context of political discussion, and 
political discussion happens mostly among individuals who are already in someone’s social 
network (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2006), there is not a strong expectation that 
extraversion should increase attempts to persuade.17  Extraversion does have a positive 
relationship with the size of discussion networks, and the rate of discussion with weak ties 
(Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2010), but it is not a significant predictor of overall 
frequency of political discussion or attempts to persuade others (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 
2010).   
Opinion Strength 
It seems uncontroversial to hypothesize that people who hold strong opinions are more 
likely to engage in persuasion than people who are ambivalent or otherwise uncertain.   To 
take the negative case, individuals who are less sure or less extreme in their position on an 
issue will probably not feel compelled to convince others to share their perspective.  This 
premise fits well with traditional models of campaign behavior, where the often unwritten 
assumption is that individuals become involved in politics because of the strength of their 
opinions, which are causally prior to their decision to be involved.  However, opinion 
                                                 
17 Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson (2010) find that people high in extraversion are more likely to 
discuss politics outside of close personal relationships, i.e. among clubs, church, and work contacts. 
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strength is a very complex concept, and the particular measurement of attitude strength may 
lead to different conclusions.18   
For example, following the same pattern as other political behaviors, stronger(weaker) 
party attachment is related to a higher(lower) rate of attempts to persuade others, with true 
independents being the least likely of all to try to persuade (Keith et al. 1992).  Note that this 
applies to strength of partisanship, but not party identification – there is no expectation that 
Democrats, Republicans, conservatives, or liberals will attempt to persuade at any higher rate 
than any others.  There is some doubt cast on this conclusion when we turn to the social 
influence literature, though.  Although the direction of causality is unknown, Huckfeldt, 
Johnson, and Sprague find that “strong partisanship is virtually coterminous with an absence 
of disagreement” (2004, 23).  At least to the extent that disagreement is an important 
precondition for persuasive behavior (although see the subsection on disagreement later in 
this chapter), individuals with the strongest party attachments are also the least likely to have 
the opportunity to persuade.    
Additionally, Munson’s (2008) work on pro-life activists indicates that strength of 
opinion is an insufficient explanation for activism.  In fact, nearly one-quarter of the 
interviewed pro-life activists had been pro-choice at some point, and their mobilization into 
pro-life causes preceded and encouraged the development of their pro-life attitudes.  Indeed, 
helping participants to form, clarify, and articulate their opinions is one of the hypothesized 
benefits of deliberative encounters (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Mutz 2008).  
                                                 
18 A single question asking individuals whether they “care” about an issue or candidate is 
insufficient to allow precise measurement or clear interpretation of the resulting data.  In fact, 
Krosnick et al. (1993) identify 10 separate attributes of attitudes related to attitude strength, 
and conclude that these attributes are not merely different ways of operationalizing one or 
even a few latent factors (see also Krosnick and Petty 1995).   
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Applied to persuasion, if trying to persuade others is a way in which some people habitually 
approach political conversation, attempts to persuade others may be the cause of attitude 
formation and crystallization, rather than the result.   
It may also be the case that being an opinionated person about many things, not 
necessarily having strong opinions about a particular issue or ideology, would increase the 
propensity for persuasion.  Opinionation (holding opinions about many things) seems to be a 
stable individual characteristic that represents a separate underlying construct from political 
interest and competence, although it is related to both (Krosnick and Milburn 1990).  
Krosnick and Milburn (1990) find gender, race, and life-cycle effects on political 
opinionation that persist even after accounting for interest and competence, indicating that 
some individuals will, by nature, express opinions about more public issues than others.    
IV. Social Context 
The social context in which people live has direct impacts on their beliefs and actions, 
and as Huckfeldt (2014) explains, the emphasis on individual characteristics at the expense of 
social contexts is a misleading approach to the study of political behavior.  I next address 
some possible sources of social influence on individual persuasive behavior.  There is no 
existing research that directly addresses the impact of social networks on attempts to 
persuade others, but there is a robust literature on social influence that can aid in the 
generation of plausible hypotheses and interesting research questions.   
Social Norms about Political Conversation 
Is it acceptable to talk about politics among your friends, family, and coworkers? How do 
you handle disagreements? Would overtly pressuring others to change their opinions strain 
 47 
interpersonal relationships?  In most cases, the specific rules and norms of political 
discussion are not well articulated, in large part because they vary based on the context of the 
discussion and the identities of the participants (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).  
Huckfeldt and Sprague summarize it by saying “the nature and content of social influence 
and social communication in election campaigns are fundamentally structured by the social 
context – by the social composition of the environments where individuals reside, work, go 
to church, and so on” (1995, 5).   
Americans do seem to be aware of political discussion norms and are sensitive to their 
violations or pressures for conformity (Sinclair 2012).  The eggshells upon which one must 
walk to successfully navigate political disagreement are perhaps one reason why politics sits 
alongside sex and religion as a taboo topic for mixed company.  Gerber et al. (2012) 
experimentally determine that known disagreement is one reason why some people avoid 
talking about politics with their friends, and choose other less contentious topics instead.  
Norms of politeness in face-to-face conversation are extremely strong, and political 
conversation is expected to remain polite even in the face of strong disagreement, which 
sometimes leads to self-censoring or avoidance of political topics altogether (see Schmitt-
Beck and Lup 2013).   Experimental research demonstrates that violation of these norms, 
even in televised discourse between political elites, generates adverse physiological 
responses and correspondingly decreases trust in government among viewers (Mutz and 
Reeves 2005; see also Mutz 2007, 2016).    
Some of the effect of social norms is likely to be mediated by individual-level traits.  
Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie (2014) explore conditional effects of positive and negative 
orientations toward conflict.  Orientations toward conflict do not affect the frequency of 
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discussion on their own, but individuals with positive orientations toward conflict gain more 
from disagreement in political discussion, as evidenced by higher levels of information, 
tolerance, and political participation.19  Similarly, Mutz (2006) shows that people who avoid 
conflict but find themselves in politically heterogeneous discussion networks are less likely 
to discuss politics and participate politically.  Additionally, one reason women are less 
assertive in political conversations is that they are more sensitive to social norms and have 
stronger motivations to maintain friendly interpersonal dynamics (Karpowitz and 
Mendelberg 2014).  Because they are so dependent on the particular contexts and 
personalities involved, it is difficult to formulate a general statement of the social norms that 
govern political conversations.  However, the impact of social norms on the occurrence and 
nature of political discussion, including the decision to try to persuade, should not be 
discounted. 
Direct Social Influence 
Studies of voter turnout indicate that social influence can have a powerful impact on the 
decision to vote (Bond et al. 2012; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008).  Indeed, campaign 
organizations often explicitly rely on the assumption that a higher rate of participation in 
someone’s social network increases the social pressure for them to think or act similarly 
(Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; McClurg 2004), and that campaign contacts from 
friends and neighbors are more effective than contacts from strangers in a distant phone bank 
(McKenna and Han 2014).  Through informal social pressure, high levels of activism are 
expected to generate even more political activism.  Likewise, theories of deliberative 
                                                 
19 Political participation in Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie (2014) is a 6 item scale, which, as 
is common in the literature, does not distinguish persuasion from other forms of behavior, so 
no direct insights can be gleaned here. 
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democracy that prioritize informal talk assume that more talking engenders more interest and 
information, which in turn produces more political talk with new discussion partners (Delli 
Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004; Walsh 2004).  However, persuasion is an interaction in 
which both sender and receiver need to be involved and take on particular roles, which may 
impose some limits on participation rates.  Voting, donating to campaigns, displaying signs, 
and talking about politics are all activities that have no theoretical ceiling.  By contrast, if 
everyone is trying to persuade, who is being persuaded?   
There is no existing research on the effect of having more persuaders in a social network 
on an individual’s propensity to engage in attempts to persuade.  There are two possible 
hypotheses for this effect.  First, as already alluded to, it is possible that having more people 
in a network who try to persuade increases the perception of disagreement and increases 
ambivalence (Mutz 2006), leading some people to “bow out” of the conflict by choosing not 
to engage in persuasive behavior.  Alternatively, more political persuasion may create social 
norms that are more tolerant of overt persuasion as an approach to political discussion, 
leading more people to advocate on behalf of their preferred positions in the same or 
subsequent political conversations.   
Political Disagreement 
Political disagreement is a central feature of the literature on social influence, although it 
is best understood as a middle step in a larger social and political process.  Speaking 
generally, the theory is that social processes generate political discussion networks that have 
more or less heterogeneity, and the exposure to (or lack of) differing viewpoints has 
consequences for the opinions and behaviors of the discussants.  Therefore, existing research 
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addresses heterogeneity in social networks as both an interesting outcome to be explained in 
its own right, and as an explanatory variable for other forms of behavior.   
One important consideration is whether attempts to persuade others in political discussion 
are a significantly different phenomenon from political disagreement.  Logically speaking, 
there is less room for persuasion if the message sender and receiver completely agree on an 
issue.20 If persuasion is defined as an outcome, rather than a behavior, then any encounter 
between individuals holding differing opinions that results in some convergence of views by 
one or both discussion partners is evidence that persuasion occurred.  Indeed, Huckfeldt, 
Johnson, and Sprague (2004) conceptualize persuasion in this way in their extensive 
treatment of the phenomenon of political disagreement within discussion networks.  In this 
perspective, the only difference between political disagreement and persuasion is whether the 
encounter actually resulted in changed opinions.21   
However, if attempts to persuade are understood as an intentional behavior undertaken by 
some individuals in their political conversations, regardless of their success, then persuasive 
behavior remains a distinct concept from merely reducing disagreement in political 
conversations.22  A strategic political persuader would be most likely to target discussants 
                                                 
20 Of course, persuasion can also change the intensity or certainty with which an opinion 
is held, or the receiver’s actions based on that belief (i.e. persuading someone to show up to 
vote, if they already support your preferred candidate).  In this case, attempts to persuade 
may occur even in situations where there is not strong attitudinal disagreement. 
21 Somewhat closer to the mark, Stoker and Jennings (2008) examine reported changes of 
opinion due to the influence of a spouse and find that influence and similarity between 
spouses increases over the length of the marriage.  Note, however, that although they 
separate interpersonal influence from shared environmental factors, this approach still does 
not address the intentionality of the attempt to persuade. 
22 Following the recommendation of Gass and Seiter (2004), I prefer to use the term 
persuasion to identify intentional attempts to persuade, and the term influence for changes in 
opinion that resulted from a stimulus that did not specifically intend to persuade.  This 
distinction is also used by Thorson (2014). 
 51 
with whom they have the highest probability of success.  Thus differences of opinions may 
provide more opportunity to persuade, but within the context of each conversation 
individuals may choose to just express their opinions, or to “agree to disagree” if they know 
efforts to persuade are likely to be fruitless.  Conversely, when a point of disagreement is 
reached between individuals who usually agree and share a great deal of common ground, 
perhaps discussion partners are more willing and comfortable trying to demonstrate why their 
discussion partner is in the wrong on this one particular issue (Morey, Eveland, and Hutchens 
2012).  Most research focuses on strict agreement and disagreement, and ignores 
conversations with undecided or ambivalent discussants, who are most vulnerable to 
persuasion (Thorson 2014). Therefore, it is not really expected that the broad patterns of 
agreement and disagreement that so clearly shape the formation of political discussion 
networks and patterns of political discussion are going to have the same implications for 
efforts at political persuasion.   
Additionally, the experience of disagreement may also directly impact rates of discussion 
and political participation, although the empirical evidence is mixed.  Some work posits that 
individuals in situations of disagreement become more tolerant of opposing views and 
ambivalent about their own opinions, and this ambivalence leads them to withdraw from 
political activity (Mutz 2002, 2006; Valenzuela, Kim, and Gil de Zuniga 2012).  However, 
these findings are disputed and several recent studies find no evidence that turnout and other 
participation rates are different between individuals exposed to political disagreement and 
those who are not, especially when controlling for orientations toward conflict (Huckfeldt, 
Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Pattie and Johnston 2009; Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie 2014).   
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Scholars on both sides of the participation debate agree that exposure to disagreement in 
political conversation is associated with higher levels of ambivalence, political tolerance, and 
information about both their own and opposing positions, whether or not it depresses 
participation.  Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) report that discussants who interact 
with proponents of both Bush and Gore in the 2000 election were better able to identify the 
positive and negative aspects of both candidates (see also Thorson 2014).  Consistent with 
the causal mechanism posited by Mutz (2002, 2006) they report that this exposure to 
diversity increases ambivalence and depresses interest in the election.  Although Wojcieszak 
(2011) finds that this effect is conditional on attitude strength, individuals with moderate 
opinions report more ambivalence after exposure to disagreement, while individuals with 
strong opinions polarize further.  Similarly, McClurg (2006) suggests that some of these 
conflicting results can be explained by accounting for expertise in the political networks, 
where additional expertise in the network improves levels of information and confidence, 
counteracting the ambivalence that derives from disagreement. 
To date, there are no studies that specifically model the effects of disagreement or 
ambivalence on attempts to persuade others.  The conflicted and conditional nature of the 
existing literature leads to two competing sets of expectations.  First, more exposure to 
political disagreement increases opportunities for persuasive interactions, and, in turn, may  
increase an individual’s store of political information to draw on in building their case 
(Lyons et al. 2016; Thorson 2014).  For those who have positive orientations to conflict and 
already strong opinions, disagreement may provide a psychological benefit and additional 
attitude polarization that will encourage them to advocate their positions to others in political 
conversation.  Conversely, exposure to political disagreement may result in more information 
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about both sides of an argument, thereby causing discussants to become ambivalent, 
increasing their tolerance for opposing viewpoints, and depressing motivation to persuade 
others.  
Nature of Relationship 
The nature of the relationship between political discussants may also have an impact on 
whether someone tries to persuade their discussion partner in a given political conversation.23  
Disagreement is most likely to be encountered in discussion networks that are large and low 
density, meaning there is little overlap between one person’s discussion network and 
another’s (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Valenzuela, Kim, and Gil de Zuniga 
2012), because disagreement becomes more likely as relationship ties become weaker (Mutz 
2006).  However, the impact of network size and social organizations on diversity is 
contingent on the type of relationship, and workplace contacts are much more likely to bring 
political diversity to social networks than are friends, family, or fellow church members 
(Mutz 2006).  Online, larger social networks and more interactions with weak ties are 
associated with higher levels of political participation, but only when there is a high level of 
agreement; exposure to disagreement depresses participation (Valenzuela, Kim, and Gil de 
Zuniga 2012).  From this perspective, if disagreement is a precursor to attempts to persuade, 
then political persuasion would be most expected among those with whom the persuader has 
the weakest social ties (acquaintances, coworkers). 
                                                 
23 Existing research on the nature of the relationship between discussion partners focuses 
on the presence of disagreement, and does not extend to direct modeling of persuasive 
attempts.  Therefore, to the extent that disagreement is related to or indicative of persuasive 
behavior, the following literature provides some guidance in how particular kinds of 
relationships might facilitate or inhibit persuasive behavior. 
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However, stronger relationships may be more resistant to the risks of political 
disagreement.  Political discussion with a particular discussion partner becomes more 
frequent as relationship ties become stronger (Mutz 2006).  Additionally, there is some risk 
to the harmony of the relationship associated with overt attempts to persuade. Morey, 
Eveland, and Hutchens (2012) demonstrate that although strong ties are the most likely to 
generate political agreement, the added safety of the relationship also makes them the setting 
in which individuals are most likely to discuss political disagreements.  Applying this finding 
to persuasion, the frequency of discussion and resilience of relationship is expected to lead to 
political persuasion happening most often in closer interpersonal relationships (spouses, close 
friends, family members), even accounting for the less frequent occurrence of disagreement.      
Organizational Membership 
Membership in civic, professional, or hobby groups has been linked to traditional 
political participation in a variety of ways (Putnam 2000). Organizational membership gives 
people a chance to develop civic skills, and more opportunities to be invited to participate, 
either formally through grassroots mobilization by the organization or informally through 
contact with other group members (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995).   In the case of political persuasion, one might expect that the larger and 
(possibly) more diverse social networks developed through organizational association would 
provide more opportunities to try to persuade others in the course of regular conversation.  
Furthermore, increased interaction with like-minded others through a social group could 
provide exposure to the arguments and discursive narratives that could be used to advocate 
the position in conversations outside the group.  Although there is certainly some 
endogeneity, where the people who have time, resources, and motivation to be engaged in 
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civic or other organizations are also the ones who are likely to participate politically, group 
membership is certainly correlated with, and a plausible contributor to, levels of political 
activism.   
However, the empirical evidence does not support that conclusion.  Jacobs, Cook, and 
Delli Carpini (2009, 56) find that organizational membership is positively related to 
persuasion about an issue, but there is no statistically significant relationship with persuasion 
about vote choice during an election.  Other work on discursive participation finds that while 
organizational membership does increase the size of discussion networks (Baybeck and 
Huckfeldt 2002), voluntary associations do not generate many named political discussants, 
and group membership does not substantially contribute to the level of opinion diversity in a 
discussion network (Mutz 2006).  Even Putnam’s (2000) seminal work on organizational 
membership and social capital does not address political discussion or attempts to persuade 
others, in large part because rates of both activities have been relatively constant for decades, 
and so do not correlate with trends in declining participation and social capital.  If persuasion 
is an instrumental form of campaign behavior, then perhaps organization membership may 
contribute the skill-development and mobilization to increase attempts to persuade.  
However, if persuasion is a form of discursive behavior, organizational membership is 
unlikely to have a direct effect on attempts to persuade.   
Mode of Communication 
Deliberative theory prioritizes face-to-face interaction as the most likely to achieve the 
benefits promised by deliberation (Mendelberg 2002).  However, the explosive rise in the use 
of social media for campaigning and political discussion has led to a great deal of research 
about the potential of online communication to revive deliberative democracy, and how the 
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nature of political participation and conversation changes when it occurs in a mediated, 
impersonal, or anonymous online forum (Baek, Wojcieszak, and Delli Carpini 2012; 
Sunstein 2001).  Specifically, some have wondered if mediated or anonymous 
communication allows individuals to be more brazen in sharing or pushing strong opinions 
than they would otherwise be in person (Sunstein 2001).  The strong impact of social norms 
on discursive behavior begs the question of whether less personal forms of communication 
(even phone or email, when compared with face-to-face talk) mitigates the pressure to be 
polite and non-confrontational, increasing overt attempts to persuade.  Additionally, social 
media generates its own culture and set of conversational norms, which may have distinct 
impacts on political expression (Choi 2014; Gil de Zuniga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012). 
There is a contested relationship between online news acquisition, social media use, and 
political participation (Boulianne 2009), where the effects of internet use are shown to 
depend on the purpose behind the internet use (Gil de Zuniga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012).  
Even controlling for off-line discussion frequency, political discussion on social media has a 
demonstrated positive effect on political participation  (Hyun and Kim 2015).24  Jacobs, 
Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) include internet discussion in their examination of discursive 
participation. However their 2003 data still include many economic and educational 
disparities in internet access and use that affect political participation rates using this 
medium.   
One challenge in research on social media is that the lines between expressive and 
persuasive communication are increasingly blurred, and probably depend on the message 
                                                 
24 This study, conducted in South Korea, finds increases in a scale of political 
participation behaviors, which includes political persuasion (with no differentiation between 
on- and off-line persuasive efforts). 
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posters’ perceptions of their intended audiences.  The public nature of online participation 
means that a great deal of political commentary on social media may have textual 
characteristics of persuasive communication, except that it is not directed at persuading 
anyone in particular.  Additionally, it is not clear whether the common question wording for 
persuasive attempts – “did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote 
for or against a particular candidate”- would cue survey respondents to think about online 
participation.25   Data that accurately conceptualize the nature of political participation online 
and its effect on discursive participation is needed to better formulate a clear expected 
relationship.   
V. Political Context 
 In addition to the effects of individual traits and social norms, the broader political 
context may have an influence on whether people decide to engage in persuasive behavior. 
At the most basic level, the political context determines which issues or candidates are salient 
for discussion at any given time.  Even the strongest opinions about a politician’s fitness for 
office will not lead to an attempt to persuade if the politician is not running for office in the 
current election cycle.  Likewise, the particular issues on the ballot in a referendum or 
proposition, or the issues that are salient due to current events or media coverage, are more 
likely to be discussed and persuaded about than issues that are less currently relevant.  
Individuals who are predisposed to political persuasion, and whose social norms allow for or 
                                                 
25 The wording “talk” implies a back-and-forth, verbal exchange, rather than a one-off 
expression of position (as is the norm on Twitter, or a blog post, for example).  Also, the 
question encourages respondents to think about efforts directed at particular people, which 
may not apply to the amorphous, public audience of online posts.   
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encourage persuasive participation, may still be unlikely to persuade if the broader political 
context is incongruent with their issue or candidate priorities.   
In addition to issue or candidate salience, an individual’s perception of being in the 
majority opinion, the competitiveness of the election environment, and the type of election 
may have direct impacts on motivations to persuade. 
Minority Status 
Considering the transition from the immediate social context to the broader political 
context, there has been a great deal of work regarding the impact of perceptions of being in 
the minority or the majority opinion.  Although the empirical evidence has been mixed, 
Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence theory posits that the social pressures on individuals 
who feel like they are in the overwhelming minority will suppress their political voice 
(Noelle-Neumann 1974; and see Glynn, Hayes, and Shanahan 1997 for a meta-analysis of the 
follow-up studies).  In what they claim to be a direct test of the effect of the Spiral of Silence 
on persuasive behavior, Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) find that respondents who felt they 
were of the majority opinion were more likely to report a willingness to try to persuade a 
hypothetical person they knew who holds the opposite opinion.  They found effects for 
perceptions of majority status at both the national level and in the immediate social network, 
although the national-level effects were much weaker than more local perceptions.   
Electoral Competition 
More competitive elections are expected to increase voter turnout and other forms of 
political interest and activism (Donovan 2007; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Tolbert and 
Franko 2014).  A highly competitive race receives more media coverage, lowering the 
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information costs, and increases the probable impact of individual votes, increasing the 
potential benefits.  Thinking about non-voting activities, donating money or displaying a sign 
in a hotly contested election has much more potential impact than in an uncontested election, 
shifting the cost-benefit calculus in favor of more participation.  When the outcome is less 
certain, media and citizens are likely to find the election more interesting, and therefore pay 
more attention.  Given the empirically demonstrated connections between political interest, 
political attention, and attempts to persuade (Hansen 1997; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 
2009), these mechanisms are expected to function for political persuasion in the same way as 
other forms of political behavior. 
Research on the gender gap in persuasive behavior has examined a variety of specific 
ways in which campaigns may motivate women to be more interested and involved in the 
election.  Hansen (1997) finds a significant spike in women’s persuasive activity during the 
1992 “Year of the Woman” campaign season, but only when there was a woman running for 
a prominent office on their ballot.  Absent a high level of novelty and media attention, the 
gender gap returned in the 1994 election cycle.  Atkeson (2003) extends this analysis and 
finds that it is not enough to have more female candidates on the ballot, female candidates 
must be competitive in the election to increase women’s persuasive engagement.  
Alternatively, Stokes-Brown and Neal (2008) posit that women candidates who emphasize 
economic issues in the campaign increase women’s rates of persuasive participation.  
Although these studies do not provide a straightforward prescription for how campaigns can 
improve women’s persuasive participation, they do demonstrate that the campaign 
environment has the potential to activate latent interest in ways that motivate participation.   
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Campaign Mobilization 
Another mechanism by which electoral competition can increase political activity, 
including persuasive behavior, is indirectly through the increased efforts of campaign 
organizations.  Campaign mobilization has a demonstrated ability to induce citizens to vote 
and otherwise participate in politics (Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993), and there is specific evidence that campaign contacts are related to a substantial 
increase in the propensity to try to persuade others (McClurg 2004, 419; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993, 171).  This is especially significant because campaign contact does not 
increase the reported frequency of political discussion, but it does seem to qualitatively alter 
the content of the discussions that do happen.  If this is true, and campaign contact is a causal 
force in motivating attempts to persuade, then further research into the most effective appeals 
(and targets of those appeals) is urgently needed.   
However, there are a few caveats to keep in mind when interpreting the positive effect of 
campaign mobilization on persuasive participation.  First, there is no existing academic 
evidence of the extent to which campaigns actively try to motivate supporters to persuade on 
their behalf, and it is a tenuous link to expect that all dinner-table or water-cooler attempts to 
persuade were caused by a direct request from a campaign organization.  Some scholars have 
argued that mobilization is a less powerful explanation of increased turnout in competitive 
elections than the direct effects of media coverage and campaign interest described 
previously (Hogan 1999).  Similarly, changes in mobilization efforts or effectiveness are 
unable to explain recent declines in political participation (Goldstein and Ridout 2002).26  
                                                 
26 Or increases in political persuasion, as the case may be? 
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Finally, campaigns are known to target those who are already most likely to participate, so 
this may be a spurious relationship. 
Type of Election 
Like all forms of participation, aggregate rates of persuasion are generally lower in 
midterm elections than presidential elections (Thorson 2014, 355).  But even beyond 
aggregate differences that can be explained by variations in levels of attention, interest, and 
information, is it possible that the identities and motivations of persuaders for, say, a local 
school bond election are different from those for a presidential candidate.  There are two 
dimensions of context that may affect rates of persuasion: issues versus candidates, and local 
versus national elections.   
Issue v. Candidate: Very few published measures of persuasion distinguish between 
different kinds of content of the persuasive effort.   In a rare exception, Jacobs, Cook, and 
Delli Carpini (2009) differentiate between trying to persuade someone about an issue, and 
trying to persuade someone about whom to vote for.  Forty-seven percent of respondents 
reported trying to persuade someone about an issue, and 31 percent reporting trying to 
persuade about a candidate.27  For the most part, the direction and significance of 
demographic, social capital, and political capital predictors is the same for issue and 
candidate persuasion.  As already noted, organizational membership is positively associated 
                                                 
27 There are some methodological caveats to note about the persuasion rates reported by 
Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini.  The survey was conducted in 2003, and asked 
retrospectively about 2002 (a midterm election), so the rate of persuasion about a candidate is 
comparable to what is found in ANES for the 2002 midterm election (Thorson 2014).   In a 
deviation from any other published measure of persuasion, the issue persuasion question asks 
whether the respondent “tried to persuade someone about your view on a political issue,” 
without any reference to campaigns or elections.  The acontextual nature of the question may 
be responsible for the much higher response rate for issue persuasion. 
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with non-electoral issue persuasion but not with candidate persuasion, while candidate 
persuasion has a negative relationship with political trust that is not present in issue 
persuasion.  Interestingly, their model of issue persuasion does not present a gender gap, 
although the gender gap in candidate persuasion is only marginally statistically significant 
once controls for political capital are included.  These differences are not explained in 
Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini’s work, and require further testing to corroborate and fit to a 
theoretical model; however, it is at least some empirical evidence that the difference between 
issue and candidate persuasion deserves further explanation. 
Local v. National: Generally speaking, national level elections inspire more attention and 
participation than local elections, perhaps because of the increased media coverage which 
reduces information costs.  To the extent that political persuasion follows the trends of other 
forms of political behavior, we expect more persuasion about national than local elections in 
general.  However, issue activists, who are involved in particular community causes or who 
care passionately about a particular issue, may be able to have more impact at the local level, 
and so would be more likely to try to persuade others about their causes on that level. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect some differential interactions where individuals who are 
motivated by their desire to influence a particular cause may be drawn more towards local 
elections, whereas political generalists may be drawn to national elections in which there is 
more exposure and interest from others in their discussion networks. 
VI: Summary 
The previous sections have reviewed the findings of the empirical literature, and the 
hypothesized expectations where empirical results are not yet available, for dozens of factors 
that might influence someone’s decision to try to persuade others about politics.  It is now 
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useful to take a step back and use broader strokes to identify a set of variables and expected 
relationships that distinguish discursive participation from campaign participation.  Many of 
these differences will be tested in later sections as a way of determining the ways in which 
persuasive behavior is better understood as a form of discursive participation or campaign 
participation.    
As both discursive participation and campaign participation are dimensions of a broader 
concept of general political participation, there are a number of individual-level traits that 
inspire participation, but which are not useful for distinguishing between the two dimensions.  
Most of these non-distinguishing variables are measures of political capital, and emphasize 
an individual’s non-participatory engagement in politics.  The expected relationships 
between these variables and discursive or campaign participation are the same, and 
persuasion follows the same pattern.  These variables are undeniably important facilitators of 
persuasive behavior, and will often be included in the empirical models that follow.  
However, they are unable to directly address the theoretical question at the heart of this work.  
These variables are listed below, with the demonstrated relationship in parentheses ( positive 
“+”, negative “-”, or no relationship “0”).  They are also subdivided by whether existing 
research has already demonstrated the particular relationship with persuasive behavior. 
Empirically Demonstrated Non-Distinguishing Influences on Persuasive Behavior: 
 
Self-reported Interest in Campaigns (+) 
Attention to Campaigns (+) 
Social Trust (+) 
Political Trust (0) 
Political Knowledge (+) 
Openness to Experience (+) 
Gender (-) 
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Hypothesized Non-Distinguishing Influences on Persuasive Behavior: 
 
Opinionation (+) 
Salience of Isssue/Candidate (+) 
Conflict Avoidance (-) 
 
There also exist a number of characteristics of individuals, social contexts, and political 
contexts that have different effects (demonstrated or hypothesized) for discursive 
participation and campaign participation and so can be used to distinguish between the two.  
Campaign participation is an instrumental behavior that is expected to be motivated by 
external forces and goals, whereas discursive participation is more motivated by internal 
dispositions and the dynamics of one’s social environment.  The list below enumerates some 
variables that are expected to distinguish between discursive or campaign motivations for 
persuasive behavior.  Each listed variable represents an expected departure from the external 
and instrumental motivations of campaign participation, and therefore identifies ways in 
which persuasion is expected to be more akin to discursive participation.     
Empirically Demonstrated Distinguishing Influences on Persuasive Behavior: 
 
Age (-) 
Race (0) 
Income (0) 
Education (0) 
Internal Efficacy (+) 
Extraversion (0) 
Organizational Membership (0) 
Perception of Being in the Minority (-) 
Issue Persuasion (rather than Candidate) (+) 
 
Hypothesized Distinguishing Influences on Persuasion: 
 
Social Norms of Politeness (-) 
Exposure to Disagreement (+) 
Closeness of Relationship (+) 
Online Communication (?) 
Campaign Mobilization (0, although + in some research)  
Competitiveness of Election (+) 
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At the individual level, the biggest difference is the expected role of traditional socio-
economic resources in facilitating participation.  Education, income, age, and race all have 
well-established positive relationships with voting or other forms of campaign participation.  
However, the hope of discursive participation hinges on overcoming these resource-based 
barriers.  In previous work, education, income, and race have all been shown to have little 
relationship with persuasive participation, and age is negatively related to persuasion (as 
opposed to the positive relationship found with voting and many forms of campaign 
participation.)   
To the extent that political persuasion is not expected to be an instrumental campaign 
activity, external efficacy is hypothesized to have a positive relationship with campaign 
participation, but not necessarily deliberative or persuasive participation.  Instead, previous 
research has demonstrated a strong positive effect of internal efficacy on persuasion, which is 
much more tenuously related to campaign participation.  Additionally, extraverted 
personalities have been shown to be more active political participations, but extraversion 
does not increase frequency of discussion or attempts to persuade others.  Both of these 
factors indicate that persuasion is located more in an internal or interpersonal sphere, lacking 
the strong connection to the broader political context.  
There is less existing research about social context, so the expectations in this area are 
more open-ended.  There is demonstrated evidence that having a larger social network or 
being a member of more organizations does not increase the likelihood of engaging in 
persuasive behavior, although it does increase the likelihood of campaign participation.  
Other features of the social context are expected to make people more comfortable with the 
act of persuasion, specifically: exposure to disagreement, having a close relationship with the 
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discussion partner, and usually agreeing with the discussion partner.  These factors decrease 
the risk associated with violating social norms and straining interpersonal relationships, 
whereas little exposure to disagreement or strong norms of politeness may increase the 
perceived costs.   
Finally, the political context may interact with individual traits in a unique way that 
facilitates or inhibits persuasive behavior.  Although campaign mobilization has been shown 
to be positively correlated with persuasive behavior, I question the extent to which contact by 
a campaign is causally connected to persuasive participation.  The particular nature of the 
election, including the competitiveness or perception of being on the winning side, are 
expected to have less influence on persuasive behavior than they do on other forms of 
campaign participation.   
In the following chapters, I will examine many of these relationships using a variety of 
survey data sources.  This will allow me to replicate and elaborate on relationships that have 
already been demonstrated in previous research, as well as testing new hypotheses that help 
build a general theory of persuasive participation.  I begin in Chapter 3 by statistically 
evaluating the similarities and differences that persuasive behavior shares with both 
campaign participation and discursive participation.  I look at a wide range of possible 
predictors of persuasive behavior and identify which are the most important predictors of 
persuasion and how those compare with other forms of participation.  In Chapter 4, I use 
panel data to explore persuasive behavior as it actually occurs, with particular emphasis on 
the social and temporal aspects of persuasion. Finally, in Chapter 5, I explore the dynamics 
of persuasive behavior throughout the course of a particular election cycle and explore the 
motivations of persuasion in more depth.  Using this variety of approaches, I am able to 
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address to some extent all but one of the hypothesized relationships (I do not have data on 
conflict avoidance), and replicate all but two of the previously demonstrated empirical results 
(except extraversion and perception of holding a minority opinion).  
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Chapter 3: Political Persuasion and Dimensions of Political Behavior 
I. Introduction 
Democracy is expected to be a system of government in which government actions 
reflect the will of the people.  The most direct voice that American citizens have in their own 
governance is voting to select the individuals who will represent their interests in decision-
making bodies.  However, voting is not the only way that people voice their preferences or 
affect governmental policy-making, and scholars of political participation have identified a 
wide array of ways in which Americans are active in politics and other civic affairs.    
Not all forms of participation in the public sphere have the same goals or are inspired by 
the same motivations.  While some activities might affect who gets elected, others try to 
directly influence public policy, and still others might try to resolve community problems 
without involving official government institutions.  Indeed, scholars have discussed various 
“dimensions” of political participation for decades, with the expectation that behaviors that 
have similar motivations or intentions can be described as clustering on one dimension, and 
that different dimensions are distinct from each other in a meaningful way (Claggett and 
Pollock 2006; Verba and Nie 1972; Zukin et al. 2006).   
In current empirical research, attempts to persuade others are associated with two distinct 
types of political participation.  Most often, persuasive behavior is included as one form of 
campaign, or electoral, participation, which is composed of behaviors aimed directly at 
aiding specific candidates or causes in securing a victory during an election (Verba and Nie 
1972; Zukin et al. 2006).  Other forms of campaign participation often include displaying a 
sign or bumper sticker, donating money, working for a campaign, or attending a meeting or 
rally.  Along with attempts at persuasion, these activities are commonly used to form a scale 
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of political participation that is used in a variety of settings as a control for an individual’s 
level of political activism. 
Increased recent attention to models of deliberative democracy underscores the 
importance of everyday political conversation as a crucial mechanism by which citizens 
develop and voice their opinions and suggests another role for attempts to persuade others in 
the democratic process.  Talking about politics is often used as a measure of non-
participatory engagement in politics, akin to reported political interest or attention to political 
news.  However, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009; see also Delli Carpini, Cook, and 
Jacobs 2004) describe a discursive dimension to political participation, in which they argue 
that talking about politics is a form of political participation in and of itself, and that although 
it usually does not directly impact policy outcomes, discursive participation has important 
implications for our understanding of political participation, public opinion, and democratic 
governance.  Discursive participation might include political conversation in formally 
organized events, such as deliberative polls (Fishkin 1995), issue forums (Gastil 2000), or 
town hall meetings (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014; Mansbridge 1983).  More often, 
though, discursive participation is informal, “everyday talk” about politics that occurs within 
existing social networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2006; Walsh 2004).  
In their empirical analysis, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini include attempts to persuade 
others as a form of discursive participation, alongside talking about politics, online political 
communication, and attendance at formal deliberative meetings. 
Understanding persuasion as a form of discursive participation in some ways distances it 
from actual political processes and outcomes.  If persuasion is a form of campaign 
participation, then it is best understood as an instrumental activity undertaken with an 
 70 
intention to influence electoral outcomes (i.e. getting more people to vote in your preferred 
way so that your candidate will win).  However, when understood as a form of discursive 
participation, an attempt to persuade others represents one way in which some individuals 
process their own political beliefs, psychologically engage with the political system, and 
navigate the social norms of their discussion environments.  Therefore, the motivations, 
costs, and benefits of persuasion are expected to align more closely with those of deliberation 
or discursive participation than those of campaign participation.28   
The first step in better understanding attempts to persuade from the perspective of 
discursive participation is to examine whether persuasion does indeed share more in common 
with discursive participation than other forms of political or campaign participation.  The 
following sections present two empirical approaches to examining the relationship between 
attempts to persuade and other forms of political behavior.  First, I use factor analysis to 
examine the relationships between attempts to persuade and other forms of campaign 
behavior and discursive participation.  Second, I use machine learning techniques to identify 
the most important statistical predictors of many forms of behavior, including attempts to 
persuade others.  These most important predictors can then be compared across behaviors to 
identify the aggregate similarities and differences among the behaviors based on what is 
correlated with engagement in each activity.  This is not a causal argument attempting to 
explain what motivates people to engage in persuasion or discursive participation.  Rather, 
the use of non-parametric machine learning provides a diagnostic approach to describing how 
                                                 
28 For example, see Thorson’s (2014) work on how both the attempt to persuade and 
having someone else attempt to persuade you increase information about both sides of a 
political issue, which is one of the hypothesized benefits of deliberation (see Mendelberg 
2002).   
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the dimensionality and correlates of discursive participation differ from other forms of 
political behavior.   
The contributions of this work are threefold.  First, I provide evidence for a discursive 
dimension to political participation, and put it in context of other established dimensions.  
Second, I examine the relationship of attempts to persuade others to both the campaign and 
discursive dimensions of participation, and find that attempts to persuade are distinct from 
other forms of campaign participation in a number of ways.  Third, this effort represents a 
methodological contribution in the application of machine learning methods to substantive 
political science inquiry.  Although these machine learning techniques are not designed to 
directly test a specific hypothesis, the analysis of the statistical relationships between 
variables in this deductive way can still provide valuable evidence that speaks directly to 
important and testable theoretical questions. 
II. Dimensions of Political Behavior: Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a traditional tool for identifying how different forms of political 
participation “fit” together.  Factor analysis uses the correlations between item responses to 
identify the structure of latent, unobservable “factors” that are reflected in the observed data.  
In terms of political behavior, factor analysis has been used to identify which of many 
possible civic or political acts demonstrate the same kind of public engagement.  In prior 
work, political persuasion has always loaded most strongly on the factor containing other 
forms of campaign behavior, such as displaying a sign, donating money to a campaign, or 
volunteering for a party or campaign organization.   
However, because factor analysis identifies latent dimensions based on the 
interrelationships between the various variables that are included in the analysis, adding 
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similar items has the potential to change the resulting factor structure.  Factor analysis of 
campaign behaviors is quite well-established in the political science literature, but the most 
prominent works do not include any other form of discursive participation, and have not 
identified a particular discursive dimension of political behavior.29  Attempts at persuasion 
load on a campaign participation dimension because that is the best fit of the items that are 
included, but when at least two other discussion-based measures are included in the factor 
analysis, a discursive dimension to participation emerges, and persuasion forms a part of that 
dimension (Claggett and Pollock 2006).  If persuasive behavior is indeed more related to 
discursive participation than campaign participation,  the inclusion of other forms of 
discursive participation will cause persuasive behavior to shift to the discursive dimension, 
consistent with the results of Claggett and Pollock (2006).   
Verba and Nie (1972, chap. 4) provide a seminal factor analysis of modes of political 
participation, where they identify three empirical clusters in political participation: 
Campaigning, Voting, and Communal Acts.30   In more recent years, however, political 
scientists have pushed to expand the definition of what constitutes political participation.  
Zukin et al. (2006) convened focus groups to build a comprehensive scale of the ways in 
which people are involved in public or community affairs.  They identify a 19-item scale of 
political participation, which they group into three dimensions of participation: Civic, 
Electoral, and Political Voice.  The results of both Verba and Nie’s and Zukin et al.’s factor 
                                                 
29 Political discussion with friends and family members is frequently asked about in 
political surveys, but it has been viewed as a form of engagement, akin to reported political 
interest or levels of news consumption, rather than active participation, and so is not included 
in the factor analysis (see footnote 4 of chapter 3 in Zukin et al. 2006). 
30 Verba and Nie also identify one non-political dimension, which is based on individuals 
who contact elected officials for resolution to a personal, specific problem, rather than to 
address a larger socio-political issue.  This non-political dimension is omitted from the 
present discussion. 
 73 
analyses are reproduced in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.1, where the dimension is listed in 
italics in each cell, followed by the reported factor loading for each item on that dimension.31  
To the extent that there are repeated indicators, and in spite of different naming conventions, 
the factor structure is highly consistent across these studies.32  These established analyses are 
then directly compared with original analysis that includes additional measures of discursive 
participation and therefore tests for the possibility of a discursive dimension. 
Factor Analysis Data and Methods 
The 2012 iteration of the American National Election Studies Time Series Study (2012 
ANES)33 includes a broad range of political participation questions, which allows for an 
almost direct replication of the work by Zukin et al. (2006).34  The third column of Table 3.1 
provides a replication of Zukin et al.’s (2006) work using the 2012 ANES data, with a few 
caveats.  First, it should be noted that, prior to rotation, the items all load heavily onto a 
single factor.  This is expected, as all of the items are intended to measure the level of civic 
                                                 
31 While there is no definitive cut point for the minimum acceptable factor loading, a 
loading of at least .4 (or occasionally .3) is usually considered sufficient for exploratory 
factor analysis.  
32 One notable difference is that the use of multiple items to identify voting behavior 
leads to the creation of a separate voting factor in Verba and Nie’s formulation that is absent 
in Zukin et al.’s approach, where voting instead loads on their Electoral dimension.   
Additionally, Verba and Nie did not include any of the measures that make up Zukin et al.’s 
expressive dimension of Political Voice, so that is a new addition.   
33 The 2012 ANES is a survey of eligible voters in the United States conducted around 
the 2012 presidential election, with interviews taking place from September 2012 through 
January 2013.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 2,054 respondents in two waves 
(one pre-election, one post-election); online surveys were completed by 3,860 respondents in 
four shorter waves (two pre-election, two post-election).  The majority of questions were the 
same across interview modes. 
 A full description of the study is available at www.electionstudies.org.  The data used in 
this analysis is the July 1, 2013 update, downloaded from www.sda.berkeley.edu. 
34 The question wording for both Zukin et al. (who use an original survey) and the present 
study, along with descriptive statistics for the ANES data, can be found in Appendix 3A.   
 74 
and political activity in which an individual engages.  However, the high level of inter-
correlation between the items in the various factors demonstrates that the factors are not 
independent, as is assumed when orthogonal rotations are conducted.  For this reason, an 
oblique rotation (promax) is used in the following analysis.35 Additionally, because all items 
in the participation inventory are binary, a factor analysis based on Pearson’s correlation is 
inappropriate.  Instead, I calculate the polychoric correlations between items, and use this 
correlation matrix, rather than the raw individual-level data, to conduct the factor analysis.36  
In spite of a different data sample, some differences in question wording, and some 
adjustments in the specific methodological approach, the replication in Table 3.1 corresponds 
admirably with the results reported by Zukin et al.  Notably, in all of the first three columns, 
attempts to persuade others scale with other forms of electoral or campaign behavior. 
The final column of Table 3.1 provides results that test for the existence of a discursive 
participation dimension, and whether attempts to persuade fit better with campaign behavior 
or discursive participation. 37  Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) provide the most 
comprehensive exploration of the form and nature of discursive participation conducted to 
date.  They identify six different types of discursive participation: talking about politics; one-
to-one online political discussions; discussions in online forums or groups; formal or 
informal meetings about community issues; attempts to persuade about a stance on an issue; 
                                                 
35 This is consistent with Verba and Nie’s recommendation to use an oblique rotation 
(binormanin), although the specific rotation method is different.  This is a divergence from 
Zukin et al.  who use an orthogonal rotation (varimax).  However, to the extent that the 
replication is consistent with the findings of Zukin et al., the details of the rotation selected 
do not appear to make a substantively important difference. Additionally, a number of 
additional rotations were tested for the analysis in Column 4 (including varimax), and the 
promax rotation displayed provides the most simplified factor structure. 
36 See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/efa_categorical.htm for a description of this 
method, and example code for Stata. 
37 The full results of this factor analysis are available in Appendix 3B. 
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and attempts to persuade about a vote choice.  Of these, the 2012 ANES data allow for the 
inclusion of four relatively comparable discursive participation items: talking about politics; 
sending a political message on Facebook or Twitter; attendance at a meeting about a school 
or community problem; and attempts to persuade about a vote choice.38   
 
Table 3.1: Factor Analysis of Political Participation 
 
(1) 
Verba & Nie 
(2) 
Zukin et al. 
(3) 
Replication 
(4) 
Extension 
Persuade others how to vote 
Campaign  
.54 
Electoral 
.55 
Electoral 
.46 
Discursive 
.49 
Work for Party / Candidate 
Campaign  
.79 
Electoral 
.47 
Electoral 
.79 
Electoral 
.89 
Attend Political Meeting / Rally Campaign  
.79 
  
Electoral 
.84 
Contribute Money to Party/Candidate 
Campaign 
.74 
Electoral 
.62 
Electoral 
.59 
Electoral 
.55 
Membership in Political Club 
Campaign 
.80 
   
Display Campaign buttons, stickers, etc. 
 
Electoral 
.73 
Electoral 
.68 
Electoral 
.64 
Regularly vote in elections 
(Only Local Elections in Col. 1) 
Voting 
.81 
Electoral 
.55 
  
Presidential Vote - Most Recent 
Voting 
.91 
 
Voting 
.88 
Voting 
.85 
Presidential Vote - Prior Election 
Voting 
.90 
 
Voting 
.91 
Voting 
.91 
Work with others to solve a local problem 
Cooperative 
.75 
Civic 
.69 
Civic 
.62 
Civic 
.74 
Form a group to work on local problems 
Cooperative 
.77 
   Active membership in community problem-
solving organizations 
Cooperative 
.56 
Civic 
.65 
Civic 
.63 
Civic 
.65 
Volunteer for a nonpolitical organization 
 
Civic 
.75 
Civic 
.85 
Civic 
.81 
Raise money for charity 
 
Civic 
.48 
Civic 
.46 
Civic 
.43 
Contact local leaders 
Cooperative 
.60 
   
Contact state or national leaders 
Cooperative 
.44 
   
Attend meeting on school/community issue 
   
Civic 
.70 
Contact elected official 
 
Voice 
.47 
Voice 
.65 
Voice 
.63 
                                                 
38 Question wording and descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 3A. 
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Protest 
 
Voice 
.60 
Voice 
.60 
Voice 
.45 
Boycott 
 
Voice 
.56 
  Sign a written petition 
(Includes Online Petition in Col. 4) 
 
Voice 
.52 
Voice 
.50 
Voice 
.41 
Call into radio talk show 
 
Voice 
.50 
Voice 
.64 
Voice 
.51 
Contact print media 
 
Voice 
.42 
Voice 
.77 
Voice 
.71 
Door-to-door canvass 
 
Voice 
.33 
  
Discuss politics with family / friends 
   
Discursive 
.62 
Send political message via social media 
   
Discursive 
.66 
Cells contain the dimension label in italics, followed by the reported factor loading. 
Sources: Col. 1 – Verba and Nie (1972); Col. 2 – Zukin et al. (2006);  
Cols. 3 & 4 – Original replication using the 2012 American National Election Studies. 
 
Factor Analysis Results 
The results in the final column of Table 3.1 support the expectation that a discursive 
dimension to political behavior emerges when additional measures of discursive participation 
are included in the factor analysis.  The deliberative participation dimension includes talking 
about politics with friends and family members, sending a political message on a social 
networking site, and attempting to persuade others.  The inclusion of a form of online 
communication in a discursive dimension of political participation is encouraging for those 
exploring the possibility of online communication for enhancing deliberative democracy.39 
However, the formal deliberative element of the discursive activities – attendance at a 
meeting about a school or community issue – was more strongly related to civic participation 
than informal discursive participation.40  In light of this evidence that attending a meeting 
                                                 
39 See the volume edited by Davies and Gangadharan (2009). 
40 The survey question does not determine whether those who attended actually spoke at 
the meeting or participated in any other way, which might account for some of the disparity.  
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bears more in common with other forms of problem-oriented civic participation than 
discussion with friends and family, deliberative theory may need to rethink the relationship 
between everyday talk and the kind of deliberative participation that happens in more 
formally organized settings. 
Additionally, persuasion loads more strongly on the deliberative factor than on the 
campaign factor.  Although attempts to persuade loaded on the campaign dimension in all 
previous models (columns 1 – 3), the inclusion of other discursive activities leads to a switch 
for political persuasion, while the remaining items are unaffected.  The factor loading of 
political persuasion on the campaign dimension drops from .46 (column 3) to .28 (full results 
in Appendix 3B) once other items in a discursive dimension are included.  Furthermore, the 
new loading on the discursive dimension is .49, which represents a substantially stronger 
relationship than the campaign dimension loading of .28.   However, there is often not a clear 
line between various dimensions of political behavior (see Zukin et al. 2006), and political 
persuasion is admittedly the weakest item in the discursive participation factor.  It would be 
premature to completely disconnect persuasion from campaign behaviors.  However, the shift 
of political persuasion to the discursive dimension also provides significant evidence that the 
unquestioning inclusion of attempts to persuade in scales of campaign participation is 
inappropriate. 
One potential concern is that because persuading necessarily requires talking about 
politics the two items might be so highly correlated that they may load on the same factor 
even if they do not share common underlying characteristics.  For example, approximately 
half of the people who report discussing politics say they tried to persuade someone else, but 
                                                                                                                                                       
However, this question is directly comparable to that used by Jacobs, Cook, and Delli 
Carpini (2009) to identify formal deliberative participation. 
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only a very small number (4% of respondents) report trying to persuade someone and say 
they do not talk about politics.  It is possible that persuaders being a direct subset of 
discussants might lead to an inordinately strong relationship between these variables that 
could adversely affect the factor structure.  However, there is a very similar relationship 
between voting and persuading, where approximately half of reported voters also tried to 
persuade someone else, and only 4% of respondents who tried to persuade say they did not 
vote.  To the extent that both discussion and voting have a similar descriptive relationship 
with persuasion but still load on different factors, there is added confidence that the factor 
analysis is identifying a substantive difference between these two types of participation.41   
III. Most Important Predictors of Persuasion: Machine Learning 
Factor analysis identifies commonalities between variables by looking at the statistical 
relationships among a number of (in this case) dependent variables, without reference to 
possible independent variables.  However, this is not the only way to examine the similarities 
and differences that characterize a set of outcome variables.  In this section, I use two 
machine learning approaches in an effort to reinforce and add conceptual depth to the results 
of the factor analysis.  These techniques look at the statistical relationships between the 
dependent variables and a wide variety of predictor variables, and comparison of the results 
across the various dependent variables allows for further description of their similarities and 
differences.  Because machine learning is, by nature, atheoretical and designed to generate 
predictions based on as few starting assumptions as possible and without concern for 
                                                 
41 Additionally, the Pearson correlation between discussion and persuasion is .33.  While 
this is among the highest correlations in the data, it is within a normal range for items in the 
same factor of this data and not high enough to elicit concern.  A correlation matrix for all 
campaign and discursive participation variables is available in Appendix 3C. 
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interpretability, some have questioned its use in the social sciences.  However, political 
scientists are increasingly recognizing the potential for machine learning in providing 
empirical answers to long-standing theory-based questions (Muchlinski et al. 2016).  The 
following sections represent one effort to incorporate the descriptive evidence achieved by 
the application of machine learning into substantive political science research.  The 
consistency in the results of factor analysis and machine learning methods provides 
additional confidence in the overall conclusions about the relationship of political persuasion 
to dimensions of campaign participation and discursive participation.   
Methods Overview 
As described in the previous chapter, there is a huge variety of potentially relevant 
predictors of attempts to persuade others.  The 2012 ANES is a large survey, with the 
potential to test the relationships between persuasion and dozens of independent variables.  In 
an effort to develop a parsimonious explanation that retains statistical rigor and takes 
advantage of the incredible amount of available data, I next employ two machine learning 
statistical tools: random forest and lasso.42  These approaches avoid the researcher bias that 
might come from arbitrary decisions about which variables to trim from the models, and 
provide a guide to help determine which of the many potentially significant coefficients are 
actually of substantive importance in predicting attempts to persuade and other forms of 
political behavior.  These methods do not directly test causal hypotheses or produce 
interpretable coefficient estimates, but they are useful in identifying the strongest predictors 
                                                 
42 For more on the growing use of machine learning techniques, such as random forests, 
in social sciences, see Grimmer (2015) or Varian (2014). 
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of attempts to persuade and comparing them with other forms of campaign participation and 
discursive participation. 
The 75 independent variables included in the machine learning analysis are listed in 
Table 3.2.  In a number of cases, multiple versions of questions addressing a similar topic 
were asked, or the same question was asked in both the pre- and post- election 
questionnaires.  In order to avoid excessive redundancy in the modeling, which can lead to 
underestimates of variable importance, only one measure is used in the analysis.  Where both 
are available, questions from the pre-election questionnaire were retained over questions 
from the post-election questionnaire, as the temporally prior measurement reduces 
endogeneity concerns.  Also, questions with fewer response categories were selected over 
similar questions with more response categories.43 
The two machine learning techniques have their own advantages and biases, which will 
be discussed in more detail later.  However, in this case, I find that they come to very similar 
substantive results.  As analysis tools, they provide a great deal of substantive insight into 
what kinds of variables most strongly predict persuasive behavior and identify which of the 
many potential explanatory theories deserve further pursuit. Furthermore, because 
statistically significant regression coefficients can be found for most explanations in a sample 
of this size, they do not provide a clear picture of substantive importance.  Analysis of most 
                                                 
43 For example, the binary “Did you watch any programs about the campaign on 
television?”  was included rather than “During a typical week, how many days do you watch 
national news on TV, not including sports?”  Questions with fewer categories were selected 
because random forests can be biased towards variables with more response categories, 
although this is corrected for in the particular implementation used here.  Additionally, to the 
extent that we are looking for coherent substantive interpretation of the relationships, a single 
binary variable is more straightforward than treating an ordinal variable as interval or 
including a series of dummies.  
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important variables allows for comparison of which independent variables have substantively 
stronger connections to each of the different forms of political participation.  
Table 3.2: Independent Variables Included in Machine Learning Analysis 
Demographics Political Capital Political Attitudes 
Female Campaign Interest Strong Preference for Pres Candidate 
Age News Source: Social Media Bible is Word of God 
Attends Church News Source: Blogs American Identity Important 
Religion is Important News Source: Internet Emotion When See Flag 
Education News Source: TV Journalists Provide Fair Election Coverage 
Married News Source: Newspaper Voters Offered Real Choice 
Veteran/Military Status News Source: Radio Rich Buy Elections 
Union Member Trust Gov to do Right It Makes a Difference Who Is In Power 
Union Member in Household Gov Run by Big Interests Who People Vote For Makes a Difference 
Hispanic Government Wasteful Satisfied with US Democracy 
Black Government Corrupt Therm Difference: Pres Candidates (10 pt) 
White Elections Make Gov Pay Attention Therm Difference: Parties (10 pt) 
Owns Home Political Knowledge, out of 7 Independent 
Years at Current Address Efficacy: Politics too Complicated Republican 
Income Efficacy: I Understand Politics Strength of Party ID 
Homosexual/Bisexual Efficacy: Public Officials Care Care who wins Pres Election 
Opinionation Efficacy: No Say in Gov Should Adjust Morality to Changing World 
Authoritarianism Scale  New Lifestyles = Societal Breakdown 
 Social Norms Should Be Tolerant of Diff Moral Standards 
Political Activity Social Trust More Emphasis on Traditional Family Ties 
Registered to Vote Member of Civic Organization Financial Change Past Year 
Voted in 2008 General Can See Both Sides of Disagreement Expected Financial Change Next Year 
Voted in 2012 General Someone Tried to Persuade R Should Gov Use Scientific Approaches 
Voted in 2012 Primary  
 Voting is a Duty Political Environment  
Ever Discuss Politics Close Pres Race in State  
 
Voter Mobilization Contact  
 Campaign Contact  
 Parties are Different  
 
One common statistical problem that arises where many explanatory variables are present 
in a dataset is overfitting the data.  When models are overfit, some variables may appear 
highly significant for the analyzed data, but when applied to a new sample they are not 
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significant and the model performs poorly.  In order to avoid results that are idiosyncratic 
features of this dataset, it is essential to self-consciously take measures that avoid overfitting 
the data and improve the generalizability of the results.  As implemented here, both random 
forest and lasso use cross-validation methods where the models are developed using a subset 
of the data, and their predictive accuracy is tested on the remaining portion.  When repeated 
many times, this helps combat overfitting (Gareth et al. 2013).   
Classification Trees and Random Forests    
Classification trees are a non-parametric statistical tool that can be useful in determining 
what attributes best predict a binary outcome (see Chapter 8 of Gareth, Witten, Hastie, and 
Tibshirani, 2013 for an introduction).  The classification tree takes the set of available 
predictors, and at each “branch” in the tree (called a node), determines which predictor 
results in a binary split of the data (or predictor space) that most improves the overall 
classification of cases into the outcome categories.44   In this way, the classification tree 
divides the overall set of observations into subgroups that share similar attributes and 
(ideally) have the same value for the dependent variable.  The iterative process ends when 
only a small number of cases (i.e., 1) are left in each of the remaining subgroups, known as 
“leaves” or terminal nodes.   
At each node, the classification tree selects the variable (and split of that variable) that 
will result in the most improvement in the classification of respondents into groups (i.e. 
persuaders vs. non-persuaders).  Variables chosen earlier in the process are therefore 
understood as more “powerful” or “better” predictors of persuasive behavior than those 
                                                 
44 One advantage of the random forest algorithm is that ordinal or categorical data can be 
included in its original form, and the algorithm will automatically determine which category 
(or categories) should be used to define the split.   
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chosen later in the process.  Although this process does not provide a point estimate for the 
independent, causal effect of a single attribute on the overall outcome, the subdivision of 
respondents into groups provides a profile of individuals who are most (or least) likely to 
engage in persuasive behavior.   
However, a single classification tree is often lacking in overall predictive accuracy and 
prone to overfitting (Gareth et al. 2013, 303).  A random forest algorithm “grows” a whole 
forest of classification trees as described above, with two differences.  First, the tree is grown 
from a random subset of the data, with accuracy tested on the “out-of-bag” sample.  Second, 
at each node, the algorithm is only allowed to select from a random subset of the available 
predictor variables.  This results in significant variation in the placement of variables from 
one tree to the next.45  Then, the relative importance of the various predictors is compared 
across all of the trees in the random forest, resulting in a ranking of which variables most 
efficiently classify the observations.  The random forest provides a means for comparing the 
available independent variables to determine which attributes are the most efficient 
predictors of persuasive behavior.   
Variable importance is calculated by randomly permuting the values for the variable in 
each tree and then calculating the mean decrease in predictive accuracy (percent of cases 
correctly classified), called the permutation importance score.  The idea is that if the variable 
values are replaced with random, and therefore uncorrelated, data, the comparison provides a 
numerical evaluation of the independent influence of each variable on the overall 
                                                 
45 This is an important way of dealing with correlated variables in the dataset.  For 
example, if two variables are highly correlated, but one has a slightly better improvement in 
prediction accuracy, the first will always be chosen and, because a related split was already 
conducted, the second may not be chosen until much later in the tree (if at all).  The use of a 
random subset of variables for each node allows for an independent estimation of the 
importance of each variable.  
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classification accuracy.46  However, one shortcoming to this approach is that the calculations 
assume no correlation between the predictor variables, so variables which are not in 
themselves important (i.e. home ownership), but which are correlated with other variables 
that are efficient predictors (i.e. income), may receive an artificially high rating.  As of this 
writing, it is not computationally feasible to correct for correlation among predictor 
variables; therefore the use of other methods (such as lasso, which does not suffer from this 
bias) is valuable in providing an independent check and informing correct interpretation of 
the results.   
Random Forest Results 
Using the random forest algorithm, I identify which of the 72 independent variables 
included are the most efficient predictors of different forms of political behavior.  There are 
three different dependent variables, which are generated based on the results of the factor 
analysis: 1) attempts at political persuasion, 2) campaign participation – displaying a 
sign/sticker, donating to a campaign, working for a campaign, or attending a political rally, 
and 3) discursive participation – discussing politics and sending political messages via social 
media.  All three of the dependent variables are binary, indicating whether the respondent 
reported engaging in any of the included political behaviors.  The strength of this approach is 
                                                 
46 There is a second method of calculating variable importance, which involves averaging 
the decrease in Gini (purity of the terminal nodes) for each branch where the split is defined 
based on each variable.  However, this measure is biased towards variables that have more 
potential splits, and is not recommended for situations where there are multiple classes of 
data (Strobl, Boulesteix, Zeileis, & Hothorn, 2007).    
This bias can also a problem for the permutation accuracy calculation when the sampling 
of predictor variables occurs with replacement, but is unbiased when sampling without 
replacement occurs.  The analysis presented here includes sampling without replacement 
using the cforest command in the R package party (Hothorn et al. 2006; Strobl et al. 2007, 
2008). 
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that it allows for a direct comparison of the most important predictors of three different types 
of participation.  Because each analysis draws from the same large pool of predictor 
variables, the relative importance of different predictors can be compared to generate a sense 
of the similarities and differences between the three forms of participation.  The results of 
this analysis are depicted in Figure 3.1.  The top 10 most important variables for all three 
outcomes are displayed, and the bars represent the permutation importance score.  Higher 
values indicate that the variable is a more efficient predictor of whether someone will engage 
in each type of behavior.47   
The random forest results provide further evidence of the connection between political 
discussion and attempts to persuade others.  Political discussion is the most important 
variable for predicting political persuasion, while it is the 7th most important variable for 
predicting campaign participation.48  The high importance of political discussion also reflects 
a practical relationship.  It is hard to “talk to someone and try to show them why they should 
vote for or against a party or candidate” if you never talk to anyone about politics.  
Therefore, it is unsurprising that political discussion is the most efficient predictor of 
persuasive behavior. 
Consistent with the expectations outlined in Chapter 2, and with Hansen’s conclusion that 
political interest is the strongest predictor of attempts to persuade (Hansen 1997, 84), 
attention to the political campaign follows discussion in importance.  In fact, attention to the 
campaign is the second most important variable for all three types of political behavior.  The 
                                                 
47 The permutation importance score is not an interpretable relational parameter, and it 
does not signify a directional or causal relationship.  However, it is useful in distinguishing 
which variables have a stronger connection to the outcome of interest, and allows for an 
ordering of variables based on their importance as predictors.   
48 Political discussion is not included as a predictor of discursive participation. 
 86 
Figure 3.1: Random Forest: Most Important Variables 
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high and consistent importance of political interest indicates that any form of participation 
and engagement in politics cannot be understood without accounting for individual interest 
and investment in political events.     
third most important variable for predicting attempts to persuade is whether someone else 
tried to persuade the respondent.  This is also a highly important variable for discursive 
participation (#7), but not for campaign participation (#31). This supports the hypothesized 
role for social norms in discursive participation, where, rather than having a set of influential 
people who always do the persuading and a set of malleable or ambivalent targets of 
persuasion, persuasive efforts begat persuasive efforts.  Further exploration of the temporal 
ordering and specific circumstances of reciprocal persuasive efforts is necessary to 
understand the social dynamics and causal relationships involved in this process. 
Opinionation and attitude extremity are also among the most important variables 
predicting persuasion.  Self-perception of having a lot of opinions is related to engagement in 
persuasive behavior and discussion, but much less predictive of campaign participation.  
However, the difference in the 10-point like/dislike ratings of both candidates and parties are 
related to both persuasion and campaign participation, but are not as related to discursive 
participation.  Attitudes, then, seem to affect participation in two ways.  Having a lot of 
opinions leads people to talk a lot about politics, but perceiving a bigger difference between 
the available political options leads to more activism on behalf of a cause.  This is one area 
where political persuasion seems to bridge the gap between discursive participation and 
campaign activism, and clarify some of the ambiguity regarding the role of opinions in 
political participation (see the discussion in Chapter 2).    
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The most important variable for predicting campaign participation is direct contact by a 
political candidate or party.  Contact by a campaign is also among the most important 
variables for both political persuasion (#5) and discursive participation (#11), but the 
magnitude is much smaller.  This confirms the expectations laid out in Chapter 2, where 
direct mobilization has a demonstrated relationship with persuasive participation, but is not 
expected to motivate the majority of persuasive attempts in everyday conversations.  The role 
of campaign contact in producing discussion, persuasion, and participation also deserves 
further exploration, some of which is provided in Chapter 5. 
There are four measures of efficacy included in the random forest algorithm, but only one 
– the most direct measure of internal efficacy, whether the respondent is confident in their 
ability to understand politics – is among the most important variables for all three measures 
of political participation.  This suggests that internal confidence in a capacity to participate in 
politics is more important than a belief that the system will respond to individual efforts or 
opinions for all forms of participation.  The role of both internal and external efficacy will be 
examined in more depth in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.   
Finally, the most important predictor of discursive participation is using the internet as a 
source for political news.  As a practical matter, the discursive participation outcome 
includes individuals who send messages via social media.  Therefore, internet use for 
political information is going to be an efficient classifier to distinguish the segment of the 
population who use the internet for political purposes.  However, underscoring the 
importance of engagement in the campaign, the use of all four forms of media by which 
people seek political information (internet, television, newspaper, and radio) are among the 
most important variables for all three types of participation.   
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There are some additional interesting findings in what is not an important predictor.  For 
example, and contrary to the expectations laid out in Chapter 2, objective political 
information is an important predictor for discursive participation (#8), but not for campaign 
participation (#26) or persuasion (#56).  This indicates that attempts to persuade are not just a 
manifestation of expertise, and that a focus on increasing information may improve 
discussion rates but is probably insufficient for motivating both campaign participation and 
persuasion.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, income and education also do not break into 
the top 10 list for any form of political participation.  Several specific attitudes, including 
patriotism, civic duty, or attitudes about government function, were also not among the most 
important variables.  Similarly, although having a big difference in feelings about the 
candidates or parties is very important for all three outcomes, actual partisanship (Republican 
vs. Democrat) is not an important predictor.  Participation seems to depend more on the 
personal trait of having a lot of strong opinions, and is not determined by the particular 
content of those opinions. 
The random forest results indicate ways in which persuasive behavior is similar to both 
discursive participation and campaign participation.  However, the similarities to discursive 
participation occur with more important (higher ranked) variables than the similarities to 
campaign participation.  Specifically, persuasion and other forms of discursive participation 
are highly connected to psychological engagement and social norms in a way that campaign 
participation is not.  But persuasive behavior also retains some of the reactivity to the 
election (campaign contact and attitude extremity), that characterize campaign participation.  
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Lasso Methods 
 Like random forest, lasso provides a statistical way to narrow a large field of potential 
predictors into a manageable set of most influential variables.  Lasso takes an iterative 
approach to logistic regression, which limits the variables in each model to those that most 
efficiently predict the binary outcome of interest.  For each logistic regression, lasso sets a 
parameter, λ, which penalizes the model for the sum total of the (normalized) coefficients.49  
A λ of 0 would have no penalty, and would therefore give the same results as a typical least 
squares logistic regression model.  As λ increases, the model must determine how to allocate 
the scarce available total value for the coefficients, which is done by assigning a coefficient 
of 0 to more variables – effectively removing them from the model.  For the remaining 
variables, larger coefficients are allocated to the variables with the most predictive value. 
Because of the zero-sum accounting and normalized parameters of lasso, the coefficients 
are not easily interpreted, and there is not yet an accepted method of calculating standard 
errors or performing a significance test.  Therefore, in addition to the results from the lasso 
displayed Table 3.3, I report a logistic regression model including the most important 
variables identified by each lasso, which lends itself to more familiar substantive 
interpretation.   
                                                 
49 The tricky part of lasso is determining the appropriate value of λ.  A single lasso 
calculation will report the models that result from each of a series of possible λ values, but 
does not provide any guidance as to which value (and resulting logit model) is most 
appropriate.  Therefore, I use cross-validation to identify the best value for λ.  Cross-
validation divides the data into 10 parts (folds), then uses 9/10 to fit a lasso model, and then 
predicts the outcomes for the remaining 1/10 of the data.  This is iterated over all folds to 
provide estimates of the average prediction error for each potential value of λ.  From there, it 
is common to identify either the value of λ that corresponds to the minimum mean prediction 
error, or the first λ that comes within one standard error of the minimum.   I use the latter, as 
it is less likely to overfit the data.   
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Lasso and Logit Results 
The lasso algorithm produces a larger range of most important variables, but examining 
the top candidates and comparing with the random forest results is instructive.  Table 3.3 
includes the same variables (in the same order) as Figure 3.1, with full results available in 
Appendix 3D.  For persuasion, the lasso estimation does not identify any additional 
important variables beyond what was included in the random forest results. Although the 
rank ordering is slightly different, the top six most important variables predicting persuasion 
are identical between lasso and random forest (political discussion, campaign interest, 
someone else persuading the R, opinionation, campaign contact, and TV news). The same is 
true for the top 6 variables for discursive participation (internet news, someone else 
persuading the R, TV news, parties are different, campaign interest, and opinionation), and 
the top 5 variables for campaign participation (campaign contact, campaign interest, voter 
mobilization, organizational member, and primary voter; although race is also of high 
importance in the lasso results, see Appendix 3D).   There is a high degree of consistency in 
the top most important variables between the two estimation techniques, which provides 
added confidence in the strong predictive power of these explanatory variables. 
There are also substantial differences in the most important predictors between the 
different forms of political participation.  While discursive participation is most strongly 
related to variables that signify interest in the political process and development of political 
opinions, campaign participation is more related to contact with civic, political, and 
campaign organizations.  Persuasion includes more variables that overlap with discursive 
participation, such as discussion, campaign interest, and TV news, but campaign 
mobilization and organizational membership are still strong predictors of persuasion, 
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providing some continued overlap with campaign participation.  Attempts to persuade others 
retain elements of both discursive and campaign participation.  Persuasion is more activist in 
nature than other forms of discursive participation, but the most important variables have 
more overlap with discursive participation than campaign participation. 
Table 3.3: Lasso Estimation of Most Important Variables 
  Attempts to 
Persuade 
Discursive 
Participation 
Campaign 
Participation 
  Lasso Logit Lasso Logit Lasso Logit 
Ever Discuss Politics .76 .98 (.10) *** 
  
.22 .39 (.12) *** 
Campaign Interest .45 .46 (.07) *** .39 .39 (.08) *** .53 .56 (.08) *** 
Someone Tried to Persuade R .32 .66 (.08) *** .83 .97 (.12) *** 
  
Opinionation .11 .25 (.05) *** .35 .37 (.06) *** .01 .09 (.06) 
Campaign Contact .13 .23 (.08) ** .19 .24 (.10) * .60 .73 (.09) *** 
News Source: TV .10 .44 (.11) *** .58 .68 (.11) *** 
  
Therm Difference: Pres Candidates (10 pt) .03 .08 (.02) *** .01 .02 (.02) .03 .04 (.02) * 
Therm Difference: Parties (10 pt) .01 .04 (.02) * .01 .01 (.02) .03 .03 (.02) 
Member of Civic Organization .08 .32 (.08) *** .07 .10 (.10) .34 .53 (.08) *** 
Efficacy: I Understand Politics .03 .11 (.04) ** .18 .19 (.05) *** .03 .06 (.05) 
News Source: Internet .00 .23 (.08) ** .69 .67 (.10) *** .23 .38 (.09) *** 
News Source: Newspaper .01 .22 (.08) ** .10 .18 (.10) .15 .33 (.09) *** 
Voted in 2012 Primary .03 .29 (.08) *** 
  
.26 .43 (.08) *** 
Voter Mobilization Contact .02 .28 (.08) *** .15 .23 (.10) * .34 .53 (.08) *** 
Care Who Wins Pres Election 
  
.27 .31 (.14) * 
  
Strength of Party ID 
    
.01 .08 (.05) 
Parties are Different 
  
.47 .48 (.13) *** 
  
Income 
  
.02 .03 (.01) *** 
  
Political Knowledge 
  
.15 .18 (.04) *** 
  
Intercept -2.81 -5.23 (.23) *** -5.37 -6.30 (.57) *** -4.21 -6.56 (.31) *** 
N 
 
3970 
 
3970 
 
3970 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01.  Standard errors for the coefficients in the logit models are 
given in parenthesis. Full results available in Appendix 3D. 
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One benefit of the lasso results is that they are based on logistic regression, and the most 
important variables can then be incorporated into a traditional model with a more 
straightforward relational interpretation.  In the logistic regression models, not all of the 
variables identified by the lasso as important are statistically significant.  This is not 
surprising, as the algorithm selects variables that improve the classification of the subset of 
variables that are not yet accurately classified.50   When variables identified relatively late in 
the process are then used in a model with other control variables to predict the full set of 
results, they may not be statistically significant.  Even so, the top most important variables 
are statistically significant, with signs in the expected directions.   
Variables which capture political capital, meaning interest, knowledge, and previous 
political activity are important across all three forms of political participation.  Consistent 
with the results of the random forest in the previous section, interest in the campaign and 
attention to political news in a variety of formats is highly important for all three dependent 
variables.  Objective political knowledge, on the other hand, is only an important predictor of 
discursive participation.  Additionally, internal efficacy (confidence in one’s own ability to 
understand politics) is important and has a statistically significant positive relationship with 
political discussion and political persuasion.  By contrast external efficacy (expectation of 
government responsiveness to individual efforts) has a statistically significant relationship 
with campaign behavior, but internal efficacy is not statistically significant. 
Among the individual-level traits, echoing the random forest results, opinionation is a 
positive and statistically significant predictor of both persuasion and discursive participation, 
but not of campaign participation.  However, while holding a lot of opinions is related to 
                                                 
50 See Lo, Chernoff, Zheng, and Lo (2015) for a more thorough discussion of the 
relationship between highly significant and highly predictive variables. 
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discursive and persuasive behavior, the overall results of the logit and lasso models indicate 
that there are not necessarily specific political attitudes that motivate more political 
participation than others. Aside from opinionation, there are no other individual-level 
predictors that have a consistent effect on political persuasion.  In spite of what much 
political science research claims about the value of resources in motivating political 
participation, income and education are not found to be important predictors of attempts to 
persuade by either metric.  Income is an important and statistically significant predictor of 
political discussion (probably largely due to the inclusion of online participation in the 
measure of discursive participation), but otherwise income and education are not important 
predictors of any of the three forms of political participation.  This may be because income 
and education influence participation indirectly, and more direct variables are available (and 
important) in the analysis.  
Moving to the effects of the social and political context, we find that persuasion shares 
similarity with both discursive participation and campaign participation.  Again consistent 
with the results of the random forest, someone else attempting to persuade the respondent has 
a positive relationship with both persuasion and discursive participation, but not campaign 
participation.  As expected, social norms are an important piece of understanding persuasion 
as a form of discursive participation.   
On the other hand, the respondent’s relationship with the broader political environment 
matters for persuasion and campaign participation in a way that it does not affect discursive 
participation.  Membership in a civic organization, voter mobilization contact, and contact by 
a political campaign all have positive effects on persuasion and campaign participation.  
However, confirming some key differences between campaign participation and persuasion, 
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not all features of the political context motivate attempts to persuade.  The perceived 
closeness of the presidential race does not affect political persuasion or discursive 
participation, but is important for campaign participation.  Direct contact seems to be 
important for motivating participation, but the likelihood of impacting national outcomes (by 
competitiveness of election or changes in policy direction) does not seem to be an important 
reason why some people try to persuade others. 
IV. Discussion 
The analysis in this chapter uses three different statistical analyses to explore whether 
attempts to persuade others are more like other forms of discursive participation or more like 
campaign participation.  Factor analysis uses the statistical relationships between the 
dependent variables themselves to identify underlying dimensions of similarity and 
difference among forms of political participation.  The two machine learning algorithms 
allow for the comparison of important independent variables across the different kinds of 
participation.  The use of all three approaches adds confidence in the results and depth to our 
understanding of different forms of political participation.   
The results confirm the existence of a discursive dimension of political participation, 
which is comprised of attempts to persuade others, informal political conversation, and 
political messaging on social media sites.  Using data from the 2012 ANES, I am able to 
replicate the factor structure reported in the influential works of Verba and Nie (1972) and 
Zukin et al. (2006), which include political persuasion among the forms of active campaign 
involvement.  However, previous research does not account for the possibility that there is a 
discursive dimension to political participation, and does not consider the potential for 
attempts to persuade others to fit in the discursive dimension.  The analysis presented here 
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contributes to our understanding of political participation by directly testing for the existence 
of a discursive dimension to political participation.  By including four measures of discursive 
participation, I find evidence for the existence of a discursive dimension to political 
participation and that attempts to persuade others loads more heavily on the discursive factor 
than on the campaign participation factor. 
Additionally, using two machine learning techniques (random forest and lasso), I identify 
the variables that are the most efficient predictors of attempts to persuade, discursive 
participation, and campaign participation.  The random forest and lasso algorithms narrow 
more than 70 independent variables down to a handful of “most important” predictors; and 
the results are highly consistent across methods.  This allows me to go beyond just looking at 
the dependent variables and inferring the characteristics of the underlying factor to actually 
examining the relationship of the various dimensions to potential predictor variables.  
Comparison of the most important variables across the different forms of participation 
reveals important systematic differences that conform to theoretical expectations about the 
nature of discursive and campaign participation.  This analysis reveals that even though  
persuasive behavior retains some similarities to campaign participation, it has more in 
common with discursive participation.   
Specifically, discursive participation is related to increased interest in the campaign, 
attention to political news, and high levels of opinionation, while campaign participation is 
most related to external social and political forces, such as membership in civic organizations 
or contact by a party or campaign organization.  Political persuasion shares more important 
variables with discursive participation, but in some ways bridges the gap between “just 
talking” about politics and active engagement in the political process. 
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There has been a great deal of normative discussion and empirical research about whether 
everyday political conversation among the mass public is sufficient to revitalize democracy 
(Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Mendelberg 
2002; Mutz 2008).  Much of this literature relies on demonstrating connections between 
discursive or deliberative participation and further political action.  The results of this chapter 
suggest that political persuasion bears more in common with other forms of discursive 
participation than with the campaign behaviors with which it is usually scaled.  However, 
paying more attention to the qualitative differences in how people approach political 
conversation – specifically, whether or not they try to persuade others when they talk about 
politics – suggests one way in which political discussion may become more than “just talk.” 
These results also represent a caution for future political behavior scholars in their use of 
scales of political participation.  In particular, the distinctiveness of political persuasion from 
other forms of campaign participation suggests that future research should more carefully 
consider whether and how to include measures of interpersonal persuasion in statistical 
models.  This is not to say that all previous applications of participation scales are incorrect 
or misleading, but we should be more forthcoming about the inherent assumptions we make 
when creating those scales, and the ways that the assumptions might affect the results and 
their interpretations.  Persuasive behavior is predicted by a set of factors that is quite distinct 
from other forms of campaign participation, and the continued inclusion of persuasion in 
participation scales may obscure important findings in areas where persuasion is most 
different (i.e. the effects of competition or campaign mobilization). 
The final contribution of the present work is methodological.  Machine learning 
techniques are gaining increasing popularity both in academia and the private sector.  
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Machine learning methods are prized for their inductive approach that is free of researcher 
bias, a characteristic that is both an advantage and disadvantage.  The advantage of avoiding 
bias in the selection of variables is contrasted with the lack of a direct test of a causal 
theoretical model or interpretable coefficients.  Researchers must carefully select appropriate 
methods and be clear about their justification and application to a particular research project; 
but, when done properly, the results can be extremely informative and shed new light on 
important social science questions. The analysis presented here is one example of how these 
techniques can provide evidence relevant to answering theory-driven political science 
questions.   
The analysis presented in this chapter paints in relatively broad strokes.  Rather than 
emphasizing the development of specific causal models or estimation of particular 
parameters, this chapter examines the statistical properties of relationships between variables.  
While this statistical overview is valuable in identifying how persuasive behavior relates to 
other dimensions of political behavior, it provides little concrete understanding of the process 
or motivations of political persuasion.  The next chapter aims to fill in some of these details 
by addressing both descriptive features of persuasive behavior and causal modeling of the 
motivations for persuasion over time.  
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Chapter 4: The Who, What, When, and Why of Interpersonal 
Persuasion 
Whether in elections or policymaking, all political outcomes fundamentally hinge on 
persuading others to support a preferred position. For politicians and other elite actors, the 
reasons why they try to persuade others are often quite clear – they would like to gather 
support for their policy positions or candidacy, and persuading others is instrumental to their 
success. However, the reasons why the political layperson attempts to persuade their friends, 
family, or coworkers are not as clear, as these individuals receive little direct, tangible benefit 
from attempting to persuade others. Building on the broad brushstrokes of the analyses in the 
previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is to unpack the black box and examine the nature of  
persuasive behavior by directly answering several fundamental questions: Who, What, 
When, and Why.  Investigating these questions reveals a number of ways in which 
persuasion may not fit with the traditional expectations of campaign behavior, and moves 
towards a clearer understanding of the nature and function of persuasive behavior as a form 
of democratic participation.  
As a fundamental democratic action, persuasion yields little individual-level reward but 
has the potential to drive huge shifts in aggregate public opinion.  Indeed, interpersonal 
influence has been considered an important mechanism for the diffusion of political attitudes 
for more than a half century (Gamson 1992; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955).  Although there is 
mounting empirical evidence demonstrating that interpersonal influence occurs (Huckfeldt 
and Sprague 1995; Lyons et al. 2016; McClurg 2006), there is very little understanding of 
how persuasion happens in everyday conversations.  The implications of political persuasion 
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for democratic theory and practice cannot be assessed without first adequately describing the 
occurrence and function of interpersonal persuasion in the mass public.   
The prior chapters of this work have given significant cause to doubt that all forms of 
participation are motivated by the potential for influencing elections or policy outcomes. 
Campaign participation is therefore expected to be outward-facing, where external forces 
stimulate engagement in an external political process.   However, interpersonal persuasion 
may be better understood as a way in which individuals psychologically engage with the 
political system than as a direct form of campaign participation.  The theory tested here is 
that individuals try to persuade others as a way of processing their own political 
considerations and beliefs as they navigate the social norms of their discussion networks; 
they do not necessarily persuade because they believe changing other people’s views will 
move political outcomes in their preferred direction.  As such, individual psychological traits 
and social influences are expected to have a more substantial impact on persuasive behavior 
than external forces.      
Using the framework of Who, What, When, and Why people engage in persuasive 
behavior, I examine how internal and social factors facilitate persuasion.  Each section 
provides some evidence towards resolving significant debates or ambiguities that are present 
in the existing empirical and theoretical literature on interpersonal persuasion.  Taken as a 
whole, this empirically-grounded and nuanced description of persuasion improves not only 
our academic understanding of persuasive behavior, but also provides practical insights into 
an important mechanism by which public opinion and electoral outcomes are shaped.  
One way that the social and instrumental differences in political persuasion can be 
explored is by examining who people target in their attempts to persuade others.  If 
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persuasion is mostly about getting a “win” for their candidate or issue, then we would expect 
to find that most persuaders are individuals who are passionately committed to a particular 
cause, and therefore try to persuade everyone in their social networks to have as much impact 
as possible.  However, if persuaders attend closely to social dynamics, they might be willing 
to persuade some kinds of contacts but not others.  For example, Huckfeldt and Sprague 
(1988) find that people strategically select political discussants from among the contacts 
available in their social networks.  Perhaps the selection of a target for persuasion is also a 
strategic subsample of political discussion partners.  Additionally, although disagreement is 
not equivalent to persuasion per se, Mutz (2006) finds that disagreement is systematically 
more likely to come from some kinds of relationships (i.e. coworkers) than others (i.e. 
family). Examining the target of persuasive endeavors can inform us about the relative 
weight of instrumental versus social motivations for persuasive endeavors.   
Next, examining the particular subject matter of persuasive efforts provides insight about 
how persuasion interacts with other kinds of participation.  Specifically, persuasion is a 
relatively low-cost endeavor (in terms of time and monetary resources), and so it is often 
seen as a precursor, or at least a natural companion to, other forms of campaign involvement.  
If individuals are really trying to influence the outcome of elections through their 
participation, then it seems reasonable to expect, say, campaign donors to make their dollars 
count by directly trying to influence others’ attitudes about that same issue or candidate.  
However, if the end goal of attempts to persuade is not about winning the election, then 
persuasion may occur about a wide variety of issues, whether or not the individual is actively 
participating on behalf of that issue in other ways. 
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Past empirical work has demonstrated but not discussed a consistent negative relationship 
between attempts to persuade and age (Hansen 1997; Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  The discussion of “when” takes advantage of the panel 
nature of the Youth Parent Socialization Panel to explore this particular puzzle and determine 
whether life-cycle effects or generational replacement are responsible for the decline.  
Examining the life-cycle trends of different forms of participation is one way of exploring the 
similarities and differences between persuasion and other forms of participation, and allows 
for further theory-building about the factors that influence the decision to try to persuade.      
Finally, three potential explanations of “why” people choose to persuade are explored: 1) 
because they care a lot about the issue/candidate, 2) because they are interested in politics, 
and 3) because someone asked them to.  The first suggests an instrumental motivation, 
directly connected to achieving a desired outcome on a personally important issue.  The 
second is an individual-level psychological explanation, where the decision to persuade 
comes from individual enjoyment of politics generally, and not a particular cause. The third 
is an external motivation where social contacts or campaign organizations directly instigate 
participation.  All three explanations are likely true to some extent for different individuals, 
however examining the relative importance of instrumental, individual, and social 
motivations in a single model is instructive.   
The following analysis contributes to our understanding of political behavior in several 
ways.  First, it provides a descriptive look at the landscape of persuasive behavior in the 
United States over time, a perspective that has not been well-described in previous work on 
persuasion.  Second, by specifically examining a variety of ambiguities in existing literature 
provides a clearer conceptual understanding of the individual and social (rather than external 
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or instrumental) motivations for political persuasion.  Third, a better foundational 
understanding of the mechanism of interpersonal persuasion is essential to improving models 
of the diffusion of public opinion and understanding the role and potential of discursive 
participation in democratic government. 
I. Data and Methods 
The Youth-Parent Political Socialization Panel (YPSP)  began in 1965 with a nationally 
representative survey of high school seniors (G2) and their parents (G1).51 The students and 
parents were then re-interviewed in 1973 and 1982, and the students were interviewed a final 
time in 1997.52 I have combined the four-wave student data (ICPSR #4037) with the three-
wave parent data (ICPSR #9553) to create one dataset that includes 935 students and 898 
parents who participated in all waves of the survey. From the original sample, 45% of G1 
(parents) and 56% of G2 (students) respondents are retained across all waves and included in 
this analysis. For the majority of the analysis, the data have been reshaped into a panel, 
where each completed survey is a separate observation and most individual respondents are 
represented by three or four observations (one for each wave of the survey).  
There are several advantages to using the YPSP to explore persuasive behavior. First, 
while many political surveys focus on behavior during a particular election cycle or race, the 
YPSP asks respondents to report their political activities since the last wave of the survey (a 
span of 8, 9, or 15 years), which allows for a more representative look at the natural 
occurrence of persuasive behavior over a variety of political contexts. Additionally, 
                                                 
51 See the appendix to The Political Character of Adolescence (Jennings and Niemi 1974) 
for a full description of the original data collection. 
52 The student generation’s children (G3) were also interviewed in 1997, but they are not 
included in this analysis. 
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respondents in two waves of the survey (1973 and 1982) were asked to describe whom, 
when, and about what they attempted to persuade. The detailed and often open-ended nature 
of these responses allows for a more robust descriptive picture of persuasion as it occurs than 
closed-ended accounts in a single context. Second, the panel nature of the data allows for the 
exploration of changes in political behavior across the life cycle, and captures variation in 
political behavior as a result of changes in individual circumstances and characteristics.  
The primary dependent variable of interest is whether individuals reported an attempt to 
persuade others about a political candidate or issue. Persuasion was the first behavior asked 
about in a battery of 9 political activities,53 after the following introduction:  
I have a list of some of the things that people do to help make an election come 
out the way they want it to. I wonder if you could tell me whether you have done any 
of these things during any kind of public election? By that I mean elections for public 
office or votes on issues, propositions, referenda, and so on. First, did you ever talk to 
any people and try to show them why they should vote one way or the other?54 
 
After respondents reported whether they attempted to persuade someone else, they were 
asked to identify the target(s) of their persuasive behavior – friends, family members, 
coworkers, or some combination of the three. Furthermore, in the second and third waves of 
the survey, they were asked to report the year and subject of their persuasive attempts (2 
mentions in 1973, 3 mentions in 1982). These additional questions are also used as dependent 
variables to examine the occurrence of persuasive behavior. 
                                                 
53 In 1965: Only 5 behaviors were included in the battery, and students (G2) were not 
asked about political participation at all (including persuasion). 
54 There are two caveats to note about this question wording. 1. The text primes 
respondents to think about persuasion as something they do to “help make an election come 
out the way they want it to.” I argue elsewhere that this is not the primary motivation for 
persuasion. 2. The presumed intention of the attempt to persuade is to change someone else’s 
behavior, specifically their vote choice, rather than trying to change someone else’s opinion. 
These assumptions in the question wording may make depress recall of persuasive 
interactions that were non-electoral in nature, and may make it more difficult to gauge the 
extent of non-electoral motivations for persuasion. 
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Importantly, the panel nature of the data allows for the inclusion of respondent-level 
fixed effects, which account for all stable individual-level traits that might influence an 
individual’s propensity to persuade others. Therefore, factors that vary at the individual level 
over the several survey waves can be included as explanations for variations in individual 
decisions to persuade, while simultaneously ruling out the possibility that unobserved, stable 
individual-level characteristics are creating spurious correlations. In models where fixed 
effects are included, individual-level traits that have little or no variance across survey waves 
(e.g., gender) cannot also be included as independent variables, and so are omitted. 
II. How Much? 
Before moving on to the more substantive questions regarding persuasive behavior, it is 
useful to provide some background information regarding the rates of persuasion in the 
survey, and this sample’s comparison to the nationally representative American National 
Election Studies (ANES).  Figure 4.1 displays the percent of respondents in each wave of the 
YPSP who reported voting in the last presidential election and attempting to influence the 
vote of someone else. This is paired with the matching presidential election-year ANES 
response rates for the same two questions.  
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Figure 4.1: Rates of Voting and Persuasion Behavior 
 
Notes on Figure 4.2: YPSP reports of voting behavior in the most recent presidential 
election are paired with ANES voting rates from the same presidential election year.  
YPSP retrospective reports of persuasion span the entire timeframe between survey waves, 
whereas ANES reports are only from the listed presidential election year, and are therefore not 
a direct comparison (YPSP are expected to be higher because of the longer timeframe). 
For YPSP: 1964 is based on G1 responses in 1965; 1972 is based on G1 and G2 responses 
in 1973; 1980 is based on G1 and G2 responses in 1982; and 1996 is based on G2 responses in 
1997. 
 
Overall, YPSP respondents report more political activity than ANES respondents. On 
average, YPSP respondents have 5-10% higher rates of voting and persuading than the 
corresponding ANES respondents. About 80 percent of YPSP respondents reported voting in 
the last presidential election, and about 40 percent reported attempting to persuade someone 
else. The YPSP rates of voting and persuasion are both higher than the ANES estimates, and 
clearly higher than the actual turnout rates for those years.   
There are at least two factors that contribute to the atypically high activism of the YPSP 
respondents. First, the sample is skewed towards the well-educated, as high school seniors 
and their parents were the sample, which removes all high school drop-outs (and their 
parents) from the sampling frame. Second, the protest generation of which the G2 
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respondents were a part was characterized by an unusually high degree of activism (Jennings 
and Beck 1979). Therefore, the YPSP data should be taken with caution when estimating 
population parameters, keeping in mind that the politically inactive segments of the 
population are likely to be underestimated, and that any analysis that includes G2 responses 
will report higher levels of participation overall.  
Additionally, because the following analysis is based on panel data, Figure 4.2 depicts the 
total number of survey waves in which respondents (G1 and G2 combined) reported an 
attempt to influence the vote of others.  The modal response is no persuasion reported in any 
wave of the survey (37%), indicating that more than a third of the respondents never 
intentionally tried to persuade someone else. When compared with only 14% of respondents 
who never engaged in any of the other eight forms of political participation, there remains a 
sizeable segment of the population who is willing to be politically engaged in other ways, but 
unwilling to try to persuade others. On the other end of the spectrum, while some individuals 
are habitual persuaders who will go to bat for their preferred cause(s) regularly, there are just 
as many who are motivated enough to get involved for one issue or election cycle, but do not 
continue that behavior in future elections. There is a roughly equal division between 
persuasion in one, two, and three waves of the survey (24%, 19%, and 20%, respectively).55  
 
  
                                                 
55 Recall that, because G2 respondents were not asked about political participation in 
1965, each generation is asked about persuasion in 3 waves; making 3 the max for both G1 
and G2. 
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Figure 4.2: Number of Survey Waves in Which Persuasive Behavior was Reported 
 
Looking at the data from a different angle, approximately 50% of respondents who 
reported an attempt to persuade in one wave of the survey did so again in the next survey 
wave. By comparison, approximately 75% of presidential election voters in one wave voted 
again in subsequent survey waves. Likely persuaders are somewhat less consistent than likely 
voters, and changes in individual circumstances or political context must be accounted for to 
gain a complete understanding of the varying motivations for political persuasion. 
III. Who? 
Moving now to the substantive question of “Who?” – when people try to persuade 
someone else, who is the target of the persuasive attempt?  On the one hand, if persuaders are 
wholly motivated by their passion for a particular cause, we would expect they would try to 
persuade as many people as possible to take their side.  However, it is also possible that 
persuaders react to the social context in particular ways.  For example, maybe political 
disagreement is more palatable in stronger relationships where there is less risk of alienation, 
and then we would expect to see more persuasion among family and friends than coworkers.   
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37%
One
24%
Two
19%
Three
20%
 109 
On the YPSP, respondents reported whether they tried to persuade their coworkers, 
friends, family members, or some combination of the three.56 Figure 4.3 presents a 
proportional Venn diagram of the targets of persuasive efforts reported by both generations 
in all 4 waves of the survey.57 
Figure 4.3: Targets of Persuasive Activity 
 
The main substantive insight from Figure 4.3 is that half (49%) of the respondents report 
trying to persuade all three kinds of targets (coworkers, friends, and family members). 
Because most people are trying to persuade two or more relationship types within their 
networks, the nature of their relationship with the target is unlikely to be the primary 
motivating factor for whether they try to persuade someone else. Rather, it seems that 
persuaders are choosing to take that action for other reasons, such as intensity of feeling 
                                                 
56 In 1965, “all three” was not a coded response. Based on the distribution in the other 
survey years, I counted all of the “other combination” responses as “all three.” 
57 The unit of analysis in this diagram is the survey, so most individual respondents are 
counted 3 times. There is no substantive difference if the proportions are calculated 
separately by generation or survey wave. 
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about the issue or their personal orientation to political discussion, and then trying to 
persuade anyone with whom they have a political conversation.   
However, there are still 29% of persuaders who report targeting only one relationship 
type.58 This leaves a substantial portion of respondents who may be comfortable persuading 
one contact in their network, but who would not necessarily take a persuasive approach in 
conversations with other contacts. Mutz (2006) reports that political disagreement is most 
likely to come from contacts with whom social ties are weaker, especially coworkers. If 
attempts to influence others were merely another way of measuring the occurrence of 
disagreement in political discussion, then coworkers should also be the most common target 
of persuasive attempts. However, coworkers are the least commonly reported discussion 
target, and persuasive attempts are dispersed across all relationship types. Individuals do not 
seem to be more comfortable targeting one relationship type across the board, i.e. it is 
probably not universally true that it is “safer” in some way to persuade coworkers than 
family members. The social norms that govern persuasive behavior, then, are not determined 
by modes of communication with different types of people, but instead seem to derive from 
an individual’s perception of appropriate political conversation based on their whole 
network.  
In addition to the raw frequency of persuasion of different target types, the panel nature 
of the data also allows for examination of whether individuals persuade the same kinds of 
targets over time. For example, if someone reported persuading a family member in 1973, 
                                                 
58 Keep in mind also that this presumes all persuaders have regular contacts in their social 
networks that fit all three relationship types; the reality is that unemployed respondents or 
single respondents living alone may not have coworkers or regular family contacts to try to 
persuade. This means that only looking at the incidence of “all three” leaves some under-
reporting of individuals who have fewer than three types of contacts, but who do persuade all 
types available in their networks. 
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how likely are they to report persuading a family member again in 1982? If the relationship 
with the other person has a strong influence on the decision to persuade, we would expect 
people to persuade the same kinds of targets at relatively high rates across time. Low rates of 
repeat persuasion would indicate that the nature of the relationship has less influence than 
other contextual factors on the decision whether or not to persuade. Figure 4.4 depicts the 
occurrence of repeat persuasion of the same target type. Each bar shows the percent of people 
who persuaded the same relationship type in both waves (numerator), given that they 
attempted to persuade someone in both waves (denominator).  
Figure 4.4: Rates of Repetition of Persuasive Behavior 
 
Only about 50 percent of people who reported persuading in one wave of the survey 
repeat the behavior in the next wave. However, Figure 4.4 shows that, of those who do report 
persuading in subsequent survey waves, most of them target the same relationship types. The 
lowest level of re-occurrence is for co-workers, which is understandable as coworkers are the 
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most volatile relationship type due to job changes or retirement. Friends and family members 
were repeat targets for over 70 percent of repeat persuaders in all waves of the survey.   
Understandably, the likelihood of repeatedly targeting all three relationship types is 
significantly lower. Because social networks naturally shift over time, it is unlikely that all of 
an individual’s social contacts remain constant from one wave to the next, causing some 
variation in their propensity to target different relationships.59 To the extent that people 
engage in persuasion in both elections, and have stable networks, they do attempt to persuade 
others with whom they have the same kind of relationship in subsequent years. Interpersonal 
relationships appear robust enough to withstand political advocacy, and the norms of political 
discussion that allow for possibly confrontational persuasive behavior in these networks are 
fairly stable over time. 
IV. What? 
Now that we have addressed who persuaders are targeting when they try to persuade 
others, what issues or candidates form the subject of their persuasive endeavor? It is possible 
that the kinds of people who persuade about national-level candidates do so for significantly 
different reasons than those who persuade about more local candidates or on behalf of a 
preferred issue position. Additionally, the substance of persuasive endeavors can be 
leveraged to examine the relationship between persuasion and other kinds of participation by 
addressing whether persuasion is a stepping-stone to other forms of participation on the same 
issue. 
                                                 
59 It should also be noted that the levels of repeat contact for the final panel period (82 - 
97) are much higher than the earlier waves. The likely cause is the longer time span for this 
wave – 15 years and 4 presidential elections after the prior wave, whereas the other waves 
only cover 8-9 years and 2 presidential elections. 
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The first step is to identify what people actually try to persuade about. In the 1973 and 
1982 survey waves, YPSP respondents were asked to identify two (1973) or three (1982) 
issues or candidates that they had tried to persuade about since the previous wave of the 
survey. The benefit of the long time frame of this question is that, although we can expect 
there to be recency bias, it does not limit responses to a particular race or election cycle, and 
therefore captures the natural occurrence of persuasive behavior over a long timeframe. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 provide cross-tabulations of the first two issues or candidates that were the 
subject of persuasive efforts, where each cell represents the percent of persuaders who 
targeted each type of issue(s) or candidate(s).60 
Table 4.1: Reported Topics of Persuasive Behavior: 1965-1973 
  
Second Mention  
  
None 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Other 
Candidate 
Issue Total 
First 
Mention 
Presidential Candidate .39 .12 .06 .05 .62 
Other Candidate .09 .03 .03 .02 .17 
Issue .11 .03 .01 .05 .20 
 Total .59 .18 .10 .12 1.00 
 
Table 4.2: Reported Topics of Persuasive Behavior: 1973-1982 
*Notes: Cells contain percent of persuaders who reported each combination of topics. 
                                                 
60 Only 76 respondents in 1982 provided a third issue/candidate, so for simplicity and 
comparability, Table 1b is limited to just the first two mentions. 
  Second Mention  
  
None 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Other 
Candidate 
Issue Total 
First 
Mention 
Presidential Candidate .28 .16 .05 .02 .51 
Other Candidate .14 .02 .06 .03 .25 
Issue .16 .01 .01 .06 .24 
 Total .58 .19 .12 .11 1.00 
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The most common subject of persuasive behavior is a presidential candidate. In 1973 
68% of individuals who attempted to persuade did so about a presidential candidate, and 55% 
in 1982.61  In spite of being the least likely elections for one person to make a difference, 
national elections capture a majority of media attention, and it would appear they are also the 
subject for a majority of persuasive endeavors.  
However, although most respondents persuade about the presidential race, alone or in 
combination with another issue/candidate, a sizeable minority persuade exclusively about 
one or more non-presidential issues or candidates – 31% in 1973 and 46% in 1982. The 
existence of this group of non-presidential persuaders indicates the presence of significant 
variation in the subject matter of persuasion, and that only focusing on the highly-publicized 
national-level political campaigns may be misleading. Future research should seriously 
consider how persuasive behavior might change across electoral contexts. 
Furthermore, perhaps due to the high participation rates, persuasion is often seen as a 
lower cost political behavior in the traditional scale of campaign activities, at least in terms of 
expended time or money. The underlying theory of many campaign managers is that if you 
can get individuals to commit to participating in a low-cost political activity, they are more 
likely to continue and agree to higher-cost activities. For instance, a candidate’s mobilization 
efforts might start by making sure people are registered to vote; if they are, they might ask 
for a commitment to vote on Election Day; if they are already a committed voter, they might 
ask them to try to convince their friends and family to also vote; and so on (see McKenna and 
Han 2014 for how the Obama campaign applied this logic to developing their volunteer 
                                                 
61 Interestingly, there was less reported presidential persuasion in the 1982 wave, which 
included the more competitive 1980 presidential election, than the 1973 wave, which 
included the comparably less competitive 1972 election (at least based on the final vote 
margins).  
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campaign staff).  If an attempt to persuade is the first element of a Guttman scale of political 
participation and functions as a stepping stone to more costly behavior, then we would expect 
people who participate in campaigns in other ways to have also attempted to persuade others 
about the same issues or candidates.   
Table 4.3 presents the coincidence of persuasive activity with other forms of campaign 
participation. The campaign participation scale includes 8 other items,62 whether the 
respondent has: 1) Attended any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that; 2) 
Done any other work for a party, candidate or issue; 3) Worn a campaign button or put a 
campaign sticker on your car; 4) Given money or bought any tickets to help a particular 
party, candidate, or group pay campaign expenses; 5) Written a letter, sent a fax or e-mail 
message, or talked to any public officials; 6) Written a letter to the editor of a newspaper or 
magazine giving any political opinions; 7) Taken part in a demonstration, protest march, or 
sit in; and 8) worked with others to try to solve some community problems. If respondents 
reported engaging in any of the other 8 activities, they are listed as “some” in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: Coincidence of Persuasion and Campaign Participation 
  
Attempted to Persuade 
 
 
No Yes Total 
O
th
er
 
C
am
p
ai
gn
 
P
ar
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ci
p
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n
 None 
.31 .06 .37 
(1465) (289) (1754) 
Some 
.30 .33 .63 
(1423) (1561) 2984 
Total 
.61 .39 1.00 
(2888) (1850) (4738) 
Notes for Table 4.3: G1 and G2 are combined, and the unit of 
observation is the survey, such that each respondent is represented by 
three observations (one for each wave).  
                                                 
62 Except for the G1 respondents in the 1965 survey wave, where only the first four 
campaign activities are recorded.  
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Nearly one-third of respondents did not persuade and did not participate in any other 
campaign activities; an additional third both persuaded and participated in another way. A 
very small minority, only 6 percent, persuaded and did nothing further, which partially 
supports the expectation that persuasion is a stepping-stone to other forms of behavior. 
However, that support is not clear-cut, as 30 percent of respondents participate in other, 
presumably more costly, ways but do not report any attempt to influence someone else’s 
vote. A pretty significant segment of the population is willing to donate time, money, or other 
effort on behalf of a candidate or cause, but is unwilling to talk to friends, family, or 
coworkers to try to win their support. Most people who persuade do also participate in other 
ways; however the converse does not necessarily apply, which indicates that persuasion is 
perhaps not as easy or costless of an initial step in political participation as it seems on face 
value. 
To take it one step further, if persuasion scales directly into other forms of participation, 
then persuasion and the campaign activities should be about the same issues or candidates. 
The YPSP also included the issues or candidates on behalf of which respondents completed 
other political behaviors. Table 4.4 limits the cases to just individuals who reported trying to 
persuade, and displays what percent also performed other political activities about either the 
same issue or different issues.  
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Table 4.4: Subject Matter of Persuasive and Other Campaign Activity 
  
Additional Activity on 
Same Issue 
A
d
d
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al
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None Some Total 
None 
.27 .05 .32 
(366) (70) (436) 
Some 
.35 .33 .68 
(473) (457) (930) 
Total 
.61 .39 1.00 
(839) (527) (1366) 
Notes for Table 4.4: G1 and G2 are combined, and the unit of 
observation is the survey. Cells show percent of persuaders who 
engaged in additional campaign activities. 
 
Overall, more than a third of persuaders also participated in other campaign activities for 
the same issue, but the vast majority of them (87 percent) also participated in support of other 
causes about which they did not persuade. Conversely, three-fifths of persuaders completed 
no additional activities on that topic, and nearly half of those (35 percent of the total sample 
of persuaders), did participate on behalf of another cause. Although individuals who persuade 
are likely to go on and engage in other campaign behaviors (only a quarter did not participate 
in any other campaign activities), the additional activity is not necessarily about the same 
issue. Engaging in persuasion on behalf of a political cause or issue does not seem to be 
strongly related to an individual’s likelihood of engaging in additional activities about the 
same issue relative to different issues. Although persuasion does appear to indicate a more 
activist or engaged approach to politics generally, it is not necessarily a stepping stone to 
additional activity about the same issue. 
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V. When? 
Third, the YPSP data are uniquely equipped to provide insight into the question of when 
individuals try to persuade others. Specifically, are there generational or life-cycle effects 
such that some individuals are more likely to try to persuade than others because of their age 
or birth cohort?  Prior research has demonstrated a significant, negative effect of age on 
persuasive behavior,63 however a cross-sectional survey cannot determine whether these 
effects arise out of changing norms of political discussion or a true effect of age on 
participation. Because the YPSP has three waves of responses for two generations, we can 
shed some light on the relationships between age, generation, and persuasion.  
To put it in context, the trends for persuasion over the life cycle are compared with five 
other common forms of political activity. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 present the percent of G1 
respondents who voted, attempted to persuade, attended a rally, displayed a button or sticker, 
worked for a campaign, or donated money, by respondent’s age. 64 Figure 4.6 demonstrates 
that although voting becomes more probable as citizens age, excepting a small dip at the end 
of life when mobility and cognitive resources begin to decline (Burden et al. n.d.), the 
probability of persuasion trends in the opposite direction. The percent of individuals who say 
they voted in the last presidential election continues to rise steadily until the early 70s before 
                                                 
63 These effects are found in a prior working paper, available upon request. Based on the 
National Annenberg Election Studies Data, there is a significant negative relationship 
between age and attempts to persuade, which is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of 
other predictor variables. 
64 These four non-voting political activities are included because a shorter participation 
scale was used in ’65 than in later survey waves, so these are the only four that are 
consistently asked across all three waves of G1 surveys.  G2 is not included in these graphs 
for two reasons: 1) G2 has a higher overall participation rate, and their inclusion at the 
younger end of the spectrum may artificially inflate the life cycle effects, and 2) the long 
time frame for the question asked in 1997, when G2 is 50, makes the response rates less 
comparable and averaging together problematic.  
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tapering off at the upper limits of the age range. Meanwhile, the probability of engaging in 
persuasion peaks between 40 and 50 years of age, and declines steadily from that point.  
Figure 4.5: Persuasion and Voting Behavior by Age 
 
Figure 4.6: Persuasion and Campaign Behavior by Age 
 
* Data is based on G1 respondents, over three waves of interviews. 
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The effect of age on other forms of behavior is less consistent, as demonstrated in Figure 
4.7. The percent of respondents who attend a rally fluctuates substantially, but the average 
remains fairly constant over the life cycle. While fewer people report wearing a button or 
displaying a sign or bumper sticker, this behavior follows a similar downward sloping trend 
as respondents age. By contrast, the percent of respondents who donate money rises steadily 
until the gap of nearly 20 percentage points that exists between persuasion and donating at 
age 35 is completely eliminated at age 65. Finally, the percent of respondents who work for a 
campaign declines incrementally with each wave of the survey, but in a much less drastic 
fashion than the decline of persuasion (a 7 point total decline for working, versus a 35 point 
total decline for persuasion).  
The negative effect of age is robust to individuals’ latent propensities to persuade, and a 
logistic regression that includes individual-level fixed effects finds a statistically significant 
negative effect of age on the likelihood of persuasive behavior, as shown in Model 1 of Table 
4.5. The disparity in overall trends by age is evidence that the motivations and necessary 
resources for persuasive participation may be significantly different than those required for 
other forms of political engagement, especially voting and donating.65 
However, life cycle is not the only factor at play, and as previously hinted at by Figure 
4.5, there is evidence for some generational differences between G1 and G2. Across all age 
ranges, G2 has a higher rate of persuasive behavior than G1. Even the lowest level of G2 
persuasion (age 34; .40.6%), is roughly equivalent to G1 at their best (age 40; 40.5%). The 
                                                 
65 Two notes about other model specifications: 1) The effect appears to be fairly linear, 
and an age-squared term is not significant in the model and does not change the direct age 
coefficient. 2) As expected, the parallel model predicting voting behavior has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. 
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results of the second model in Table 4.5 indicate that the G2 cohort is significantly more 
likely to report engaging in persuasion attempts than the G1 cohort, even when controlling 
for respondent age.66 The likely explanation for the generational difference is the increased 
activism of the protest generation (Jennings and Beck 1979). However, a second possible 
explanation is that changing social norms lead to different expectations about the role of 
political opining in discussion across generations. Additional data for recent cohorts that 
have been socialized into a more polarized and interactive online political environment 
would be indispensable in evaluating whether the G2 cohort is uniquely active, or whether 
changing social norms lead subsequent generations to also persuade at higher rates.  
Table 4.5: Logit Models of Persuasion by Age 
  (1) (2) 
Age 
-.01* -0.01*** 
(.00) (0.00) 
G2 Cohort Dummy -- 
.43* 
(.08) 
Fixed Effects 
Yes 
784 Groups 
-- 
Constant 
-- -.21* 
(.16)  
N 2346 5465 
Psuedo R2 0.005 0.016 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
                                                 
66 Some of the generational effect is likely to be overstated because of the increased 
reporting of persuasion derived from the long timeframe of response for the third wave of 
G2’s survey (15 years, including 4 presidential elections, as compared to 8 – 9 years and 2 
presidential elections for the other survey waves), there is still evidence for some 
generational difference in approach to political persuasion, based on the other waves.  
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VI. Why? 
Human motivation for action is complicated and convoluted and often misunderstood, 
even by the actors themselves. That being said, this section explores three potential 
explanations for why some people might attempt to persuade others.  The first explanation is 
that they have strong opinions and care passionately about a particular cause, and so want to 
advocate for a favorable public outcome (whether in an election or on a policy issue).  
Evidence for this explanation would be a positive relationship between persuasive behavior 
and opinion strength (opinionation, or strength of partisan attachment).  A positive 
coefficient for external efficacy, or the belief that the political system responds to the 
preferences of people like the respondent, would further support this instrumental 
explanation.   
The second explanation is based on individual-level engagement with the political 
process.  First, individuals must have enough interest in political issues that they are willing 
to expend the cognitive resources to learn about, form opinions, and discuss them. However, 
it is worth noting that as undeniably important as engagement is to persuasive behavior, as a 
concept it does not provide a great tool for differentiating why some people attempt to 
persuade while others talk frequently about politics or engage in other ways without ever 
trying to persuade. Therefore, consistent with other forms of political behavior, political 
interest is seen here as a necessary individual trait that creates a propensity to persuade, but it 
is not seen as a sufficient explanation on its own.  
Political interest is also expected to interact with the political context in order to impact 
political persuasive behavior. In one of the few studies that specifically examines political 
persuasion as a form of behavior (or, as she calls it, political “proselytizing”), Hansen 
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(Hansen 1997) finds that the persistent gender gap in persuasive behavior is minimized in 
contexts where prominent women are on the ballot (see also Atkeson 2003; Stokes-Brown 
and Neal 2008). In other words, she demonstrates that a particularly salient electoral climate 
is able to activate some people’s latent propensity and make them political persuaders, when 
they otherwise would not engage in this way. The opposite is also expected to be true – 
people who care little about the issues or candidates in the current election, or whose 
passionate causes are not currently salient, are less likely to engage in persuasion. 
Finally, some people may engage in persuasion because someone asked them to. 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), suggest that individuals need to be mobilized in order to 
participate in politics. It is unclear the extent to which campaigns actively try to mobilize 
people to engage in informal persuasive behavior,67 but in general, mobilization to persuade 
appears to be much less common than voter mobilization or donation solicitations. A social 
capital theory of mobilization, such as that described in the Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995), relies less on direct contacts by official campaign 
organizations and more on individuals being put in social contexts where they have the 
opportunity to participate, or to be asked to participate by others in the social group. If this is 
the case, we would expect those who have more social interactions, say those who are 
married, currently employed, attend church frequently, or participate in civic organizations to 
have larger networks that would provide more opportunity to persuade.68 However, Mutz 
                                                 
67 This is addressed more fully in another chapter of my dissertation, available upon 
request. 
68 While Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) do not directly address persuasive 
communication, they analyze the persistence of disagreement in political discussion networks 
and conclude that larger networks are more likely to sustain diversity of opinion. Under the 
debatable assumption that persuasion occurs more often in high-diversity environments, this 
work would also support the expectation that larger networks would lead to more persuasion. 
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(2006) finds that political discussion with others who disagree is not affected by network size 
or involvement in civic organizations.  The extent to which organizations are responsible for 
mobilizing persuasion is a crucial indicator of whether persuasion is motivated by the same 
factors as other forms of campaign participation. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of two logistic regressions predicting the binary outcome of 
whether or not someone will attempt to persuade others. The first model estimates the 
coefficients for stable demographic variables, using a pooled data set in which individual 
surveys are the unit of analysis, and the data include both generations and all three waves. 
The second model includes individual-level fixed effects (and therefore omits stable 
demographic characteristics, and drops all observations for which the dependent variable has 
the same value in all survey waves).  The independent variables are drawn from the corpus of 
other survey questions asked in each wave of the survey, and are from the same wave of the 
survey as the reported attempt to persuade (the dependent variable).  
There are a few variables (opinionated, internal efficacy, group membership, and age) for 
which the coefficients are statistically significant in the first model, but lose significance 
when fixed effects are included. To some extent the disparity is expected, as the inclusion of 
fixed effects captures all observed and unobserved stable individual-level traits, and therefore 
may swamp the effect of these individual-level characteristics, especially if their variance 
within individuals over time is low.  In real terms, the coefficients in the first model describe 
the correlations that exist based on variation across different survey responses; while the 
second model describes variation explained within individual respondents over time. 
Therefore, it is more valuable to look at the overall picture of both models than to spend a 
great deal of effort explaining differences between the two estimations.   
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 Table 4.6: Logit Models of Persuasion 
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The first four variables are scales of individual-level opinions or traits. In the first 
model, individuals who are highly opinionated are more likely to try to persuade, but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant when fixed-effects are included. Strength of opinion 
appears to be a relatively stable individual-level characteristic that does not explain within-
subject variation from one survey wave to the next as well as it explains variation between 
different respondents. Self-confidence and social trust are not significant predictors in either 
model. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for political trust in the second 
model indicates that when individuals feel some additional trust in government they are more 
likely to try to influence others to vote for their preferred causes or candidates.   As expected, 
self-evaluated political interest and objective political knowledge (based on a 5-question 
quiz) are both positively related to an individual’s propensity to persuade. These are 
cognitive resources that contribute to the ability and willingness someone has to persuade 
about politics.  
The next three variables measure variations of political efficacy, which are all coded so 
that high levels of efficacy have higher numerical values. Although none are great 
measures,69 the first is a generally accepted measure of internal efficacy, and individuals who 
disagree that “sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me 
can’t really understand what is going on” are more likely to report engaging in persuasion. 
However, much like opinion strength, this measure is a better predictor of differences across 
                                                 
69 Of the questions asked in the YPSP, the “complicated” question is the most common 
for measuring internal efficacy, although it has been shown to capture elements of both 
internal and external efficacy. The best measure of external efficacy in the panel, “People 
like me don’t have any say about what government does,” is not included in the first wave of 
the Socialization Panel and so is not included in the analysis. However, it is not statistically 
significant in models where it is included.  See Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) and Niemi, 
Craig, and Mattei (1991) for more information on measurement of efficacy. 
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respondents than within individuals, and is not significant in the second model after the 
inclusion of fixed-effects.  
Internal efficacy is followed by two evaluations of the political system’s responsiveness 
to the respondents’ behavior or opinions, in the abstract. Individuals who disagree that voting 
is the only way to have a say in what government does are more likely to persuade in both 
models. This is unsurprising as it would display a high degree of cognitive dissonance for 
individuals to continue persuasive or other political behaviors if they believed voting was the 
only way to make their opinion heard. However, this logic does not extend to beliefs about 
the actual responsiveness of government officials to public opinion, and the third efficacy 
measure, “How much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think 
when it decides what to do?” is not significant in either model. This indicates that persuasion 
is more strongly related to an individual’s beliefs about their own capacity for action than to 
their expectation that the political system will respond to their participation. 
The last three variables under political engagement are a set of dummy variables 
capturing strength of partisan affiliation, with strong partisan as the baseline category.70 The 
negative and statistically significant coefficients for all three variables in both models 
indicate that individuals with weak or no party attachments are less likely to try to persuade 
than individuals with strong party ties. The positive effect of strong partisan identification is 
expected, given that strong partisans are likely to have more stable attitudes and strong 
convictions in their beliefs to form the basis of persuasive participation.  
                                                 
70 Party affiliation (Republican/Democrat) is not a significant predictor of attempts to 
persuade – strength of opinion matters much more than content. Party affiliation is omitted 
from the analysis to avoid collinearity arising from the overlapping “true independent” 
category that is used in both sets of variables. 
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The next variables are indicators of the likelihood that respondents have regular social 
interactions with others that would provide them more opportunity to persuade. Being 
married, employed, and frequently attending church have no effect on persuasive 
participation, while organizational membership is statistically significant in the first model, 
but no longer significant once fixed effects are included.  Although Mutz (2006) finds that 
exposure to political disagreement is most likely to come from coworkers and least likely to 
come from membership in civic organizations, this is not strongly supported by the data, as 
employment status is not a statistically significant predictor of within-subject persuasive 
behavior.  Rather, this is evidence that modeling disagreement in a discussion network is not 
akin to modeling persuasive behavior in a discussion network.   
On the other hand, models of social capital expect organizational membership to 
positively encourage political participation (Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995), and to make participation more powerful (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). When 
evaluated alongside opinion strength and internal efficacy, which are also only significant in 
the model without fixed effects, the picture that emerges is one of important variation 
between (rather than within) respondents, where individuals who have strong beliefs about 
the world, feel confident in their ability to understand politics, and proactively belong to 
civic, community, or professional organizations are the most likely to persuade. However, as 
these factors do not explain variation in persuasive behavior within subjects over time 
(Model 2), it is unlikely that increasing group membership would lead directly to more 
persuasive participation. 
The final section represents demographics, most of which are omitted for the second 
model because there is little or no variance within individuals over time.  As expected, 
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income is not an essential resource for persuasive behavior, and it is not a significant 
predictor of persuasion in the first model (between subjects). In fact, in the second model, 
increased income is actually negatively related to the likelihood of persuasive behavior, when 
explaining variation within subjects over time. As already shown, older people are less likely 
to persuade, and this effect persists after the inclusion of a number of other control variables. 
In yet another demonstration of a persistent gender gap (e.g., Hansen 1997), women are less 
likely to persuade. Interestingly, white respondents are also less likely to persuade, which 
leaves an open question for future research to corroborate and explain.71 Finally, more 
educated individuals are more likely to try to persuade others, which is expected based on the 
well-documented relationship between political engagement and education. 
Overall, the results of these two models indicate that individuals who are predisposed to 
care about politics, who are informed, who have strong opinions, and who believe that they 
are capable of understanding and having a say in the political process are more likely to 
engage in persuasive behavior. On the other hand, a few individual traits do not seem to have 
a strong relationship, such as self-confidence, frequency of social contact, or belief that 
government officials will actually respond to the attitudes they express. 
VII. Conclusion and Discussion 
The analysis presented here uses data from the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel to 
describe persuasive behavior, focused on the Who, What, When, and Why of persuasive 
endeavors in the United States over time.  Returning to the theoretical model presented in 
Chapter 2, it is useful to examine how individual, social, and political factors influence 
                                                 
71 I found a similar race effect in the National Annenberg Election Studies data from 
2008, but I assumed it was just due to the racial context of that particular election. The re-
occurrence of this reverse racial gap is an open opportunity for further research. 
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persuasive participation, and how these factors compare to the expectations of other forms of 
campaign participation. An important element of this discussion is identifying the gaps in the 
story where further research is needed to provide empirical evidence for (or against) the 
theory presented here. 
First, individual traits. As the analysis in the “why” section demonstrates, there are some 
key individual-level features without which it is hard to imagine persuasion occurring. 
People who are interested in politics, have some information, have relatively strong opinions, 
and see themselves as capable political actors are more likely to try to persuade than 
individuals lacking these qualities. These individual predispositions are especially important 
for a behavior where traditional economic resources, such as time and money, are not strictly 
necessary for enabling engagement. In fact, one interpretation of the disparate trends for 
voting and persuading as citizens age is that the additional time left for political participation 
after people finish raising families and enter retirement is beneficial for time-costly 
endeavors such as voting, but does not provide the same boon to time-neutral activities such 
as persuasion. 
Second, individual traits interact with social norms as individuals determine whether or 
not to take a persuasive approach to a political topic of conversation. Social capital or 
political mobilization are often seen as important factors driving the decision to participate in 
politics. Indeed, most people do not seek out opportunities to donate money or work for a 
campaign unless they are invited to do so. Additional data are necessary to fully address the 
role of mobilization and social capital in persuasion, but the data from the YPSP cast doubt 
on the extant expectation that having additional social contacts facilitates political 
persuasion.  
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That said, most people persuade multiple categories of individuals (friends, family 
members, and coworkers), indicating that persuasive conversations are happening in a variety 
of interpersonal contexts. The existing depictions of the social sources of political 
disagreement (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2006) do not line up with the 
nature of persuasive participation described here. The particular ideological (dis)agreement 
or interpersonal relationship with the specific discussion partner is perhaps not as central to 
the decision to persuade as the perception that persuasion is a generally appropriate way to 
have a political conversation.  The high incidence of repeated persuasion of the same 
relationship type demonstrates that individuals are comfortable returning to that mode of 
conversation. Additional exploration into the existence and impact of localized norms of 
political discussion is warranted, especially in light of the potential for generational effects 
hinted at by this data, and by the use of social media for political discussion that arose after 
the completion of the YPSP.  
Which brings us to the third element: the political context acts as a filter to determine 
which issues have enough political relevance to merit persuasive behavior. If an issue that an 
individual already cares about is also politically salient, they are more likely to attempt to 
persuade than if there is mismatch between their own priorities and the current political 
context. One bit of evidence for this comes from the “what” analysis, where the most 
common topic of persuasion is presidential candidates. Those attempts to persuade are 
happening in an electoral context where the candidates are identified and salient. Political 
campaigns or other current events put issues and candidates into the public sphere in such a 
way that discussion – and, in turn, persuasion – about those issues becomes natural and 
expected; whereas persuasion about other issues would be incongruous. However, there is an 
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important causality question that is not answered here. It is possible that the political context 
forces individuals to think, form opinions about, and discuss issues in such a way that they 
are then motivated to persuade about them. While it is a chicken-and-egg problem, it would 
be useful to identify whether media coverage and political climate can be enough to motivate 
individuals to persuade who otherwise would not, or whether it only serves to activate 
individuals who are already predisposed to persuasive behavior.  
Interpersonal influence is an undeniably important element of how people form opinions 
and make political decisions. However, the mechanism by which that happens – interpersonal 
persuasion – has not been carefully examined in its own right. By taking a close look at 
persuasion in practice, the analysis of this chapter demonstrates that persuasion is 
characterized by unique features that make it distinct from the other forms of political 
behavior with which it is usually scaled. This chapter emphasized the internal dynamics of 
persuasive behavior, with particular attention to individual-level changes over time.  
However, external social and political cues also play a role in motivating or inhibiting 
persuasive behavior.  Chapter 5 continues to examine the “why” of interpersonal persuasion 
by comparing the dynamics of persuasion to other forms of campaign participation over the 
course of a single presidential election.  
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Chapter 5: Why Do Voters Try to Persuade Each Other? Interpersonal 
Persuasion as Discursive Participation 
When political persuasion is modeled alongside other forms of campaign participation, 
the underlying assumption is that it shares an end goal or motivational purpose with the other 
forms of campaign behavior. It is common sense to expect that individuals who donate 
money or spend time working for a campaign do so because they hope to – and believe they 
can in some small way – improve their preferred candidate’s likelihood of winning. If 
attempts to persuade others are indeed correctly understood as a form of campaign behavior, 
then there should be evidence that individuals try to persuade others because they expect to 
make a difference in the overall outcome of the election.  However, if persuasive behavior is 
best understood as a form of discursive participation, the end goals of attempts to persuade 
others would be related to individual engagement and interpersonal dynamics, rather than to 
electoral gains.  While very little research in either the campaign participation or discursive 
participation literatures specifically models persuasive behavior as a distinct phenomenon, 
they each provide a useful set of expectations for what might motivate attempts to persuade 
others. Using data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Studies Phone Survey, this 
chapter explores the motivations for self-reported persuasive behavior and compares these 
predictors to models of other traditional forms of campaign participation.   
Comparing the competing expectations derived from the theoretical frameworks of these two 
dimensions of political participation and testing the implications can improve our 
understanding of what motivates some people to attempt to persuade others, and, eventually, 
of the role of interpersonal persuasion in the democratic process.  Although a complete 
inventory of all possible reasons why some people choose to engage in persuasive behavior 
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and others do not is beyond the scope of this chapter, focusing on a few key distinctions 
between campaign participation and discursive participation allows for identification of the 
dimension of participation to which persuasive behavior is most closely connected.  
Furthermore, connecting persuasive behavior to these broader dimensions of participation 
connects it to existing literature in a way that generates a more robust understanding of the 
nature and effects of interpersonal political persuasion in the mass public. 
I. Theory and Hypotheses 
In an effort to compare and contrast the motivations of persuasion with those of other 
forms of campaign participation, this chapter examines four main explanatory factors:  1) 
Reactivity to the electoral context, 2) Responsiveness to campaign mobilization efforts, 3) 
Differential impacts of internal and external efficacy, and 4) Social norms about political 
disagreement. The different perspectives of campaign participation and discursive 
participation generate diverging expectations for the role of each of these explanations in 
motivating persuasive behavior. Comparing persuasive behavior with other forms of 
participation in each of these areas provides substantial evidence that persuasion is more akin 
to discursive participation than campaign participation.  
Reactivity to the Electoral Context 
Campaign participation, as it has been defined here, is directly connected to the outcome 
of elections.72  Therefore, it follows that the ebb and flow of campaign participation will 
closely track the ebb and flow of the electoral cycle. Broadly speaking, more competitive 
                                                 
72 Although this usually refers to the election of a particular candidate to office, it may 
also include issue-based voting opportunities, such as propositions, referenda, or bond 
elections. 
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elections are expected to increase voter turnout and other forms of political interest and 
activism (Donovan 2007; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Tolbert and Franko 2014). Although 
there is very little research that directly addresses attempts to persuade others as a distinct 
electoral behavior, there is a small set of studies that explore the situations under which the 
particular campaign environment is able to reduce the persistent gender gap in reported 
attempts to persuade others. Hansen (1997) finds that when more women run in well-
publicized races for high-profile offices that women voters become more likely to engage in 
persuasive behavior (what she calls “political proselytizing”). These findings have been 
qualified by Atkeson (2003) who shows that female candidates only increase rates of 
attempted persuasion if the race is competitive, and by Stokes-Brown and Neal (2008) who 
conclude that female candidates motivate more persuasive attempts among women voters if 
they emphasize economic issues rather than traditional “women’s issues.”  In all three 
studies, and consistent with the effects on other forms of campaign participation, the authors 
find particular circumstances in which features of the campaigns are able to increase rates of 
persuasive behavior.  
Highly competitive elections attract more media attention and public interest, and as 
political discussion is a manifestation of political interest, rates of political expression also 
increase in competitive electoral environments (Settle et al. 2015). However, it is also worth 
pointing out that in an era of declining electoral competitiveness at sub-national levels 
(McDonald and Samples 2006; Donovan 2007), aggregate rates of attempts to persuade seem 
to be increasing (Thorson 2014). Because discursive participation is often disconnected from 
the actual institutions of politics, interpersonal political discussion may also be much less 
reactive to shifts in the electoral environment than other forms of campaign participation. 
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Discussion is not constrained in the same cyclical manner as, say, financial donations or 
displaying lawn signs, and may occur in a more uniform way throughout the election cycle. 
Therefore, if attempts to persuade others are a form of campaign behavior, there should be a 
high degree of reactivity to the electoral context such that people are more likely to attempt 
to persuade at key moments in the election when their efforts will have more impact. By 
contrast, if it is a form of discursive participation, it may still increase in more competitive 
races, but should be much less reactive to the particular developments and timing of a 
particular electoral cycle.  
Campaign Contact 
An axiom of political behavior research is that people, even if they have the proper 
resources and interest in politics, are unlikely to participate unless they are asked (Holbrook 
and McClurg 2005; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). 
Campaign mobilization efforts are a central component to explaining levels of campaign 
participation. Therefore, if political persuasion is a form of campaign participation, then 
direct contact by a campaign organization should increase an individual’s likelihood of trying 
to persuade others. Indeed, this correlation has been found in previous research, where 
individuals who have been contacted by a campaign are much more likely to report having 
attempted to influence someone else’s vote than individuals who have not been contacted by 
a campaign organization (McClurg 2004, 419; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 171). 
On the other hand, direct contact by a campaign has been shown to have no impact on the 
reported frequency of political discussion (McClurg 2004). To the extent that frequency of 
political discussion is indicative of discursive participation, then, campaign mobilization is 
not expected to be a strong motivator of discursive participation. The data available to 
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McClurg (2004) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) only allow for estimation of 
correlational models, and therefore the demonstrated increase in persuasive behavior may be 
a spurious artifact of campaigns’ efforts to target voters who are already likely supporters. 
From this perspective, if interpersonal persuasion is a form of discursive participation, then 
campaign mobilization should be a much less important motivation for persuasion than it is 
for other forms of campaign participation. 
Internal and External Efficacy 
Political efficacy is a measure of “citizens’ perceptions of powerfulness (or 
powerlessness) in the political realm” (Morrell 2003, 589). It is traditionally divided into 
external and internal efficacy, where external efficacy refers to the belief that government 
actors and institutions respond to the political will of ordinary citizens, and internal efficacy 
refers to an individual’s belief in their own capacity to be an effective political participant. 
External efficacy has a prima facie connection to campaign participation. Even though most 
voters are probably aware that their votes have an infinitesimally small chance of influencing 
the outcome of an election, voters who take the additional steps to display signs, donate 
money, attend rallies, and work for a campaign probably have some belief that these actions 
will improve their preferred candidate’s likelihood of winning an election. However, citizens 
may talk a lot about politics without any belief that the political system is going to respond to 
the opinions they express. Rather, discursive participation has a much stronger expected link 
to internal efficacy, because a willingness to talk about politics requires some degree of 
confidence in one’s own capacity to understand complex political issues. Therefore, a 
stronger relationship with external efficacy would indicate that persuasion is more like 
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campaign participation, whereas a stronger relationship with internal efficacy would indicate 
that it is more similar to discursive participation.  
Existing research provides mixed evidence on this front. Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 
(2009) use an undifferentiated scale of political efficacy and find no effect on rates of 
interpersonal  persuasion attempts. In a more direct test  using a specific scale of internal 
efficacy, Hansen (1997) finds a statistically significant positive relationship between internal 
efficacy, which she calls “political self-esteem,” and attempts to persuade. Similarly, 
women’s lower levels of confidence generally has been linked with their decreased 
participation and leadership in group discussions (see Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). To 
the extent that persuasion is considered to be a form of discursive participation, it is expected 
to be highly related to internal efficacy, although it may be much less directly related to 
external efficacy. 
Social Norms 
One way in which discursive participation is fundamentally different than many other 
forms of political participation is the interpersonal nature of the activity. Voting, donating 
money, even displaying a sign or working for a candidate, can be done without much direct 
interaction with other people in one’s social network, and possibly little exposure to 
disagreement. Discursive participation, on the other hand, requires a direct engagement with 
other people. Even as important as social norms are for motivating voting and other forms of 
participation (Bond et al. 2012; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998), 
there is substantially higher potential for social norms to influence the frequency and content 
of political discussion. People are acutely aware of social norms for conversation, and 
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violations of those norms negatively impacts political trust and perceptions of democratic 
legitimacy (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Mutz 2007, 2016).  
Additionally, the decision to engage in political conversation depends on the perceived 
political makeup of an individual’s social network (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988). Gerber, 
Huber, and Dougherty’s (2012) experimental work demonstrates that people will actively 
avoid discussing politics in situations of known disagreement. Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) 
also find that individuals who feel they hold a majority opinion are more likely to try to 
persuade those who disagree with them. However, proponents of deliberative democracy 
hope that individuals who are exposed to reasoned disagreement become more open-minded 
and better able to articulate their own and competing viewpoints (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli 
Carpini 2009; Mendelberg 2002), and specific evidence for this outcome has been found as a 
result of exposure to attempted persuasion (Thorson 2014). An individual’s perceptions of 
the attitudes of their discussion partner and whether disagreement is socially acceptable in 
political conversation in their discussion network is likely to have a strong effect on the 
decision to engage in discussion, and, in the context of that discussion, to express a different 
viewpoint, and even try to persuade others to share their view.  
By contrast, the effect of social norms is likely to be quite different for campaign 
participation. Good citizenship norms motivate people to participate in politics, especially 
when they are in social networks with other highly engaged citizens (Lake and Huckfeldt 
1998). But norms created by disagreement in political disagreement may have a negative 
effect on campaign participation. Mutz (2006) argues that exposure to political disagreement 
leads individuals to become ambivalent and withdraw from other forms of political activity 
while individuals in relatively homogeneous networks will be more active participants, 
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although this finding is contested (see Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie 2014). Discursive 
participation is expected to occur more frequently as a result of regular exposure to political 
disagreement, whereas campaign participation may be inhibited by such exposure. 
Control Variables: Individual Traits 
There are a number of empirically established individual-level traits that are also 
important foundations for understanding patterns of political participation generally and 
persuasive behavior specifically.  Hansen (1997) concludes that political interest is the most 
important factor in motivating attempts to persuade others, a finding that is replicated in 
Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009). Indeed, interest is both an essential individual-level 
trait and the likely causal mechanism for how changes in the external campaign environment 
lead to increases in political participation. Additionally, the related concepts of political 
information and attention to political news media are important to account for, as knowing 
about politically salient topics and having information to support your position are essential 
for advocating a particular position.  
Resource-based models of campaign participation often find that individuals with more 
income, education, information, and time are more likely to participate in electoral politics 
(Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In an early study 
specifically addressing the gender gap in attempts to persuade, Cirksena (1996) finds that 
differences in news consumption and, to a lesser extent, education are strongly related to 
persuasive behavior, but marital, parental, and employment statuses (proxies for time) were 
not significant predictors. Similarly, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) report a positive 
relationship between income and attempts to persuade others. However, Jacobs, Cook, and 
Delli Carpini (2009) demonstrate that the effects of income, education, and race disappear 
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from their model once indicators of “political capital” (efficacy, trust, knowledge, interest, 
attention, and tolerance) are included in the model.73  Overall, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli 
Carpini find that discursive participation is plagued by far fewer of the resource-based socio-
economic biases that characterize campaign participation.  
One final motivating factor, attitude strength, is expected to be relevant for motivating 
persuasive behavior under both the discursive and campaign participation views.  Separate 
from actual content, attitude strength refers to the durability of an attitude and the impact it 
has on actual behavior (Krosnick and Petty 1995). Individuals who have stronger opinions, in 
this case referring to those who see a great deal of difference between the alternatives and 
hold their views with a high degree of certainty, are expected to be more likely to try to 
persuade others to take their side. Conversely, it is hard to imagine someone who sees little 
difference between the alternatives or is unsure about their own opinion trying to shape the 
opinions of others.  
II. Data and Methods 
The data analyzed here come from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Studies Phone 
Survey (NAES08-Phone), which is a project of The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the 
University of Pennsylvania. The survey was a rolling cross section (RCS) survey of 57,976 
respondents conducted from December 17, 2007 through November 3, 2008. All survey 
respondents completed a detailed demographic profile and were asked questions covering 
similar topic areas, but the specific content was updated regularly in response to 
developments throughout the campaign cycle. The RCS design usefully allows for the 
                                                 
73 Of these measures of political capital, only knowledge, interest, and attention are 
significant predictors of both forms of persuasive behavior (Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 
2009, 56). 
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tracking of political persuasion throughout the complete election cycle, rather than a single 
retrospective recall of persuasive behavior at any point in the campaign. Immediately 
following Election Day, a random sample of 3,737 respondents who had been interviewed 
during the three months prior to the general election also completed a second re-interview 
survey. Because of the nature of the re-interview sample, and the questionnaire design, the 
re-interview sample used in the analysis is limited to only individuals who reported voting 
for one of the major party candidates.74  
To the extent that the results are comparable between the RCS and re-interview samples, 
there is added confidence in the robustness of the findings, specifically that the identified 
differences between persuaders and non-persuaders are not an artifact of differences between 
voters and non-voters. Additionally, the use of various subgroups to specify different models 
throughout the election cycle, both by subdividing the RCS data by election phase and by 
comparing to the re-interview sample, safeguards against the possibility of overfitting the 
model to the unusual characteristics of a particular sample. The high level of consistency 
between comparable models based on different subsamples gives added confidence in the 
generalizability of these results.  
Dependent Variables 
First, it is necessary to explicitly define persuasion as a form of political behavior, rather 
than a process or an outcome. Previous work on persuasion in political science has largely 
focused on what makes something “persuasive.”  Most research therefore defines a 
persuasive message as one that actually results in a change or reinforcement of the message 
                                                 
74 This is not expected to significantly bias the results, but it is important to keep in mind 
when comparing models from the pre-election RCS to the post-election re-interview sample. 
Additional details can be found in Appendix A. 
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recipient’s opinion or behavior; conversely, a non-persuasive message is one that fails to 
produce any change. For example, dual-process models of information processing or attitude 
formation (Lodge and Taber 2013; Petty and Cacioppo 1986) emphasize the receiver’s 
reaction to the message, most of which is expected to be automatic and subconscious, and 
which only occasionally constitutes reasoned or intentional evaluation of an argument.75 
By contrast, thinking about persuasion as a political behavior shifts the focus to the 
sender’s conscious decision to employ a message with the explicit purpose of influencing the 
receiver’s attitudes in some way. When thinking about attempts to persuade in the context of 
everyday political conversations, the psychological engagement demonstrated by the 
message sender is the same regardless of whether the attempt is successful. The message 
sender has chosen to expend some psychological effort, and perhaps risks incurring social or 
emotional costs, in an effort to change the attitudes or actions of their discussion partner, and 
these costs are greater than those of discussing politics without trying to persuade others. 
Therefore, persuasion is measured here based on reported intention: if survey respondents 
reported a self-aware attempt to influence the vote of someone else when they talked about 
politics, they engaged in persuasive behavior, even if their discussion partner was not aware 
of the attempt and no opinions changed as a result of the interaction.  
In the RCS survey, 26,525 respondents were asked whether they had tried to influence 
someone else’s presidential election vote. This question was also asked of all re-interview 
                                                 
75 These theories do not directly address the intentions or motivations of the message 
sender as they craft a persuasive or non-persuasive message. However, some portion of 
persuasive attempts may be more or less automatic responses by individuals who habitually 
take a particular position. Future work should examine the possibility of extending Lodge 
and Taber’s (2013) framework to message senders. For the present purposes, and because the 
question wording asks about an intentional expenditure of effort, it is assumed that attempts 
to persuade are a “System 2,” reasoned and intentional process on the part of the message 
sender.  
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survey respondents. Throughout the course of the election cycle, the NAES08-Phone asked 
six different versions of the question. An important advantage to the NAES08-Phone 
questions is that all six versions limit the respondents to thinking about whether they “talked 
to any people and tried to show them why they should vote for or against one of the 
presidential candidates,” which provides consistency in the subject matter for the persuasive 
behavior. The full text of each of these questions is available in Appendix B, along with 
analysis of how question wording affects response rates.  
However, there are two key factors which are important to keep in mind when evaluating 
the statistical analysis that follows. The first is that participation rates of all kinds are higher 
during the general election than during the primary, which makes it difficult to combine 
responses across phases of the election cycle. Second, there were two different temporal 
parameters provided to respondents throughout the survey. During the active campaign 
phases of the election cycle, respondents were asked about their persuasive activity in the 
past week; whereas interviews conducted after the elections asked about persuasion during 
the presidential campaign.76  As expected, individuals who are asked only about the past 
week report persuasive behavior at lower rates than individuals who are asked about the 
entire primary or general campaigns. Because of these campaign cycle and question wording 
effects, I run separate models to predict responses to different versions of the question.  
In order to compare persuasion to the other forms of campaign participation, parallel 
models are run with a dummy dependent variable indicating whether the respondent 
participated in any other form of campaign behavior. As opposed to a count of campaign 
activities, this specification allows for the use of logit models and therefore provides the most 
                                                 
76 Complete details about the timing and wording of the various questions can be found in 
the supplemental information. 
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direct comparison to the models predicting persuasion. The additional campaign participation 
questions ask the respondents whether they have: 1) given money to a presidential candidate; 
2) done any work for one of the presidential candidates; 3) gone to any political meetings, 
rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that; or 4) wore a presidential campaign button, put a 
campaign sticker on their car, or placed a sign in their window or in front of their house. 
Slightly different forms of the questions were asked at different points in the campaign, and 
the differences in temporal scope mirror the variations in the persuasion questions. 
Unfortunately, only two of the four forms of campaign participation were asked about during 
the primary campaign period, and so I do not provide the comparison to campaign behaviors 
for that phase. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this analysis are also drawn from the pool of survey 
questions asked of each NAES08-Phone respondent. Because different questions or versions 
of questions were asked at different points in the RCS survey, all independent variables of 
interest cannot be included simultaneously. For the most part, however, other questions in the 
survey adopt the same temporal parameters as the persuasion questions (behaviors in the past 
week, or summative over the course of the primary/general campaigns). Additionally, related 
sets of questions that may be useful when testing a broad theory were often asked 
concurrently.   
There are a number of key independent variables by which I distinguish between the 
motivations of discursive participation versus campaign participation, in accordance with the 
explanations provided in the theory section.  First, if persuasion is reactive to the electoral 
context, then during the primary election cycle the difference between a decided Republican 
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primary and a very competitive Democratic primary should lead to a partisan difference in 
persuasive efforts.  If no difference exists, persuasion may not be driven by the 
competitiveness of the campaign.  Second, if persuasion is a form of campaign behavior that 
responds to external motivations, then contact by political campaigns should result in 
increased levels of persuasive behavior.  Third, internal and external efficacy can help 
distinguish the nature of motivation for participation.  Campaign participation is expected to 
have a positive relationship with external efficacy. By contrast, to the extent that it is a form 
of discursive participation, persuasive behavior should have a stronger positive relationship 
with internal efficacy and little or no relationship with external efficacy.  Finally, exposure to 
disagreement and attempted persuasion by other social contexts suggest social norms that are 
tolerant of persuasive activity, and are expected to be positively related to reports of 
persuasive activity.    
Additionally, control variables are included to account for four broad sets of alternative 
explanations. 77  1) Individual resources, including education, income, and political 
information both about the candidates specifically and politics generally. 2) Campaign 
engagement, including attention to the campaign, on-line and off-line political discussion, 
following campaign news, and watching general election debates (re-interview sample only). 
3) Attitude strength, including strength of party attachment,78 difference in thermometer 
ratings of the candidates, and timing and certainty of the vote decision (re-interview sample 
only).  4) Demographics, including race, gender, age, and religiosity. 
                                                 
77 A complete list, including descriptive statistics, is available in Appendix C. 
78 Keith, et al. (1992) find that independent “leaners” and weak partisans have similar 
rates of persuasion, while strong partisans are more likely to persuade and true independents 
are much less likely to engage in the behavior. For this reason, independent “leaners” are 
included as partisans in the party identification variable.  
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III. Results and Discussion 
Reactivity to the Electoral Context 
If the end goal of political persuasion is to influence the outcome of an election, perhaps 
by getting more people to vote for a particular candidate on Election Day, then it should 
respond in predictable ways to the ebb and flow of the campaign cycle. If persuasion is 
reactive to the electoral context in this way, there should be higher rates of persuasion as the 
election gets closer, more persuasion in a hotly contested election, and little to no persuasion 
in the days and weeks following Election Day. There is some preliminary evidence that this 
is the case. 79  However, on further examination these differences are not nearly as significant 
or robust as might be expected. As already noted, rates of interpersonal persuasion attempts 
are somewhat higher prior to the general campaign than during the primary campaign season; 
but in real terms the difference between primary and general election attempts to persuade is 
surprisingly small, only 1.5 percentage points. Comparative rates of each form of campaign 
participation over the election cycle are presented in Figure 1.  
The most striking feature of Figure 1 is the exceptionally high rate of reported attempts to 
persuade during the primary campaign season by individuals in states that had already had 
their primary election. If persuasion is understood as a form of campaign participation, 
where the ultimate goal is changing the way other people vote, then these individuals are 
being asked about persuasion when their primary election is over, the general election is still 
                                                 
79 Since primary elections are not concurrent, some individuals during the primary 
campaign season were interviewed before their primary election occurred, while others were 
interviewed after their primary had taken place. The control variable in the second model of 
Table 1 indicates a statistically significant difference, where individuals interviewed after 
their state’s primary had already occurred were less likely to report trying to persuade 
someone else in the past week. However, this same control variable is not statistically 
significant in all models, such as Model 1 of Table 5.1, and Models 1, 4, and 5 of Table 5.3.  
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at least six months away, and the candidates for the general election have not yet been 
decided (the Obama/Clinton race was still underway.)  In this context, there is probably not 
much of an electoral purpose for trying to influence someone else’s vote in interpersonal 
conversation. However, 23% of respondents still report an attempt to influence someone 
else’s vote during the past week. Only three percent fewer people report trying to persuade 
after their primary election than before it.80   
Figure 5.1: Rates of Campaign Activity over the Election Cycle 
 
*The retrospective general data are limited to individuals who reported voting for McCain or Obama in 
the general election.  
**The primary campaign and general campaign questions ask only about participation in the past week, 
while the retrospective questions ask about the campaign as a whole. 
 
If individuals were rational actors with an end goal of influencing election outcomes, 
participation should be much more responsive to the campaign cycle than it is. These results 
make much more sense if persuasion is instead seen as a form of psychological engagement, 
or a way that some people process political information and ideas within their discussion 
                                                 
80 For a discussion of alternative explanations for the high rate of persuasion after the 
primary election, see Appendix D. 
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networks. In this case, persuasion in the discussion network is not about the electoral 
outcomes, and so may occur at any time, as individuals perhaps try to reduce their own 
political uncertainty, process new information, navigate disagreement, achieve consensus in 
their discussion networks, or adhere to norms of political conversation.  
Further evidence that persuasion does not react to the broader electoral context is drawn 
from a unique feature of the 2008 primary election. In the 2008 primary season, the 
Republican candidate, John McCain, became the presumptive nominee relatively early in the 
process, on March 4. The Democratic candidates endured a much longer race, and Barack 
Obama did not become the presumptive nominee until June 3. This leaves a three month 
period in the primary season where the Republican nominee was decided, but there was still a 
close contest for the Democratic nomination. If having their preferred candidate win the 
election is a motivating factor for individuals who try to influence the votes of others, when 
looking only at this specific window, it is expected to see higher rates of persuasion among 
Democrats than among Republicans. However, a simple comparison of means test comparing 
the rates of persuasion between Democratic and Republican respondents who had not yet had 
their primary and were interviewed during this period indicates no statistically significant 
difference between the two groups (N=628, mean diff. = .05, p=.14). 
Continuing the analysis, Table 5.1 reports the results of nine logistic regressions which 
predict persuasion and other forms of behavior through the various phases of the election 
cycle. Aside from the primary campaign (Models 1 and 2), the results are paired by the phase 
in the election cycle, so that there are comparable models predicting persuasion and other 
forms of campaign behavior for each phase of the election. The key independent variables  
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are party identification during the primary elections, contact by political campaigns, and 
internal vs. external efficacy.  The results in each of these areas will be addressed in detail in 
the following sections.  The remaining variables are included as controls.  Not all variables 
are available in all periods, but as many control variables as are available are included in 
each model.   
The first model of Table 5.1 presents a logistic regression predicting attempts to 
persuade, restricted to individuals who were interviewed between March 11 and June 3, 
2008.81  If persuasion is responsive to the campaign environment, would expect to see 
Democrats in this time frame to have higher rates of persuasion than Republicans. However, 
there is no statistically significant difference between rates of persuasion for Democrats and 
Republicans. This indicates that even the substantial contextual difference between a hotly 
contested Democratic primary and a decided Republican primary did not affect persuasive 
activity for members of these two groups.  
Campaign Contact 
Common narratives explaining campaign participation claim that part of how 
individuals connect their own involvement to broader electoral outcomes comes from contact 
by campaign organizations or other civic groups (Putnam 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). A direct 
request from a known contact or campaign organization can tip the scales to motivate 
participation from those who already have the resources and disposition to do so. But how 
does campaign contact fare when the requested object is the less tangible effort of the 
                                                 
81 These dates are one week after McCain secured the nomination, so that the days 
leading up to the clinching primaries are not included in the reports of persuasive behavior, to 
the day before Obama secured the votes for the Democratic nomination. 
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individual to persuade friends, family, or coworkers to vote for the preferred candidate?  
Figure 5.2 depicts the overall percent of respondents who persuaded and participated in other 
campaign behaviors, subdivided by whether or not they reported being contacted by any 
political campaign. Overall, persuasion is much more common than the other forms of 
campaign behavior, and less than half of the individuals who tried to persuade reported 
receiving campaign contact. By contrast, approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of 
individuals who participated in other ways reported being contacted by a political campaign.  
Campaign contact is less likely to adequately explain persuasive participation than other 
campaign behaviors. 
Figure 5.2: Campaign Contact and Political Participation 
 
     *Note: The General Election sample is limited to individuals who voted for 
McCain or Obama, which leads to higher reported participation rates for this 
subsample. 
 
Returning to Table 5.1, and consistent with the expectations from campaign behavior 
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3, 5, and 9) indicate positive and statistically significant relationships between contact by a 
political campaign and attempts to persuade others. The same is true for the three models that 
predict traditional campaign participation (Models 4, 7, and 10). Overall, direct campaign 
contact does appear to have a positive relationship with persuasive behavior, which is 
consistent with the expectations of the campaign participation theory.  
However, these results are only correlational, and it is well-documented that campaigns 
selectively mobilize individuals who are already supportive of the candidate and likely to 
participate (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Ideally, support for a causal claim that campaign 
mobilization is a motivating force in getting people to try to influence the votes of their 
friends, family, or coworkers would include direct observational or experimental evidence 
demonstrating that this is a request specifically made by campaign organizations, and that 
individuals act in response to this request. This is especially true for the 2008 Obama 
campaign, which, along with the 2012 campaign, relied to an unprecedented extent on 
volunteer efforts for organizing, mobilizing, and recruiting campaign supporters. 
Specifically, the campaign organizers made a concerted effort to have local campaign 
volunteers, backed by the campaign’s powerful data analytics, contact and persuade 
undecided or sporadic voters within their neighborhoods or networks, rather than relying on 
paid staffers in remote phone banks (McKenna and Han 2014).  
For about one month immediately following the primary election, the NAES08-Phone 
Survey tried to measure such a phenomenon. In a sequence of survey questions they asked 
respondents: 1) if they had been contacted by the Obama or Clinton campaigns, 2) if that 
contact had been via an online method, 3) if they received an email that contained a request 
to “contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Obama (Clinton)”, and 4) if they 
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actually did so as a result of the email request. This provides a unique window into a very 
specific interaction with campaign organizations that was intended to produce a particular 
persuasive behavior on the part of the respondent. In total, 51 survey respondents during this 
time (2.6%) reported receiving such a request, and 19 of them (1.0%) said they actually 
followed through with it.  Although there were surely other requests to persuade made by 
campaign organizations via other modes of communication (at a rally, in-person, or via 
phone), the exceptionally small reach of this targeted request, combined with the descriptive 
picture in Figure 5.2, casts some doubt on the importance of campaign mobilization as a 
widespread instigator of persuasive behavior.  
Certainly direct campaign contact can be an important stimulus for those volunteers to 
whom the request is made, but there remains a large portion of the population, in 2008 and 
historically, who continue to try to influence others’ votes as a spontaneous effort 
unconnected with campaign mobilization. Even the staggering 2.2 million volunteers who 
were a part of the 2012 Obama campaign organization (McKenna and Han 2014) still only 
account for 3.3% of the nearly 66 million total Obama voters, a figure which remains orders 
of magnitude smaller than the 50% of voters who reported trying to influence someone else’s 
vote. The overall conclusion here is that, where they do occur, campaign requests are 
positively related to attempts to persuade others. However, there is not yet evidence that this 
is a common enough request to fully explain all persuasive behavior, and there is still a need 
to explain why more than half of individuals who report an attempt to persuade do it without 
having any contact from a political campaign. 
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Internal and External Efficacy 
The final piece of evidence suggesting that a desire to influence the outcome of the 
election may not be a strong motivation for persuasion comes from the relative importance of 
two individual psychological predispositions: internal and external efficacy. In the NAES08-
Phone survey, internal efficacy is measured by the level of agreement with the statement 
“Sometimes politics seems so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand 
what is going on”; external efficacy is based on agreement with the statement “People like 
me have no say over what the government does.”  In both cases, higher values indicate more 
disagreement with the statements, and therefore higher levels of efficacy. The correlation 
between the two is only .29 for the RCS sample and .32 for the re-interview sample.   
For the models where internal and external efficacy are included,82 there is a striking 
difference in the role of these two predispositions in motivating persuasion versus other 
campaign participation. Internal efficacy is a statistically significant predictor of persuasive 
behavior in all three models (3, 6, and 9; looking particularly at the coefficient for the most 
efficacious individuals, or “5s”), while external efficacy is not significant for any of them. 
Conversely, when looking at other forms of campaign participation, internal efficacy is not 
statistically significant in any model (4, 8, and 10), but external efficacy is significant in all 
three. In other words, the belief that average citizens can have an influence on political 
outcomes is related to whether individuals choose to donate money, work for a campaign, 
display signs, or attend a meeting, but is not related to whether or not they try to persuade 
                                                 
82 Internal and external efficacy questions were not asked during the primary campaign 
season, and were only asked of a random half of the sample during the general campaign 
season; they were asked of all respondents who were interviewed retrospectively about the 
primary and general elections.  
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others. Instead, political persuasion is related to individuals’ evaluations of their own 
capacity to be politically engaged.83   
Social Norms 
Thus far, the results have indicated mostly what persuasion is not; namely, it is not 
motivated by a connection to the external political process to the same extent as other forms 
of campaign behavior. But that does not explain what factors are responsible for widespread 
persuasive activity in the mass public. Because persuasion occurs within the context of 
political conversations that individuals are having with their friends, family members, or co-
workers, social norms about political discussion and disagreement are likely to have a 
significant impact on the decision to try to persuade someone else.   
The first indicator that social norms may have a significant influence on take-up of 
persuasive behavior is the overwhelming prevalence of face-to-face communication as the 
mode for persuasive attempts. The explosive rise in the use of social media for political 
campaigning has led to a great deal of discussion and research about how the nature of 
political participation and conversation changes when it occurs in a mediated, impersonal, or 
anonymous online forum (Baek, Wojcieszak, and Delli Carpini 2012; Sunstein 2001). 
Specifically, some have wondered if the opportunities for mediated or anonymous 
communication have allowed individuals to be more brazen in sharing or pushing strong 
opinions than they would otherwise be in person  (Sunstein 2001). The 2008 Obama 
campaign was a landmark in regards to the active use of social media to mobilize younger 
                                                 
83 Unfortunately, in spite of widespread use in political science, the measure used in 
NAES08-Phone to test internal efficacy is subject to some debate, and has been shown to 
capture elements of both internal and external efficacy (Morrell 2003). Hansen (1997) uses a 
more robust four-item scale of internal efficacy, which she re-names “political self-esteem,” 
and finds substantial and statistically significant effects on persuasive behavior.  
 158 
populations. In spite of this, nearly all individuals who reported trying to influence someone 
else’s presidential vote did so in person. (See Table 5.2.)  
Table 5.2: Mode of Political Persuasion 
 Single 
Method 
Multiple 
Methods 
Total 
In-Person 4,497 
(85%) 
788 
(15%) 
5,285 
(100%) 
Phone 501 
(45%) 
620 
(55%) 
1,121 
(100%) 
Online 273 
(36%) 
485 
(64%) 
758 
(100%) 
Mail 22 
(15%) 
122 
(85%) 
144 
(100%) 
 
Furthermore, the majority of people who used modes other than face-to-face 
communication used multiple modes. This suggests that, at least in 2008, the impersonality 
of online communication did not lead to an unusual rise in persuasion using only this method. 
In fact, as the mode of communication becomes less personal, with less direct, unmediated 
interaction, it seems to be used less frequently for persuasive purposes. More updated data 
are certainly necessary to evaluate the continued impact of online communication for patterns 
of persuasion.  However, in 2008 the face-to-face dynamic was an important conversational 
element for individuals who attempted to influence others’ votes. The interpersonal dynamics 
of attempts to persuade should not be overlooked, even in the digital age.  
Although the present data do not allow for an exhaustive exploration of the interpersonal 
dynamics of individuals in their discussion networks, there are a few telling indicators that 
demonstrate the importance of accounting for interpersonal context when explaining 
persuasion as a form of discursive participation. The NAES08-Phone asked a subset of their 
respondents during the RCS and all respondents in the re-interview sample whether someone 
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else (alter) tried to influence the vote of the survey respondent (ego) during the election. 
Unfortunately, the data are not detailed enough to identify whether the attempts to persuade 
between ego and alter were concurrent or reciprocal, or whether they occurred in different 
conversations with different discussants. However, as all political interactions add to the 
ego’s overall perception of what political conversation normally looks like, having an alter 
try to persuade the ego is certainly a signal about the social norms within their network.  
Individuals who are exposed to more disagreement and persuasive tactics in their 
conversations may be more comfortable taking those approaches themselves, perhaps 
because they perceive little risk of alienating or offending their discussion partners. 
Conversely, those exposed to no persuasion may perceive overt attempts to persuade as 
violating norms about the way disagreement is handled within their discussion networks.  
The results for the re-interview sample can be found in Model 9 of Table 5.1.  The 
coefficient for a reciprocal persuasive effort is statistically significant and positive, which 
indicates that egos are more likely to report a persuasion attempt if an alter has also tried to 
influence the ego’s vote.84  Table 5.3 presents an additional series of logit models relevant to 
the role of social norms in facilitating attempts to persuade others. The first three models of 
Table 5.3 include whether an alter tried to influence the ego using the available data for each 
                                                 
84 Understandably, having an alter try to influence the ego’s vote is not strongly related to 
take-up of other forms of campaign participation (see Model 10 in Table 1), and the survey 
does not ask parallel reciprocal participation questions for other behaviors (i.e. someone in 
the neighborhood displayed a sign for an opposing candidate). With the present data, little 
can be said about the role of social norms in motivating other forms of campaign 
participation, although it has been extensively studied in other research (Campbell 2008; 
Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Mutz 2006). For the remainder 
of the section, I will focus exclusively on the evidence for the role of social norms in 
moderating persuasive behavior.  
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of the RCS election phases, and the coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all 
models.  
One limitation to the present data is that respondents are not asked to describe the nature 
of their relationship with their discussion partners. It is reasonable to expect that individuals 
behave differently in discussions with family than they do with friends, coworkers, or 
strangers (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1991). However, for two brief periods in the spring and 
early summer, covering about two months total, the NAES08-Phone included a series of 
questions about political discussion and persuasion that asked the respondents to think 
specifically about their interactions with the individual with whom they have the closest 
relationship. The questions were only asked of respondents who specified a preferred 
presidential candidate and who had talked about politics in the past week.  Additionally, the 
influence questions did not limit the timeframe to the past week, and instead asked if the 
respondent, or their closest relation, had ever tried to influence the other’s vote.  
A complete comparison of the effects of different types of relationships is left for future 
research.  Even so, this question does allow for examination of persuasion for relationships 
that we would expect to be relatively similar, at least in terms of their overall importance to 
the respondent. The fourth model of Table 5.3 presents the results for this new dependent 
variable, along with variables indicating whether the closest relation ever tried to influence 
the respondent, and whether the respondent and their closest relation prefer the same 2008 
presidential candidate. Again we see a sizeable reciprocal effect, where individuals whose 
closest relations have tried to influence them are much more likely to report having tried to 
influence their closest relations. This further confirms the expectation that persuasion may be 
a norm of conversation that is accepted in some interpersonal contexts, but not in others.  
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(1) Primary 
Campaign 
(2)Retrospective 
Primary 
(3) General 
Campaign 
(4) Closest 
Relation 
(5) Primary 
Campaign 
Social Norms      
Someone Else Tried to 
Persuade R 
0.98 
(0.10)
***
 
0.77 (0.14)
***
 
1.40 
(0.07)
***
 
 
 
Very Little Disagreement 
   
 0.18 (0.16) 
Some Disagreement 
   
 
0.65 
(0.17)
***
 
Quite a Bit of Disagreement 
   
 
0.88 
(0.23)
***
 
Great Deal of Disagreement 
   
 
0.96 
(0.23)
***
 
Closest Relation Tried to 
Persuade R    
2.87 
(0.11)
***
  
Closest Relation Prefers Same 
Candidate    
-0.74 
(0.13)
***
  
External Instrumental 
Motivations 
     
Democrat 0.05 (0.12) 0.08 (0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.04 (0.12) 0.05 (0.12) 
Independent 
-0.42 
(0.25) -0.76 (0.31)
*
 -0.66 (0.16)
***
 -0.12 (0.25) -0.60 (0.25)
*
 
Contacted by Any Campaign 
0.43 
(0.16)
**
 
0.78 (0.13)
***
  
0.31 (0.17) 0.38 (0.16)
*
 
Internal Efficacy 2 
 
0.34 (0.19) 
 
 
 
Internal Efficacy 3 
 
-0.88 (1.17) 
 
 
 
Internal Efficacy 4 
 
0.28 (0.21) 
 
 
 
Internal Efficacy 5 
 0.49 (0.21)
*
  
 
 
External Efficacy 2 
 
-0.05 (0.17) 
 
 
 
External Efficacy 3 
 
-0.05 (0.88) 
 
 
 
External Efficacy 4 
 
0.08 (0.17) 
 
 
 
External Efficacy 5 
 
-0.26 (0.19) 
 
 
 
Resources      
General Political Knowledge 
-0.03 
(0.21) 0.51 (0.25)
*
 0.23 (0.13) 0.30 (0.21) 0.15 (0.20) 
Candidate Policy Position 
Knowledge 
0.61 
(0.30)
*
 
1.32 (0.38)
***
 
0.40 
(0.19)
*
 
0.55 (0.32) 0.69 (0.29)
*
 
Education -0.07 (0.03)
**
 -0.01 (0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03 (0.03) -0.06 (0.03)
*
 
Income 0.03 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 
Campaign Engagement      
Follow Campaign Closely 
0.30 
(0.09)
**
 
0.46 (0.10)
***
 
0.45 
(0.06)
***
 
0.23 (0.09)
*
 
0.31 
(0.09)
***
 
Days Discussed Politics 
0.23 
(0.03)
***
 
0.13 (0.03)
***
 
0.16 
(0.02)
***
 
0.08 
(0.03)
**
 
0.23 
(0.03)
***
 
Days of Campaign Info: Radio 
0.05 
(0.02)
**
 
0.02 (0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01)
**
 
0.04 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
*
 
Days of Campaign Info: TV 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 
Days of Campaign Info: 
Newspaper 
0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Days of Campaign Info: Online 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
0.02 
(0.01)
*
 
0.00 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Discussed Politics Online 
0.83 
(0.15)
***
   
0.62 
(0.19)
***
 
0.87 
(0.15)
***
 
Table 5.3: The Effect of Social Norms on Persuasive Behavior 
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Attitude Strength      
Weak Partisan 0.01 (0.15) -0.14 (0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.08 (0.16) 0.04 (0.15) 
Strong Partisan 
0.26 
(0.13)
*
 
0.13 (0.15) 
0.24 
(0.08)
**
 
0.34 (0.14)
*
 0.31 (0.13)
*
 
McCain/Obama Thermometer 
Difference  0.07 (0.02)
***
 
0.13 
(0.01)
***
 
 
 
Demographics      
Female 0.01 (0.11) -0.00 (0.13) 
-0.21 
(0.07)
**
 
-0.18 (0.11) 0.12 (0.11) 
Age -0.01 (0.00)
***
 -0.01 (0.00)
**
 -0.01 (0.00)
***
 
-0.01 
(0.00)
**
 
-0.02 
(0.00)
***
 
Frequency of Church 
Attendance 
0.07 (0.04) 0.07 (0.05) 0.04 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04) 0.08 (0.04)
*
 
Black 
-0.09 
(0.18) 
-0.19 (0.23) 
-0.20 
(0.13) 
-0.25 (0.20) -0.13 (0.18) 
Hispanic 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
-0.43 (0.28) 0.27 (0.14) 0.26 (0.23) -0.08 (0.23) 
Asian 
-0.17 
(0.45) 
0.57 (0.45) 0.13 (0.27) 0.60 (0.44) -0.24 (0.45) 
Other Race 0.38 (0.31) 0.38 (0.32) 
-0.21 
(0.19) 
0.21 (0.33) 0.44 (0.31) 
Interviewed After Primary 
-0.21 
(0.16)   
0.02 (0.18) -0.16 (0.16) 
Question Wording 
 
0.21 (0.16) 
 
 
 
Intercept -3.30 (0.44)
***
 -5.36 (1.21)
***
 -4.23 (0.28)
***
 
-2.13 
(0.45)
***
 
-3.54 
(0.45)
***
 
Log Likelihood -1173.65 -869.26 -2936.32 -1102.96 -1212.99 
Deviance 2347.30 1738.51 5872.64 2205.92 2425.98 
Num. obs. 2295 1563 5733 2494 2335 
***
p < 0.001, 
**
p < 0.01, 
*
p < 0.05 
 
Unsurprisingly, individuals who agree with their closest relations about the current 
presidential candidates are less likely to report trying to influence them. The results for this 
smaller sample based on somewhat different questions are largely in line with the first 
models of Table 5.3, giving further confidence in the overall picture that is developing about 
the importance of interpersonal disagreement and discussion norms for persuasive activity.    
 One likely reason individuals do not try to persuade others and are not the targets of 
persuasion in their political discussions is that they already agree with the people with whom 
they discuss politics. For a few months during the primary campaign season, the NAES08-
Phone asked respondents to report the perceived level of disagreement when they talked 
about politics with their friends and family, on a 5-point scale. The final model in Table 5.3 
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includes the reported level of disagreement as a series of dummy variables, in which no 
disagreement is the baseline category.85  There is a strong and statistically significant effect, 
where individuals who experienced more disagreement when they talked about politics in the 
past week were more likely to report attempting to persuade someone else in the past week. 
Mutz (2006) argues that more disagreement depresses other forms of campaign participation, 
although it is beneficial for deliberative models of democracy.  Because rates of persuasion 
are enhanced by exposure to disagreement, there is further evidence that persuasion is more 
akin to discursive or deliberative participation, rather than campaign participation.  It is 
plausible that attempts to persuade highlight disagreement in the respondents mind, leading 
to higher recall and reporting of disagreement, and therefore these results should not be taken 
as causal on face value. However, they do demonstrate that variations in the norms of 
discussion networks are correlated with the level of persuasive activity that occurs in the 
network. 
Finally, it is useful to shift focus slightly, and, instead of looking at the occurrence of 
persuasion, explore the situations where political discussion regularly occurs without any 
attempts to persuade taking place. There are a substantial number of discussion networks 
where no one engages in persuasion. Even when the sample is restricted to just respondents 
who discussed politics every single day in the past week, and so they are clearly engaged, 
informed, and interested, 40% of respondents still report no attempts to influence occurring 
in their political discussions (by ego or alter). Figure 3 illustrates the number of interactions 
in which no one persuades, persuasion occurs in one direction only (by alter or ego), or the 
                                                 
85 This model (and the data in Figure 5.3) is limited to individuals who discussed politics 
at least once in the preceding week, as only individuals who reported talking about politics 
were asked this question.  
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respondent is both the instigator and the target of persuasion in political conversations, 
broken down by the reported level of disagreement in the discussion network.  
The data presented in Figure 5.3 show that as disagreement becomes more prevalent, 
individuals are more likely to report some persuasion occurred in their discussion networks, 
suggesting that diversity or disagreement in the discussion network may be an important 
precondition for persuasive attempts to occur. It is also notable that even among the 
respondents who reported a great deal of disagreement in their political discussions during 
the past week, the most common outcome is still to have no persuasion occur. So, even 
though disagreement may provide more opportunity for individuals to try to persuade their 
discussion partners, it is not a sufficient condition, and merely increasing diversity in 
discussion networks would not necessarily increase the volume of persuasive behavior. 
Individual psychological engagement and social norms about discussion remain crucial 
explanatory elements, beyond mere exposure to disagreement. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Persuasion does not conform well to established models of campaign behavior. 
Specifically, attempts to influence the vote of others do not seem to be strongly motivated by 
an externally-focused desire to make a difference in the outcome of an election. Persuasion is 
not highly reactive to the electoral cycle or context, is not widely mobilized by campaign 
organizations, and is not predicted by external efficacy. Rather, persuasion seems to be a 
form of discursive participation, which is located more in the internal and interpersonal 
sphere, and is best understood as a way in which some people psychologically engage with 
politics in the course of their daily conversations about important issues.  Persuasive behavior 
is correlated with higher levels of internal efficacy, and occurs more frequently in discussion 
contexts where persuasion and disagreement are more common. The main results are 
consistent across many different subsamples of the respondents, and are robust to different 
question wordings and phases of the electoral cycle.  
Political persuasion is interpersonal by nature, and occurs within the context of 
conversations that individuals are having, usually face-to-face, with their friends, family or 
coworkers whose opinions and continued goodwill are highly valued. It is this distinguishing 
feature that sets political persuasion apart from the other forms of campaign behavior, and 
requires that campaigns and scholars alike understand (and perhaps encourage) this 
undeniably important interaction in a way that is unique from other forms of electoral 
participation. For individuals who are engaged in the campaign and have stronger opinions, 
individual predispositions and the norms of political discussion within the respondent’s 
discussion network have a strong influence on attempts to persuade.  
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However, many interesting and important questions cannot be answered here simply 
because the necessary data are not available in the NAES08-Phone survey. As such, this 
work should not be viewed as a complete depiction of the personal and social roots of 
persuasive activity, but should rather be taken as an invitation for further research. A deeper 
exploration of how self-confidence, conflict-avoidance or other individual-level 
characteristics and personality traits affect persuasion is warranted. Additionally, more 
detailed information about political discussion networks, and especially the role of 
persuasion in specific political conversations, is essential to illuminating the central role of 
interpersonal dynamics and social norms in facilitating interpersonal persuasion. 
Furthermore, the story presented here is limited to the 2008 American Presidential 
Election. Additional data from other elections would help to identify how the psychological 
and social processes that affect rates of persuasive behavior apply across different electoral 
contexts (local, state, or international). In fact, there is some evidence from the international 
scene that individuals’ collective willingness to stand up for their preferred candidate may be 
significantly affected by the dominant social narrative exerting pressure to support the 
frontrunner in order to avoid isolation (Noelle-Neumann 1974). Furthermore, individuals 
may behave differently when the subject of the vote is an issue rather than a candidate. 
Think, for example, about how persuasive behavior may be different for a local school bond 
election rather than a presidential election. More work is needed to understand both the 
consistencies and the variations across contexts. 
Considering the great importance of interpersonal influence for both scholars and 
campaign managers, and the normative implications of persuasive behavior for expectations 
about deliberative democracy, interpersonal persuasion deserves serious consideration as a 
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distinctive form of political participation. This unique way of interacting with the political 
system is not explained well by current models of campaign behavior, and should instead be 
further evaluated as a form of discursive participation with causes and consequences that are 
different from non-persuasive talk or other forms of electoral participation. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Political persuasion is a unique form of political participation.  As citizens move beyond 
information gathering and dispassionate discussion to advocate on behalf of a particular 
cause or candidate, they engage with the political system in a new way.  These lay advocates 
for political causes make up approximately one-third of the electorate and constitute a 
substantial force shaping public opinion. This research project explores the motivations of 
interpersonal persuasion in an attempt to better understand both the causes of persuasive 
behavior and the nature of political participation more generally. 
For decades, political scientists have treated attempts to persuade others as an 
instrumental behavior motivated by an expectation that getting more people to agree with 
their opinions will lead to a higher probability of their preferred causes or candidates 
achieving policy or electoral success.  However, political persuasion is also a subset of 
political discussion; some people choose to take a persuasive approach to political 
conversation, while other similarly informed and passionate discussants do not.  The prior 
chapters demonstrate that political persuasion bears much in common with other forms of 
discursive participation, which are motivated more by individual orientations towards the 
political system and the social norms of discussion networks than by the external political 
environment.  Even within the context of discursive participation, though, political 
persuasion is a unique behavior, and a better understanding of it may provide some answers 
as to how “just talk” can connect to broader political outcomes in important ways.   
The empirical analysis in this dissertation uses three survey data sources to explore what 
motivates political persuasion and how it is distinct from other forms of campaign 
participation.  Using a variety of analytical approaches, the empirical results largely reinforce 
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the conclusion that persuasion is better understood as an internally-motivated form of 
political engagement that is highly moderated by the social context.  However, this analysis 
is not exhaustive, and there remain additional questions to be addressed in future research.  
This chapter briefly summarizes the conclusions of the present project, discusses some 
practical and theoretical implications of those conclusions, and identifies areas for future 
research.   
I. The Paradox of Persuasion Revisited 
Let us first return to the Paradox of Persuasion, presented in Chapter 1, to see what 
resolution the empirical results discussed here can provide to the paradox.  For the 
economically rational voter, the costs of persuasion (time, energy, risk to social relationships) 
should far outweigh the benefits (the miniscule likelihood of successfully persuading 
someone who then casts a deciding vote).  However, approximately one-third of citizens 
(half of the people who discuss politics in a particular election) still try to show their friends, 
family members, or coworkers why they should vote a particular way in a given election.  
The research presented in this chapter indicates that the costs and benefits associated with 
persuasive behavior are not the purely instrumental motivations expected by the Downsian 
framework. 
The main argument of this research project is that the intended benefit of persuasive 
activity is not associated with the probability of affecting the outcome of an election or 
public policy.  This instrumental goal is both definitionally and empirically associated with 
other forms of campaign behavior, such as donating money or displaying a sign or bumper 
sticker.  However, attempts at persuasion are motivated more by internal and social factors 
than an external connection to the campaign environment.  In the framework of discursive 
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participation, the benefits of attempts to persuade are the result of the intrinsic interest in and 
enjoyment of politics, the added understanding generated by discussion, and the opportunity 
for opinionated and conflict-oriented people to satisfy those personality predispositions.  
Political persuasion, then, is more about what the individual stands to gain from the social 
engagement with interesting public issues than about the possible impact they have on the 
electoral system. 
Within the context of political discussion, the costs of political persuasion are negligible.  
For individuals who are already informed and engaged enough to talk about politics, 
persuasion takes no money, and little extra time or effort.  However, persuasion still requires 
taking a strong position, which “costs” certainty, confidence, and information that not all 
discussants have.  Politics is such a charged and controversial topic that discussion requires 
adherence to social norms and attention to interpersonal dynamics.  Therefore, some 
discussants may be unwilling to engage in persuasive behavior because they do not want to 
risk straining interpersonal relationships.  To the extent that persuasion and disagreement can 
be normalized in social networks, political persuasion can pose less risk to interpersonal 
harmony, which increases the likelihood of participation in this way.  Interpersonal 
persuasion depends heavily on intrinsic engagement in politics and on the social context in 
which it occurs, and the costs and benefits must be understood in that perspective rather than 
through strict ties to the institutional political process.   
II. Summary of Results 
Chapter 2 presented a model of the various elements that influence political persuasion.  
These included individual-level traits, social norms, and features of the broader political 
context.  The important theoretical implications of this model lie in the details of what 
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specific factors in each of these areas are related to the decision to attempt to persuade others 
and how these are similar to or different from the factors that motivate campaign 
participation and discursive participation.  Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present a variety of analytical 
approaches to addressing these various influences on persuasive behavior. The empirical 
results of those chapters are summarized here. 
Individual-Level Traits 
There are a number of individual-level traits that have confirmed importance for 
motivating all forms of political behavior.  Chapters 3 and 5 indicate that discussing politics 
frequently, being interested in the campaign, and paying regular attention to news media 
about politics are positively related to all forms of political participation.  However, other 
seemingly apparent individual-level influences on participation have different relationships 
with persuasion than with discussion or campaign participation.  For instance, education, 
income, and race have very little net explanatory power for attempts to persuade others, 
although they have long been demonstrated as important facilitators of campaign 
participation.  In fact, white respondents were less likely to report attempts to persuade 
others, which leaves an interesting puzzle for future research.  Likewise, age has a negative 
relationship with persuasion that is unique among types of participation and deserves further 
exploration. There is a well-established gender gap in political persuasion; however, once 
other indicators of political capital and efficacy were accounted for, gender was no longer a 
significant variable in most of the empirical models presented here.   
Additionally, general political knowledge is related to discussion and to other forms of 
participation, but does not have a consistent effect on attempts to persuade others.  Instead, 
specific political knowledge about the issue or candidates that are the focus of persuasive 
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behavior is more important than general information (Chapter 5).  Even so, it remains to be 
determined whether advocates of a particular cause are necessarily better informed than other 
discussants.   
As hypothesized, opinionation has a positive influence on persuasion and other forms of 
discussion and, to a lesser extent, campaign involvement.  The panel analysis in Chapter 4 
also indicates that opinionation matters more as a stable individual-level characteristic, 
meaning that a general disposition towards having a lot of opinions and being self-efficacious 
enough to confidently express them is a fairly consistent disposition that has more 
explanatory power distinguishing between people than do individual variations in these traits 
over time.  Strong opinions about particular issues are also important motivators of 
persuasion.  In Chapter 5, attitudes about the presidential candidates had a stronger 
relationship to attempts to persuade about the presidential race than other more general 
attitudes, such as partisan strength.   
One consistent finding throughout the empirical chapters is the differential importance of 
internal and external efficacy.  Internal efficacy, which suggests confidence in the ability to 
understand politics, is an important predictor of persuasive behavior using the machine 
learning techniques in Chapter 3, with a statistically significant effect in models of 
persuasion in Chapters 4 (YPSP) and 5 (NAES08).  However, it is not a significant variable 
when modeling other forms of persuasive behavior.  By contrast, external efficacy, which 
describes the perception of being able to influence actual political outcomes, is significant for 
campaign participation but not for persuasion (Table 5.1).  This indicates that persuasion is 
motivated more by an individual’s own orientation towards politics, rather than the 
instrumental, external goals that characterize other forms of campaign participation.   
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Social Norms 
Political persuasion happens in an interpersonal context, which gives social norms and 
interpersonal dynamics a particularly strong influence over the decision to engage in this 
form of participation.  Even individuals who are interested in politics, who have many strong 
opinions, and who are confident in their understanding of political issues may still choose not 
to persuade others if they feel that the social context is not conducive to persuasive behavior.  
Social norms about political discussion are very strong, and tend to emphasize avoidance of 
disagreement and confrontation.   
There has been a great deal of research on the effects of disagreement on political 
interest, information, engagement, and participation.  However, the empirical findings have 
been mixed and seem to depend on individual traits (Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie 2014) and 
characteristics of the social network (McClurg 2006).  The hypothesized effect of 
disagreement on political persuasion is mixed.  Attempts at persuasion do appear to be a 
distinct phenomenon from mere exposure to disagreement. Persuasion is an intentional 
attempt to change opinions that discussants may choose to engage in (or not) when 
confronted with differences of opinions.  The perception of exposure to disagreement is 
associated with higher levels of persuasive behavior, an effect which is probably the result of 
both increased opportunities to persuade, and the generation of social norms that tolerate 
more disagreement in discussion.  By contrast, highly homogenous political environments 
may stifle disagreement, and enhance the perception of holding a minority view which 
suppresses persuasive behavior (Kim, Wyatt, and Katz 1999).   
One of the strongest predictors of persuasive behavior is whether an alter tried to 
persuade the ego at some point.  Having the experience of being the target of a persuasive 
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attempt communicates information about social norms in ways that facilitate persuasive 
behavior.  While this survey question is also an indicator of regular political conversation 
with alters who are engaged and opinionated, having someone else try to persuade the ego 
provides a signal to the ego that overt persuasion is an acceptable way to have a political 
conversation.  This signal may reduce the uncertainty about the risk of violating social 
norms, and therefore makes persuasive behavior less (potentially) costly increasing the 
likelihood of participation.  Additional evidence for this effect comes from the reverse case, 
where the most commonly reported response among political discussants is that neither alter 
nor ego attempt to persuade others, which indicates the existence of a social taboo on overtly 
persuasive behavior in some discussion networks.   
However, in other ways interpersonal dynamics have less influence than might be 
expected.  For instance, although the relationship type (i.e. friend, family member, co-
worker), has a great deal of influence on frequency of political discussion and exposure to 
disagreement (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2006), the analysis in Chapter 4 shows that 
most persuaders target multiple relationship types.  There is not a consistent pattern where 
one particular type of relationship is most likely to be targeted by persuaders.  Perceptions of 
social norms are likely to come from all of an ego’s interpersonal interactions, perhaps 
including online or mediated discourse.  Although discussants are strategically selected from 
social networks (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998), there is no evidence of systematic differences 
between the targets of persuasion.  Additionally, membership in civic organizations 
motivates campaign participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), but it does not add 
diversity to discussion networks (Mutz 2006) or substantially increase attempts to persuade 
others.   
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Political Context 
The overwhelming evidence of the empirical research presented here is that the external 
political context has surprisingly little influence on the decision to engage in persuasive 
behavior.  During the 2008 presidential election, attempts to persuade others were not highly 
reactive to the political context.  More competitive primary races and changes in the electoral 
cycle did not significantly affect overall levels of persuasive behavior.  Although there is 
previous evidence that more engaging campaigns can increase persuasive behavior among 
women (Atkeson 2003; Hansen 1997; Stokes-Brown and Neal 2008), these works do not 
provide evidence that the increase in persuasion is due to an instrumental desire to help a 
particular candidate win the election.  Rather, persuasion is better understood as a 
manifestation of individual interest and engagement, meaning a discursive way to process 
information and attitudes that provides inherent enjoyment or social benefits rather than 
instrumental electoral gains. 
The role of campaign mobilization remains somewhat unclear.  There is no strong 
evidence that increasing campaign requests for persuasion would necessarily increase actual 
persuasive behavior.  There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between 
campaign contact and attempts to persuade in several empirical models using different data 
sources.  However, the majority of people who reported engaging in interpersonal persuasion 
were not contacted by a particular campaign organization.  It is hard to imagine that 
spontaneous dinner table or water cooler political conversations turn persuasive as the direct 
result of campaign requests.  Campaign contact does not increase overall rates of discussion 
(McClurg 2004), but it is related to higher rates of persuasive conversation.  Whether this is a 
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causal effect or a spurious result due to campaigns targeting engaged citizens requires 
additional empirical testing.   
III. Practical and Theoretical Implications 
The empirical results presented here improve our understanding of political participation 
as a general concept.  This project has compared the motivations and correlates of two 
dimensions of political participation: campaign participation and discursive participation.  
These two dimensions of participation are characterized by very different motivations and 
end purposes, and systematically different types of people engage in different types of 
participation for different reasons.  Campaign participation is undertaken by people who have 
resources to contribute (time, money) and who are connected to political campaigns and civic 
organizations such that they are asked to participate.  Discursive participation is a reflection 
of individual interest in politics and the political capital (engagement, efficacy) that provide 
the confidence to participate.  Discussion is also a primarily social activity, and so 
interpersonal dynamics and social norms shape the type of discursive participation 
undertaken in a particular situation.  Persuasion shares more features in common with other 
indicators of discursive participation, but the differences from non-persuasive discussion also 
highlight the point that there are a variety of qualitatively distinct ways in which people may 
engage in discursive participation.  Clarifying the dimensions of political participation and 
how they have distinct causes and consequences improves the theoretical understanding and 
empirical specification of future behavioral research.  For example, future researchers should 
be self-consciously aware of the implications of including persuasive behavior in general 
participation scales, as doing so may add unwanted noise to the data and obscure the results. 
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There does appear to be a “type” of person who is more inclined to persuasive behavior.  
However, their behavior depends a great deal on the social context in which they are 
embedded.  More exposure to disagreement, especially exposure to persuasive attempts on 
the ego by alters in their discussion networks, creates social norms which facilitate the ego’s 
attempts to persuade.  Unfortunately for campaign managers, there is still not a clear 
indication that campaign contact is causally responsible for motivating attempts to persuade 
others.  So how can campaign managers activate these individuals on their behalf? 
Changes in the broader political context, such as the competitiveness of the election or 
direct contact by a political campaign, may serve to activate political interest and therefore 
indirectly facilitate persuasive participation.  However, when compared with the effects of 
individual level traits and social norms, the external cues may not be the most direct path to 
encouraging persuasive behavior.  Messaging to motivate persuasive behavior may be most 
effective when it avoids a direct approach of asking people to persuade with the explicit goal 
of helping the candidate win the election.  Instead, campaign organizations may be better 
served to encourage non-confrontational political discussion across lines of political 
difference, although experimental testing of various messages would be appropriate to 
confirm this hypothesis. Campaigns and political elites could also model norms of discourse 
that allow for disagreement and position-taking in non-confrontational ways.  These indirect 
approaches may increase discursive participation across the board, including persuasive 
participation, without contributing to polarization and withdrawal from political participation 
due to discomfort with disagreement, conflict, or ambiguity. 
The profile of a persuader is different from the typical expectations of the politically 
active in some meaningful ways.  Of particular importance, the persuaders are not necessarily 
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white, wealthy, and organizationally active.  Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012) describe 
how formal organizations serve to amplify the political voice of socially and economically 
advantaged citizens, with consequences for representation and policy-making.  However, 
attempts to persuade others are a very direct form of expressing political voice that suffers to 
a much smaller degree from these biases and which is less responsive to formal 
organizational cues than other forms of participation.  Continued empirical and theoretical 
emphasis on the role of persuasion and discursive participation may provide some insights 
into how to minimize the upper-class accent of the “unheavenly chorus” of political interests.    
But do we actually want more people to engage in persuasive behavior?  Is that a 
normatively desirable democratic goal?  There is an assumption that democracy works best 
when more citizens are engaged and that participation should generally be encouraged, rather 
than discouraged.  To the extent that interpersonal persuasion has been considered a form of 
campaign participation, it is assumed that more persuasion would mean more people are 
involved in the election process.  However, this research project has questioned the 
assumption that political persuasion should be included as a form of campaign behavior, with 
substantial empirical evidence that it is not motivated by a desire to influence public 
outcomes.   
Deliberative scholars who promote discursive participation would also advocate an 
overall increase in discussion and deliberation as a way to improve democratic outcomes.  
However, it is not clear whether the model deliberative citizen is compatible with the 
persuading personality.  If the persuading personality is rigid, manipulative, confrontational, 
and unwilling to consider possible alternatives or update their preconceptions, increasing the 
level of persuasion might undermine many of the outcomes expected from empathetic, 
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reasoned, and open-minded deliberation.  The empirical results presented here are in some 
ways encouraging and others discouraging.  Attempts to persuade are motivated by strong 
opinions, but the positive effects of openness to experience and opinionation indicate that 
perhaps this is a personality trait that might not be incompatible with a willingness to 
consider alternative views.  Persuaders are more engaged and invested in the issues or 
candidates, and attempts to persuade might provide a crucial link between discursive 
participation and the political process.  Given the right set of social norms, it may be possible 
for discussants to engage in persuasive behavior in ways that remain non-confrontational or 
empathetic enough to reap the hypothesized benefits of political discussion.  More empirical 
work is necessary to understand the role of interpersonal persuasion in deliberative settings.   
As a discipline, political science needs to think much more carefully about the normative 
and practical role of interpersonal persuasion.  Continued empirical work on persuasion will 
help to clarify, and hopefully resolve, some of these concerns.  A better understanding of the 
role persuasion does play in political discussion and participation would further identify the 
possible democratic functions of this behavior, and allow empirical and theoretical scholars 
to develop an ideal model of the role of interpersonal persuasion and practical approaches to 
encourage citizens to participate in the most desirable way.   
IV. Directions for Future Research 
The results presented here provide substantial evidence that political persuasion is a 
unique form of political behavior that deserves further research attention.  Attempts to 
persuade others have internal and social motivations that are quite distinct from the 
instrumental goals of other forms of campaign participation.  Political persuasion is better 
understood as a form of discursive participation, and more nuanced attention to the varieties 
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of discursive participation would enhance our understanding of both political participation as 
a broad concept and the potential for discursive participation to enhance deliberative 
democracy in practice. However, the scope of this project is limited, and it raises as many 
questions as it answers.  There are several fruitful avenues for future analysis. 
First, the research here relies entirely on self-reports of persuasive behavior.  Although 
there are theoretical and practical reasons that make this an expedient measure, we also know 
very little about the considerations that survey respondents take into account when forming 
an answer to this question.  Cognitive interviewing would be helpful in establishing a better 
conceptual framework for what is, and what is not, included in the scope of responses.  For 
instance, it would be helpful to know whether respondents include in their response online 
commenting, door-to-door canvassing, or times when someone asked their opinion or advice 
about the issues or candidates.  As natural-language processing and other computer-based 
methods advance, perhaps it will also be possible in the future to identify markers of 
persuasive speech that can be used as an independent validation.  An independent data source 
such as this would allow for estimation of the extent and direction of social desirability bias 
in survey self-reports. 
Second, the internet and social media have drastically changed the way in which people 
interact with their social contexts and express political opinions.  The majority of this project 
has emphasized face-to-face conversation, in large part because that is what most people 
report using in the particular surveys analyzed here.  Social scientists are working hard to 
define the implications of social media for political participation, public opinion, and social 
norms more generally.  Comparing on-line and off-line efforts at persuasion may help us to 
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better understand both the role of persuasive behavior in the internet age and the effects of 
on-line communication on political expression and participation.   
Aside from the online context, more work is needed to examine the effects of specific 
social and political contexts on persuasive participation.  For instance, the data sources used 
here were insufficient to examine the full extent of social norms and interpersonal dynamics 
that affect interpersonal persuasion.  How do people select a target for political persuasion? 
Or, put another way, what considerations do people have in mind when they “bite their 
tongues” and choose not to persuade in a given situation?  The importance of maintaining 
interpersonal harmony for social reasons (i.e. having a pleasant Thanksgiving dinner) might 
factor into this decision.  Additionally, persuaders may choose targets that they feel they have 
a higher probability of successfully persuading, such as individuals who are undecided or 
who usually agree with them.    Additional data are necessary to explore these interpersonal 
dynamics. 
The data in Chapter 3 indicate that persuasion most often occurs about presidential 
candidates.  However, that particular question wording limited respondents to thinking about 
persuasion in an electoral context.  Persuasion about particular issues in a non-electoral 
context may be even more common that election-oriented persuasion (Jacobs, Cook, and 
Delli Carpini 2009).  Because political persuasion has always been considered a form of 
campaign participation, the role of interpersonal persuasion about political topics in non-
electoral contexts has not received much empirical attention.  To the extent that persuasive 
behavior is a form a discursive participation with weak ties to particular electoral contexts, 
more information about persuasion in non-electoral contexts would be enlightening.  
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Furthermore, the differences in persuasive behavior in local, state, or national contexts 
should be examined.  
Finally, this project has identified a number of resources that are and are not necessary 
for facilitating persuasive behavior.  Specifically, income, education, social connectedness, 
and information are not strongly related to persuasive behavior, but interest, opinionation, 
and internal efficacy do motivate persuasion.  However, the lingering puzzles of an inverse 
race gap and negative relationship with age suggest that persuasion may draw on a set of 
resources or have social motivations that are not yet completely understood.  Further 
attention to both of these questions, along with the continued gender gap, may help to 
determine the particular resources that facilitate persuasive participation.  Understanding 
these resources within a framework of discursive participation may help to move forward in 
practical recommendations on how to improve the state of deliberative democracy in 
America.     
  
 183 
Works Cited 
Atkeson, Lonna Rae. 2003. “Not All Cues Are Created Equal: The Conditional Impact of 
Female Candidates on Political Engagement.” The Journal of Politics 65(04): 1040–61. 
Atkeson, Lonna Rae, and Ronald B. Rapoport. 2003. “The More Things Change the More 
They Stay the Same: Examining Gender Differences in Political Attitude Expression, 
1952–2000.” Public Opinion Quarterly 67: 495–521. 
http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/4/495.short (February 20, 2013). 
Baek, Y. M., M. Wojcieszak, and M. X. Delli Carpini. 2012. “Online versus Face-to-Face 
Deliberation: Who? Why? What? With What Effects?” New Media & Society 14: 363–
83. 
Baybeck, Brady, and Robert Huckfeldt. 2002. “Urban Contexts, Spatially Dispersed 
Networks, and the Diffusion of Political Information.” Political Geography 21(2): 195–
220. 
Biran, Or et al. 2012. “Detecting Influencers in Written Online Conversations.” Proceedings 
of the 2012 Workshop on Language in Social Media: 37–45. 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2390379. 
Blascovich, Jim, Wendy Berry Mendes, Eric Vanman, and Sally Dickerson. 2011. “Social 
Psychophysiology for Social and Personality Psychology.” Book. 
Bond, Robert M. et al. 2012. “A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and 
Political Mobilization.” Nature 489(7415): 295–98. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature11421. 
Boulianne, Shelley. 2009. “Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of 
Research.” Political Communication 26(2): 193–211. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584600902854363 (July 19, 2011). 
Bowler, Shaun, and Gary M Segura. 2012. The Future Is Ours: Minority Politics, POlitical 
Behavior, and the Multiracial Era of American Politics. Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press. 
Burden, Barry C. et al. “How Different Forms of Health Matter to Political Participation.” 
Journal of Politics. 
Burns, Nancy, Kay L. Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. The Private Roots of Public 
Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Campbell, David E. 2008. Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic 
Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Choi, Sujin. 2014. “Flow, Diversity, Form, and Influence of Political Talk in Social-Media-
 184 
Based Public Forums.” Human Communication Research 40(2): 209–37. 
Cirksena, M. Kathryn. 1996. “Sources of Access and Competence in Women’s Political 
Persuading, 1964-1984.” Communication Quarterly 44(2): 227–45. 
Citrin, Jack. 1974. “Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government.” American 
Political Science Review 68(3): 973–88. 
Claggett, William, and Philip H Pollock. 2006. “The Modes of Participation Revisited, 1980-
2004.” Political Research Quarterly 59(4): 593–600. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148061. 
Cook, Fay Lomax, Michael X. Delli Carpini, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2007. “Who 
Deliberates? Discursive Participation in America.” In Deliberation, Participation, and 
Democracy: Can the People Govern?, ed. Shawn W. Rosenberg. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 25–44. 
Craig, Stephen C., Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver. 1990. “Political Efficacy and 
Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items.” Political Behavior 12(3): 289–314. 
Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin 
and the Rise of Scott Walker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Davies, Todd, and Seeta Pena Gangadharan. 2009. Online Deliberation: Design, Research, 
and Practice. eds. Todd Davies and Seeta Pena Gangadharan. Palo Alto, CA: CSLI 
Publications. 
Delli Carpini, Michael X., Fay Lomax Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2004. “Public 
Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the 
Empirical Literature.” Annual Review of Political Science 7(1): 315–44. 
Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. What Americans Know About Politics and 
Why It Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Dillard, James Price. 2004. “The Goals-Plans-Action Model of Interpersonal Influence.” In 
Perspectives on Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining, eds. John S. 
Seiter and Robert H. Gass. Boston, MA: Pearson, 185–206. 
Donovan, Todd. 2007. “A Goal for Reform: Make Elections Worth Stealing.” PS: Political 
Science and Politics 40(04): 681–86. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1049096507071089. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 
Dylko, Ivan B. 2010. “An Examination of Methodological and Theoretical Problems Arising 
from the Use of Political Participation Indexes in Political Communication Research.” 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 22(4): 523–34. 
 185 
Engelbert, Mark, and Peter Carruthers. 2010. “Introspection.” Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science 1(2): 245–53. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 2009. Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics. 
University of Oklahoma Press. 
Fishkin, James S. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Gamson, William A. 1992. Talking Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gareth, James, Daniela Witten, Trevor Hastie, and Robert Tibshirani. 2013. An Introduction 
to Statistical Learning with Applications in R. New York: Springer. Full Text Available 
At: http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~gareth/ISL/ISLR First Printing.pdf. 
Garsten, Bryan. 2006. Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment. Boston, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gass, Robert H., and John S. Seiter. 2004. “Embracing Divergence: A Definitional Analysis 
of Pure and Borderline Cases of Persuasion.” In Perspectives on Persuasion, Social 
Influence, and Compliance Gaining, eds. John S. Seiter and Robert H. Gass. Boston, 
MA: Pearson, 13–30. 
Gastil, John. 2000. By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Representative Democracy Through 
Deliberative Elections. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Gerber, Alan S, Donald P Green, and Christopher W Larimer. 2008. “Social Pressure and 
Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” American Political 
Science Review 102(1): 33–48. 
Gerber, Alan S., Gregory a. Huber, David Doherty, and Conor M. Dowling. 2012. 
“Disagreement and the Avoidance of Political Discussion: Aggregate Relationships and 
Differences across Personality Traits.” American Journal of Political Science 56(4): 
849–74. 
Gil de Zuniga, Homero, Lauren Copeland, and Bruce Bimber. 2014. “Political Consumerism: 
Civic Engagement and the Social Media Connection.” New Media & Society 16(3): 
488–506. http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1461444813487960. 
Gil de Zuniga, Homero, Nakwon Jung, and Sebastian Valenzuela. 2012. “Social Media Use 
for News and Individuals’ Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Political 
Participation.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 17(3): 319–36. 
Glynn, Carroll J, Andrew F Hayes, and James Shanahan. 1997. “Perceived Support for 
ONe’s Opinions and Willingness to Speak Out: A Meta-Analysis of Survey Studies on 
the ‘Spiral of Slience.’” The Public Opinion Quarterly 61(3): 452–63. 
Goldstein, Kenneth M., and Travis N. Ridout. 2002. “The Politics of Participation: 
 186 
Mobilization and Turnout over Time.” Political Behavior 24(1): 3–29. 
Grimmer, Justin. 2015. “We ’re All Social Scientists Now: How Big Data, Machine 
Learning, and Causal Inference Work Together.” PS: Political Science & Politics 48(1): 
80–83. 
Hansen, Susan B. 1997. “Talking About Politics: Gender and Contextual Effects on Political 
Proselytizing.” Journal of Politics 59(1): 73–103. 
Hibbing, Matthew V., Melinda Ritchie, and Mary R. Anderson. 2010. “Personality and 
Political Discussion.” Political Behavior 33(4): 601–24. 
Hogan, Robert E. 1999. “Campaign and Contextual Influences on Voter Participation in State 
Legislative Elections.” American Politics Research 27(4): 403–33. 
Holbrook, Thomas M., and Scott D. McClurg. 2005. “The Mobilization of Core Supporters: 
Campaigns, Turnout, and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential 
Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 689–703. 
Hothorn, Torsten et al. 2006. “Survival Ensembles.” Biostatistics 7(3): 355–73. 
Huckfeldt, Robert. 2014. “Networks, Contexts, and the Combinatorial Dynamics of 
Democratic Politics.” Political Psychology 35(1): 43–68. 
Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson, and John Sprague. 2004. Political Disagreement: The 
Survival of Diverse Opinions within Communication Networks. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1988. “Choice, Social Structure, and Political 
Information: The Information Coercion of Minorities.” American Journal of Political 
Science 32(2): 467–82. 
———. 1991. “Discussant Effects on Vote Choice: Intimacy, Structure, and 
Interdependence.” The Journal of Politics 53(1): 122. 
———. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hyun, Ki Deuk, and Jinhee Kim. 2015. “Differential and Interactive Influences on Political 
Participation by Different Types of News Activities and Political Conversation through 
Social Media.” Computers in Human Behavior 45: 328–34. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.12.031. 
Jacobs, Lawrence R., Fay Lomax Cook, and Michael X. Delli Carpini. 2009. Talking 
Together: Public Deliberation and Political Participation. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Jennings, M Kent, and Laura Stoker. 2004. “Social Trust and Civic Engagement across Time 
 187 
and Generations.” Acta Politica 39(4): 342–79. 
Jennings, M. Kent, and Paul Allen Beck. 1979. “Political Periods and Political Participation.” 
American Political Science Review 73(3): 737–50. 
Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1974. The Political Character of Adolescence: 
The Influence of Families and Schools. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Karpowitz, Christopher F., and Tali Mendelberg. 2014. The Silent Sex: Gender, Deliberation 
& Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Katz, Elihu, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1955. Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in 
the Flow of Mass Communications. New York: The Free Press. 
Keith, Bruce E. et al. 1992. The Myth of the Independent Voter. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Keller, Ed, and Jon Berry. 2003. The Influentials. New York: The Free Press. 
Kim, Joohan, Robert O Wyatt, and Elihu Katz. 1999. “News, Talk, Opinion, Participation: 
The Part Played by Conversation in Deliberative Democracy.” Political Communication 
16(4): 361–85. 
Koch, Nadine S. 1994. “Changing Times? The Effect of The New York Times on College 
Students’ Political Information and Behavior.” The Social Science Journal 31(1): 29–
38. 
Krosnick, Jon A. et al. 1993. “Attitude Strength: One Construct or Many Related 
Constructs?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65(6): 1132–51. 
Krosnick, Jon A., and Michael A. Milburn. 1990. “Psychological Determinants of Political 
Opinionation.” In Thinking About Politics: Comparisons of Experts and Novices, ed. 
Jon A. Krosnick. New York: Guilford, 49–72. 
Krosnick, Jon A., and Richard E. Petty. 1995. “Attitude Strength: An Overview.” In Attitude 
Strength: Antecedents and Consequences, eds. Richard E. Petty and Jon A. Krosnick. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Lake, Ronald La Due, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1998. “Social Capital , Social Networks , and 
Political Participation.” Political Psychology 19(3): 567–84. 
Lizotte, Mary-Kate, and Andrew H. Sidman. 2009. “Explaining the Gender Gap in Political 
Knowledge.” Politics & Gender 5(02): 127. 
Lo, Adeline, Herman Chernoff, Tian Zheng, and Shaw-Hwa Lo. 2015. “Why Significant 
Variables Aren’t Automatically Good Predictors.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 112(45): 13892–97. 
http://www.pnas.org/content/112/45/13892\nhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2650
 188 
4198\nhttp://www.pnas.org/content/112/45/13892.full. 
Lodge, Milton, and Charles S Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lyons, Jeffrey, Anand E. Sokhey, Scott D. McClurg, and Drew Seib. 2016. “Personality, 
Interpersonal Disagreement, and Electoral Information.” The Journal of Politics 78(3): 
806–21. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 1983. Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
———. 1999. “Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System.” In Deliberative Politics: Essays 
on Democracy and Disagreement, ed. Stephen Macedo. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 211–39. 
Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael B. MacKuen. 2000. Affective 
Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
McClurg, Scott D. 2004. “Indirect Mobilization: The Social Consequences of Party Contacts 
in an Election Campaign.” American Politics Research 32(4): 406–43. 
http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1532673X03260581. 
———. 2006. “The Electoral Relevance of Political Talk: Examining Disagreement and 
Expertise Effects in Social Networks on Political Participation.” American Journal of 
Political Science 50(3): 737–54. 
McKenna, Elizabeth, and Hahrie Han. 2014. Groundbreakers: How Obama’s 2.2 Million 
Volunteers Transformed Campaiging in America. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mendelberg, Tali. 2002. “The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence.” In Research in 
Micropolitics: Political Decisionmaking, Deliberation and Participation, eds. Michael 
X. Delli Carpini, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 
151–93. 
Mondak, Jeffery J, and Karen D Halperin. 2008. “A Framework for the Study of Personality 
and Political Behaviour.” British Journal of Political Science 38(2): 335–62. 
Mondak, Jeffery J. et al. 2010. “Personality and Civic Engagement: An Integrative 
Framework for the Study of Trait Effects on Political Behavior.” American Political 
Science Review 104(01): 85. 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055409990359 (June 28, 2011). 
———. 2010. Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Morey, Alyssa C., William P. Eveland, and Myiah J. Hutchens. 2012. “The ‘Who’ Matters: 
Types of Interpersonal Relationships and Avoidance of Political Disagreement.” 
 189 
Political Communication 29(1): 86–103. 
Morrell, M E. 2003. “Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure 
of Internal Political Efficacy.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 67(4): 589–602. 
Muchlinski, David, David Siroky, Jingrui He, and Matthew Kocher. 2016. “Comparing 
Random Forest with Logistic Regression for Predicting Class-Imbalanced Civil War 
Onset Data.” Political Analysis 24(1): 87–103. 
Munson, Ziad W. 2008. The Making of Pro-Life Activists: How Social Movement 
Mobilization Works. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mutz, Diana C. 2002. “The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political 
Participation.” American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 838–55. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3088437 (June 12, 2014). 
———. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2007. “Effects of ‘In-Your-Face’ Television Discourse on Perceptions of a 
Legitimate Opposition.” American Political Science Review 101(04): 621–35. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S000305540707044X (August 25, 2011). 
———. 2008. “Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?” Annual Review of Political 
Science 11(1): 521–38. 
———. 2016. In-Your-Face Politics: The Consequences of Uncivil Media. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Mutz, Diana C., and Byron Reeves. 2005. “The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised 
Incivility on Political Trust.” American Political Science Review 99(1): 1–15. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=290947 
(August 23, 2011). 
Mutz, Diana C., Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody. 1996. “Political Persuasion: The 
Birth of a Field of Study.” In Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, eds. Diana C. 
Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1–14. 
Neblo, Michael A. et al. 2010. “Who Wants To Deliberate—And Why?” American Political 
Science Review 104(03): 566–83. 
Niemi, Richard G., Stephen C. Craig, and Franco Mattei. 1991. “Measuring Internal Political 
Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study.” American Political Science Review 85: 
1407–13. 
Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy D. Wilson. 1977. “Telling More Than We Can Know: 
Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.” Psychological Review 84(3): 231–59. 
 190 
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/84/3/231.pdf. 
Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1974. “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.” 
Journal of Communication 24: 43–51. 
Patterson, Samuel C., and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1983. “Getting out the Vote: Participation in 
Gubernatorial Elections.” The American Political Science Review 77(3): 675–89. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1957267\nhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1957267.pdf?
acceptTC=true. 
Pattie, C. J., and R. J. Johnston. 2009. “Conversation, Disagreement and Political 
Participation.” Political Behavior 31(2): 261–85. 
Perloff, Richard M. 2008. The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the 
21st Century. Third. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Petty, Richard E., and John T. Cacioppo. 1986. Communication and Persuasion: Central and 
Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Roloff, Michael E. 1980. “Self-Awareness and the Persuasion Process: Do We Really Know 
What We’re Doing?” In Persuasion: New Directions in Theory and Research, eds. 
Michael E. Roloff and Gerald R. Miller. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and 
Democracy in America. 2003rd ed. New York: Longman. 
Sanders, L.M. 1997. “Against Deliberation.” Political theory 25(3): 347–76. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/191984 (August 27, 2011). 
Schlozman, Kay L., Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. The Unheavenly Chorus: 
Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Schmitt-Beck, Rudiger, and Oana Lup. 2013. “Seeking the Soul of Democracy: A Review of 
Recent Research into Citizens’ Political Talk Culture.” Swiss Political Science Review 
19(4): 513–38. 
Settle, Jaime E. et al. 2015. “From Posting to Voting: The Effects of Political Competition on 
Online Political Engagement.” Political Science Research and Methods 4(2): 1–18. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S2049847015000011. 
Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Smith, Eliot R., and Frederick D. Miller. 1978. “Limits on Perception of Cognitive 
 191 
Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson.” Psychological Review 85(4): 355–62. 
Smith, Eric R. A. N. 1989. The Unchanging American Voter. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Stoker, Laura, and M. Kent Jennings. 2008. “Political Similarity and Influence between 
Husbands and Wives.” In The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts 
for Political Behavior, ed. Alan Zuckerman. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Stokes-Brown, Atiya Kai, and Melissa Olivia Neal. 2008. “Give ‘Em Something to Talk 
about: The Influence of Female Candidates’ Campaign Issues on Political 
Proselytizing.” Politics & Policy 36(1): 32–59. 
Strobl, Carolin et al. 2008. “Conditional Variable Importance for Random Forests.” BMC 
Bioinformatics 9(307). http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/9/307. 
Strobl, Carolin, Anne-Laure Boulesteix, Achim Zeileis, and Torsten Hothorn. 2007. “Bias in 
Random Forest Variable Importance Measures: Illustrations, Sources and a Solution.” 
BMC bioinformatics 8: 25. 
Sunstein, Cass R. 2001. Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Tate, Katherine. 2004. Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their 
Representatives in the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Testa, Paul F., Matthew V. Hibbing, and Melinda Ritchie. 2014. “Orientations toward 
Conflict and the Conditional Effects of Political Disagreement.” The Journal of Politics 
76(3): 770–85. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9276120&
fileId=S0022381614000255. 
Thorson, Emily. 2014. “Beyond Opinion Leaders: How Attempts to Persuade Foster Political 
Awareness and Campaign Learning.” Communication Research 41(3): 353–74. 
http://crx.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0093650212443824\nhttp://ezproxy.lib.swin.ed
u.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=94614
732&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
Tolbert, Caroline J, and William Franko. 2014. “State Political Participation: Election Law, 
Electoral Competition, and Inequality.” In The Oxford Handbook of State and Local 
Government, ed. Donald P. Haider-Markel. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. 1999. “Politics, Speech, and the Art of Persuasion: Toward an 
Aristotelian Conception of the Public Sphere.” Journal of Politics 61(3): 741–57. 
Valenzuela, Sebastian, Yonghwan Kim, and Homero Gil de Zuniga. 2012. “Social Networks 
That Matter : Exploring the Role of Political Discussion for Online Political 
Participation Sebastia Homero Gil de Zu ´ N.” International Journal of Public Opinion 
Research 24(2): 163–84. 
 192 
Varian, Hal R. 2014. “Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 28(2): 3–28. 
Verba, Sidney, and Norman H. Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy 
and Social Equality. New York: Harper and Row. 
Verba, Sidney, Kay L. Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Walsh, Katherine Cramer. 2004. Talking About Politics: Informal Groups and Social Identity 
in American Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Weatherford, MS. 1982. “Interpersonal Networks and Political Behavior.” American Journal 
of Political Science 26(1): 117–43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2110843 
(October 24, 2013). 
White, Peter. 1980. “Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of 
Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem.” Psychological Review 87(1): 105–12. 
Wojcieszak, Magdalena. 2011. “Deliberation and Attitude Polarization.” Journal of 
Communication 61(4): 596–617. 
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford University Press. 
Young, Joel et al. 2011. “A Microtext Corpus for Persuasion Detection in Dialog.” Analyzing 
Microtext: Papers from the 2011 AAAI Workshop: 80–85. 
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/WS/AAAIW11/paper/download/3896/4336. 
Zukin, Cliff et al. 2006. A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and the 
Changing American Citizen. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
  
 193 
Appendices 
Appendices to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3A: Factor Analysis Variables 
Variable Zukin et al. Wording ANES 2012 Wording % Yes 
Work with others 
to solve a local 
problem 
Have you ever worked together informally 
with someone or some group to solve a 
problem in the community where you live? IF 
YES, Was this in the last 12 months or not? 
During the PAST 12 MONTHS, have 
you worked with other people to deal 
with some issue facing your community? 
28.9 
Volunteer for 
non-political 
organization 
Have you ever spent time participating in any 
community service or volunteer activity, or 
haven’t you had time to do this? By volunteer 
activity, I mean actually working in some way 
to help others for no pay. IF YES, Have you 
done this in the last 12 months? I’m going to 
read a list of different groups that people 
sometimes volunteer for.  As I read each one, 
can you tell me if you have volunteered for 
this type of group or organization within the 
last 12 months?  
Many people say they have less time 
these days to do volunteer work. What 
about you, were you able to devote any 
time to volunteer work in the last 12 
months or did you not do so? 
41.4 
Active 
membership in 
community 
problem-solving 
organizations 
Do you belong to or donate money to any 
groups or associations, either locally or 
nationally? Are you an active member of this 
group/any of these groups, a member but not 
active, or have you given money only? 
How many organizations are you 
currently a member of? 
45.9 
Raise money for 
charity 
[Now I’m going to read you a quick list of 
things that some people have done to express 
their views. For each one I read, please just 
tell me whether you have ever done it or not. 
(FOR EACH YES, PROBE: And have you 
done this in the last 12 months, or not?)] 
Personally walked, ran, or bicycled for a 
charitable cause – this is separate from 
sponsoring or giving money to this type of 
event? 
And have you ever done anything else to help 
raise money for a charitable cause? 
During the past 4 years, have you ever 
given money to a religious organization, 
or have you not done this in the past 4 
years?  
Not counting a religious organization, 
during the past 4 years, have you given 
money to any other organization 
concerned with a political or social 
issue, or have you not done this in the 
past 4 years? 
66.7 
Regularly vote in 
elections 
We know that most people don’t vote in all 
elections. Usually between one-quarter to one-
half of those eligible actually come out to 
vote. Can you tell me how often you vote in 
local and national elections? Always, 
sometimes, rarely, or never? 
In 2008 Barack Obama ran on the 
Democratic ticket against John McCain 
for the Republicans. Do you remember 
for sure whether or not you voted in that 
election? 
77.5 
[Summary measure of pre- and post- 
election self-report of voting in the 2012 
presidential election.] 
74.4 
Persuade others 
how to vote 
When there is an election taking place do you 
generally talk to any people and try to show 
them why they should vote for or against one 
We would like to find out about some of 
the things people do to help a party or a 
candidate win an election. During the 
38.8 
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of the parties or candidates, or not? campaign, did you talk to any people 
and try to show them why they should 
vote for or against one of the parties or 
candidates? 
Display campaign 
buttons, stickers, 
etc. 
Do you wear a campaign button, put a sticker 
on your car, or place a sign in front of your 
house, or aren’t these things you do? 
Did you wear a campaign button, put a 
campaign sticker on your car, or place a 
sign in your window or in front of your 
house? 
15.0 
Contribute money 
to 
Party/Candidate 
In the past 12 months, did you contribute 
money to a candidate, a political party, or any 
organization that supported candidates? 
During an election year people are often 
asked to make a contribution to support 
campaigns. Did you give money to an 
INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE running 
for public office? 
11.7 
Work for 
Party/Candidate 
From volunteering sequence, respondent 
indicated having volunteered for “A political 
organization or candidates running for office” 
Did you do any (other) work for one of 
the parties or candidates? 
3.9 
Contact elected 
official 
[Now I’m going to read you a quick list of 
things that some people have done to express 
their views. For each one I read, please just 
tell me whether you have ever done it or not. 
(FOR EACH YES, PROBE: And have you 
done this in the last 12 months, or not?)] 
Contacted or visited a public official – at any 
level of government – to ask for assistance or 
to express your opinion? 
During the PAST 12 MONTHS, have 
you telephoned, written a letter to, or 
visited a government official to express 
your views on a public issue? 
19.9 
Contact print 
media 
Contacted a newspaper or magazine to express 
your opinion on an issue? 
During the past 4 years, have you 
written a letter to a newspaper or 
magazine about a political issue, or have 
you not done this in the past 4 years? 
4.2 
Call into radio 
talk show 
Called in to a radio or television talk show to 
express your opinion on a political issue, even 
if you did not get on the air?  
During the past 4 years, have you called 
a radio or TV show about a political 
issue, or have you not done this in the 
past 4 years? 
3.1 
Protest Taken part in a protest, march, or 
demonstration? 
Protest 5.9 
Sign a written 
petition 
And have you ever signed a written petition 
about a political or social issue? 
During the past 4 years, have you signed 
a petition on paper about a political or 
social issue, or have you not done this in 
the past 4 years?  
22.8 
[For column 4 only, also includes:] 
During the psat 4 years, have you signed 
a petition on the Internet about a 
political or social issue, or have you not 
done this in the past 4 years? 
34.3 
Boycott NOT bought something because of conditions 
under which the product is made, or because 
you dislike the conduct of the company that 
produces it? 
  
Door-to-door 
canvass 
Have you worked as a canvasser—having 
gone door-to-door for a political or social 
group or candidate? 
  
Attend political 
meeting / rally 
 Did you go to any political meetings, 
rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like 
that in support of a particular candidate? 
5.9 
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Variable Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini Wording ANES 2012 Wording % Yes 
Discuss politics 
with family / 
friends 
How often do you have informal face-to-face 
or phone conversations or exchanges with 
people you know about public issues that are 
local, national, or international concerns? I’m 
talking about exchanges or conversations of 
any length. Would you say you do this every 
day, a few times a week, once a week, a few 
times a month, or less often than this? 
Do you ever discuss politics with your 
family or friends? 
66.5 
Send political 
message via social 
media 
How often do you use e-mail or instant 
messaging to talk INFORMALLY with 
people you know about public issues that are 
local, national, or international concerns. 
Would you say you do this every day, a few 
times a week, once a week, a few times a 
month, or less often than this? 
During the past 4 years, have you ever 
sent a message on Facebook or Twitter 
about a political issue, or have you not 
done this in the past 4 years? 
19.22 
Attend meeting on 
school/community 
issue 
Since the beginning of LAST YEAR – that is 
since January of 2002 – have you attended a 
formal or informal meeting organized by 
yourself, by someone else you know 
personally, or by a religious, social, civic, 
governmental or political group to specifically 
discuss a local, national, or international 
issue—for example, neighborhood crime, 
housing, schools, social security, election 
reform, terrorism, global warming, or any 
other public issue that affects people? 
During the PAST 12 MONHTS, did you 
attend a meeting about an issue facing 
your community or schools? 
23.5 
Persuade Issue People are active in their community and 
express their beleifs in many ways.  I will now 
list some activities that people sometimes take 
part to stay active and to express their beliefs. 
For each, please tell me if you have done it in 
the last year – that is since January of 2002.  
Tried to persuade someone about your view 
on a public issue. 
  
Persuade others 
how to vote 
[…] Tried to persuade someone else about 
whom to vote for in a local, state or national 
election. 
We would like to find out about some of 
the things people do to help a party or a 
candidate win an election. During the 
campaign, did you talk to any people 
and try to show them why they should 
vote for or against one of the parties or 
candidates? 
38.8 
Internet 
Deliberation 
Just thinking about the time since the 
beginning of last year – that is, since January 
2002- have you participated in any 
INTERNET chat rooms, message boards, or 
other online discussion groups organized to 
SPECIFICALLY discuss a local, national, or 
international issue?  
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Appendix 3B: Full Factor Analysis Results 
 Electoral Voting Civic Voice Discursive Uniqueness 
Work for Party / Candidate 0.89 -0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.18 
Attend Political Meeting / Rally 0.84 -0.04 0.15 0.07 -0.12 0.23 
Contribute Money to Party/Candidate 0.55 0.28 -0.07 0.07 0.07 0.40 
Display Campaign buttons, stickers, etc. 0.64 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.50 
Presidential Vote - Most Recent 0.05 0.85 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.25 
Presidential Vote - Prior Election -0.05 0.91 -0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.23 
Work with others to solve a local problem 0.05 -0.07 0.74 0.19 -0.03 0.30 
Active membership in community orgs -0.03 0.08 0.65 0.04 0.07 0.47 
Volunteer for a nonpolitical organization 0.11 -0.07 0.81 -0.17 0.05 0.38 
Raise money for charity -0.02 0.30 0.43 -0.12 0.08 0.64 
Attend meeting on school/community issue 0.07 -0.05 0.70 0.18 -0.05 0.37 
Contact elected official 0.00 0.18 0.24 0.63 -0.08 0.35 
Protest 0.20 -0.16 0.10 0.45 0.20 0.46 
Sign a petition -0.08 0.16 0.08 0.41 0.32 0.48 
Call into radio talk show 0.10 -0.09 -0.08 0.51 0.23 0.55 
Contact print media 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.71 -0.07 0.40 
Persuade others how to vote 0.28 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.49 0.49 
Discuss politics with family / friends 0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.04 0.62 0.49 
Send political message via social media -0.12 -0.14 0.05 0.13 0.66 0.59 
Variance 5.51 3.68 4.82 4.90 4.77  
Proportion 0.50 0.33 0.44 0.44 0.43  
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Appendix 3C: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
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Voted in 2008 1.00 
        
Voted in 2012 0.57 1.00 
       
Displayed Sign / Sticker 0.13 0.13 1.00 
      
Donated Money 0.16 0.15 0.29 1.00 
     
Worked for Campaign 0.07 0.08 0.28 0.31 1.00 
    
Attempted to Persuade 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.19 1.00 
   
Discusses Politics 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.33 1.00 
  
Attend Public Meeting 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.16 1.00 
 
Politics on Social Media 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.13 1.00 
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Appendix 3D: Full Lasso Results 
  Attempts to 
Persuade 
Discursive 
Participation 
Campaign 
Participation 
  Lasso Logit Lasso Logit Lasso Logit 
Political Capital 
      
Ever Discuss Politics .76 .98 (.10) *** 
  
.22 .39 (.12) *** 
Campaign Interest .45 .46 (.07) *** .39 .39 (.08) *** .53 .56 (.08) *** 
News Source: TV .10 .44 (.11) *** .58 .68 (.11) *** 
  
News Source: Internet .00 .23 (.08) ** .69 .67 (.10) *** .23 .38 (.09) *** 
News Source: Newspaper .01 .22 (.08) ** .10 .18 (.10) .15 .33 (.09) *** 
News Source: Radio 
  
.31 .36 (.10) *** .12 .23 (.08) ** 
News Source: Blogs 
  
.03 .19 (.20) .05 .31 (.13) * 
News Source: Social Media 
  
.16 .27 (.11) * 
  
Voted in 2012 Primary .03 .29 (.08) *** 
  
.26 .43 (.08) *** 
Voted in 2012 General 
  
.26 .39 (.14) ** 
  
Registered Voter 
  
-.13 -.37 (.14) * 
  
Efficacy: I Understand Politics .03 .11 (.04) ** .18 .19 (.05) *** .03 .06 (.05) 
Efficacy: Politics (Not) too Complicated 
  
.04 .06 (.04) 
  
Efficacy: No Say in Gov 
  
.06 .10 (.04) * .04 .08 (.04) * 
Who People Vote For Makes a Difference 
  
.14 .18 (.05) *** .00 .04 (.04) 
Political Knowledge 
  
.15 .18 (.04) *** 
  
Individual Traits 
      
Opinionation .11 .25 (.05) *** .35 .37 (.06) *** .01 .09 (.06) 
Education 
  
.02 .03 (.05) 
  
Income 
  
.02 .03 (.01) *** 
  
Black 
  
.11 .31 (.15) * .28 .59 (.11) *** 
Hispanic 
  
-.08 -.11 (.14) 
  
Veteran 
  
-.24 -.42 (.13) ** 
  
Homeowner 
  
-.13 -.31 (.12) ** 
  
Finances Better Over Past Year 
  
-.01 -.06 (.04) 
  
Authoritarian Personality 
  
-.04 -.07 (.04) 
  
Social Norms 
      
Someone Tried to Persuade R .32 .66 (.08) *** .83 .97 (.12) *** 
  
Member of Civic Organization .08 .32 (.08) *** .07 .10 (.10) .34 .53 (.08) *** 
Political Context 
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Voter Mobilization Contact .02 .28 (.08) *** .15 .23 (.10) * .34 .53 (.08) *** 
Campaign Contact .13 .23 (.08) ** .19 .24 (.10) * .60 .73 (.09) *** 
Parties are Different 
  
.47 .48 (.13) *** 
  
Political Attitudes 
      
Strong Preference for Presidential Candidate 
    
.08 .28 (.13) * 
Therm Difference: Pres Candidates (10 pt) .03 .08 (.02) *** .01 .02 (.02) .03 .04 (.02) * 
Therm Difference: Parties (10 pt) .01 .04 (.02) * .01 .01 (.02) .03 .03 (.02) 
Republican 
  
.12 .19 (.12) 
  
Independent 
  
-.01 -.09 (.16) 
  
Strength of Party ID 
    
.01 .08 (.05) 
Care Who Wins Pres Election 
  
.27 .31 (.14) * 
  
Gov Run by Big Interests 
  
.13 .21 (.13) 
  
It Makes a Difference Who Is In Power 
  
.04 .05 (.04) 
  
Journalists Provide Fair Election Coverage 
  
-.03 -.04 (.06) 
  
Should Not Adjust Morality to World 
  
.01 .05 (.04) 
  
Social Trust 
  
.08 .13 (.05) * 
  
Gov Should Use Science to Solve Probs 
  
.02 .06 (.05) .00 .10 (.04) ** 
Feel Emotional When See Flag 
  
.04 .07 (.05) 
  
Government is Wasteful 
  
-.10 -.18 (.10) 
  
Government is Corrupt 
  
-.07 -.13 (.06) * 
  
Satisfied with US Democracy 
  
.04 .10 (.07) 
  
Intercept -2.81 -5.23 (.23) *** -5.37 -6.30 (.57) *** -4.21 -6.56 (.31) *** 
N 
 
3970 
 
3970 
 
3970 
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Appendices to Chapter 5 
 Appendix 5A: Data and Sample Details 
 The post-election re-interview sample is significantly biased towards the politically 
active. For example, 92% of individuals who were re-interviewed reported having voted in 
the election, which is significantly higher than the actual 2008 turnout rate of 57%. 
Additionally, several of the questions that provide important control variables in the analysis 
(such as certainty about the vote choice) were only asked of individuals who reported having 
voted, and who voted for McCain or Obama (not a third-party candidate). Therefore, the 
analysis for the post-election data is limited to only individuals who voted for McCain or 
Obama in the general election. However, it is not expected that this limitation will 
significantly bias the overall analysis. In practical terms, the limitation of the re-interview 
dataset changes the baseline group to whom the persuaders are compared. For the RCS 
models, the persuaders are compared to all other citizens who did not try to persuade; for the 
re-interview models the persuaders are compared to voters who did not try to persuade.86 
Furthermore, 48% percent of voters in the NAES re-interview data report an attempt to 
persuade, which is very comparable to the 50% of voters who reported an attempt to 
persuade in the 2008 wave of the American National Election Studies. This suggests that 
although the overall sample over-represents voters, the voters themselves are not 
significantly more politically involved than expected.   
                                                 
86 96% of persuaders in the re-interview data report having voted, so the composition of 
that group is not significantly affected by removing non-voters from the sample. 
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Appendix 5B: Dependent Variable Question Wording 
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The main difference in question wordings is the temporal boundaries provided to the 
respondent for their persuasive activity. Prior to both the primary and general elections, 
individuals were asked to report attempts to influence the presidential vote of someone else 
in the past week (KB03; KB04).  However, once Clinton conceded the Democratic 
nomination to Obama in early June, half of the respondents were asked to report whether 
they had attempted to influence someone else’s vote during the presidential campaign 
(KB06; KB07). Using a comparison of means test for this split-ballot question wording 
experiment, it is unsurprisingly confirmed that individuals who were asked about the longer 
time frame (the presidential campaign) were more likely to report persuasive efforts than 
those asked only about the past week (mean diff= .118, p=.002). Similarly, for the sample of 
respondents who were re-interviewed, the mean response for the pre-election RCS question 
asking about persuasion in the past week was significantly lower than the mean response for 
the post-election question that asked about the presidential general election campaign (mean 
diff =.176, p=.000). 
Additionally, participation rates of all kinds are usually higher for general elections than 
primary elections, and therefore respondents during the general election (for both the week-
long and campaign-long question wordings) are expected to report more influence attempts 
than respondents during the primary season. A comparison of means for the “past week” 
questions in the primary and general election seasons confirms that reported persuasive 
behavior was slightly more common during the general election (mean diff = .015, p=.038). 
Each of these findings was further confirmed using a basic logistic regression that predicts 
the likelihood of saying “yes” based only on dummy variables for each question wording. All 
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coefficients were statistically significant at the .01 level, and in the expected directions. The 
full results are available in the final column of the question wording table.  
For three days (8/8/08 – 8/10/08) the NAES experimented with an alternate wording 
(KB05) that asked individuals if they “tried to convince anyone” to vote for or against a 
presidential candidate, rather than using the more common wording of whether the 
respondent “talked to any people and tried to show them” why they should vote for or 
against one of the presidential candidates. This was also run as a split-ballot experiment, and 
the comparison of means test shows that individuals asked the “convince” wording were less 
likely to report attempts at influencing someone else’s vote (mean diff = .051, p=.100). 
Responses to this version of the question are not included in any of the reported analysis.  
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Appendix 5C: Independent Variables 
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Appendix 5D: High Rates of Persuasion After the Primary Election 
There are three possible alternative explanations for the high rate of persuasion after 
primary elections: 1) individuals are trying to persuade friends or family who live out of state 
and who have not yet had their election, 2) individuals are already looking forward to the 
general election, and 3) response error leads to over-reporting of persuasive behavior. While 
these are all almost certainly occurring, they are insufficient explanations for why the rate of 
persuasion does not have a significant drop after the state’s primary election is over. As most 
persuasion reportedly occurs in-person, persuasion across state lines is unlikely to account 
for such a high continuation of the behavior after the election. Response error may take the 
form of social desirability pressure to say “yes” even when no persuasion happened, or poor 
recall, especially where the specific time frames are involved. However, there is no reason to 
expect social desirability norms to be stronger after the primary election than before it, so the 
error rate is expected to be roughly equivalent before and after the election. In this case, 
unless social desirability accounts for nearly all “yes” responses in each time period, there is 
still, by comparison, an unexpectedly high degree of persuasion occurring during the post-
primary period. Finally, although some individuals surely get an early start on persuasion for 
the general election, recall that the general election candidates are not yet known at the time 
these individuals are interviewed. And if persuasion were instrumental and responsive to the 
campaign as expected by the campaign participation literature, we would still expect it to be 
significantly higher as things became more competitive near Election Day. 
 
